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Abstract 
WiMAX is a wireless access technology which offers high speed broadband connections and 
provides a wider coverage area. It has inexpensive equipment’s and more importantly it 
brings about an acceptable QoS. Moreover its ease of deployment further nominates it 
among other wireless access networks. Nowadays, WiMAX is considered as one of the most 
common broadband technologies mainly deployed in developing countries. When it comes 
to broadband wireless access, specifically from an end-user’s perspective, security is count-
ed as one of the chief factor’s that basically affects the performance of the WiMAX network 
and its lack or weakness endangers sensitive information’s by leading to unauthorized ac-
cess. WiMAX, like other technologies does have many flaws, security breaches and vulner-
abilities. The preservation of the security within the WiMAX framework in different scenar-
ios and its protection under numerous attacks are the main problems. In addition to this some 
measures can be taken to detect and mitigate the threats in early stages. Therefore this tech-
nology can become even more widespread if its security would be warrantied and meticu-
lous actions would be taken care of. In order to address the security concerns and pave the 
way for a better understanding of the means of detection, mitigation and even fighting back, 
this dissertation is aimed to employ a security-centric research approach to the existing prob-
lems. The key results obtained in this dissertation are targeting the security fundamentals, 
explaining and providing two models for the classification of threats. One is in the case of 
attacks and threats when it comes to WiMAX by taking a hybrid approach with the yard-
sticks of probability of happening and the impact on the system. The other carried-out classi-
fication is in the scenario when VoIP services are offered by WiMAX. Thus the security 
threats together with the attacks posed at the system have been investigated in a WiMAX 
specific manner. The dissertation further provides a comparative analysis and lists the secu-
rity basics of WiMAX, WiFi and LTE. In addition to this it offers some performance inves-
tigation cases of WiMAX in specific scenarios like when the security and number of simul-
taneous users affects the performance of the WiMAX network. This performance devolution 
has been described by the Kiyotaki-Moore model. Moreover, as a countermeasure to the 
threats, an alternative power efficient WiMAX-based intrusion detection system has been 
proposed and especially DoS attack is scrutinized to observe how the IDS works on the 
packets. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Interactive communication between people makes the nature of humanity. Tele-
communication system is comprised of three parts being the transmitter, the 
channel and the receiver. The channel can be either wired with restricted mobility 
or wireless with more mobility freedom. Now the important objective here lies in 
the fact that, how one transmits the information so that the integrity would be pre-
served. The approach which one has to take for protecting the information that is 
being sent, is actually a set of policies and defined rules labeled and regarded as 
“security” measures. Several technologies and data communication networks 
have been developed up until now and some of them were targeted to provide 
high speed broadband access but they struggled more or less when it came to se-
curity issues.   
Worldwide interoperability for microwave access or WiMAX is one of those 
emerging technologies that offers high speed transmission of information. The 
Wireless MAN or IEEE 802.16 that later was named by WiMAX forum as “Wi-
MAX”, operates ubiquitously in associated licensed or non-licensed spectrum 
between 2 and 66 GHz (Roger B. Marks 2006). The role of the WiMAX Forum 
(WiMAX Forum 2009) is to deal with the certification of implementations and 
designing more techniques for networking like mutual authentication and integra-
tion related issues with other wireless technologies.  
In telecommunication field, WiMAX technology became prominent as a result of 
its wide coverage of applications. WiMAX is an access technology such as Giga-
bit Ethernet. On top of that and based on IP protocols one may use any applica-
tions like Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) and Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP). Due to the fact that VoIP services can be provided under the WiMAX 
framework, the means for secure communication and VoIP threats together with 
vulnerabilities will be discussed and analyzed throughout the way.  
WiMAX 802.16 has two layers of protocol stack being the medium access control 
layer together with the physical layer. The medium access control layer is in 
charge of security and connections. The physical layer manages error correction 
and connectivity of the signals together with ranging, bandwidth requests, and 
connection channels. The physical layer is comprised of a set of identical frames 
dispatched through the modulation of radio frequency signals. Moreover, 802.16 
has the required flexibility to support various traffic types in the transport layer 
(C. Ecklund et al. 2002). When it comes to WiMAX, up until now the main em-
phasis was on security in medium access control layer, but the problem is that the 
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provided security is not enough to meet the existing demands of multi-hop cases 
(Kejie Lu et al. 2007). 
The architecture of WiMAX, security of the standard, its security factors and the 
associated attacks and threats will be investigated thoroughly. Furthermore a new 
alternative classification and analysis of WiMAX security attacks would be pro-
vided. Moreover, a carried out comparison with LTE and WiFi has been per-
formed and because of the fact that the security and number of simultaneous users 
naturally affect the performance, this degradation has been described by the Ki-
yotaki-Moore model. In addition to this, as a countermeasure to the threats, an 
alternative energy efficient WiMAX-based intrusion detection system has been 
proposed. 
1.1 Motivations of This Research 
The main motivations of conducting this research topic can be presented as fol-
lows: 
1.1.1 Evolution of the Wireless Access Networks 
Nowadays wireless access networks are very important and play an essential role 
in many aspects of our life. The common systems deployed for voice telephony 
on a global scale like GSM, CDMA2000 and UMTS voice-mode utilize connec-
tion-oriented switching and transmission technology. The newly appearing sys-
tems for video distribution deploy broadcast-specific transmission technology. 
The present generation of mobile Third Generation (3G) wireless access systems 
which provide Internet data services such as CDMA 1xEVDO and UMTS HSPA 
are mainly for applications of file transfer and browsing web (C. Smith 2000). 
The chief differences among these wireless access networks when it comes to 
technical issues are not tangible from consumer’s perspective. In this era it can be 
observed that having access to multiple wireless networks is packed into a single 
integrated mobile customer device (W. H. Lehr et al. 2010). 
The large scale popularity and utilization of IP-based wireless 3G networks may 
imply that wireless architectures are resulting in a convergence of wireless and 
wired network architectures. The reality is that this interpretation is wrong (D. 
Goodman 2011). There is no service provider to say that they intend to offer cor-
porate video or voice broadcast services as an unnecessary application over its IP 
platform. It is not foreseen that usage of fourth generation networks will alter this 
basic dynamic. The fourth generation systems which are emerging and prevalent 
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are WiMAX together with LTE that are an IP-based networks having distin-
guished potentials together with a platform network architecture (Bogineni et al. 
2009). Beside the fact that WiMAX and LTE provide remarkable enhancements 
in spectral efficiency compared to present 3G systems, they further enable in-
creased capabilities per user that will lead to a remarkable growth of demand. A 
meticulous investigation of the balance among technology enhancements and user 
demand growth resulted in the fact that meeting user demand will need an extra 
500 to 1000 MHz of commercial spectrum in the USA by 2020, all below 5 GHz 
(ITU 2006). Taking into account that governments seriously consider their need 
for spectrum increasing, and having observed the challenges of clearing the al-
ready dedicated spectrum, it is not realistic to think that this demand will be 
achieved by new allocations. Therefore one can draw a conclusion that 4G sys-
tems will have capacity limitations like present wireless access networks, thus the 
inefficiencies related to executing all the services over the top of a common plat-
form will keep on not being feasible economically.  This is the outcome which 
commercial providers speculate. For instance, there has been a considerable effort 
to integrate “voice fallback” capability into the WiMAX and LTE standard, mak-
ing the service providers become able for coupling a dedicated voice network like 
a new design more efficient than GSM with their WiMAX or LTE network (S. 
Donegan et al. 2009; W. H. Lehr et al. 2010). In this dissertation WiMAX is the 
center of attention and investigations. 
1.1.2 Security Concepts in Data Networks 
When it comes to security in any type of data networks including wireless data 
access networks, three key issues are required to be addressed: 
• Confidentiality: it is aimed to make sure that one message has not 
been seen by anyone other than the intended receiver. For exam-
ple, the number of a credit card is confidential and its security 
must be preserved when it is transmitted via the Internet. An in-
stance of how confidentiality works can be the data encryption: an 
encrypted message can just be seen in case a key is applied to the 
message that is known by the sender and the receiver like HTTPS-
protocol between workstation and server when buying airline 
tickets from ebookers.com, where HTTPS creates secured tunnel 
end-to-end thus relaxing access networks from this burden. 
• Authentication: when an identity is claimed, authentication is in 
charge of verifying it. For example, when it comes to utilizing a 
bank account, it is critical that just the real owner of the account 
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gain access to it. There are numerous sources which offer authen-
tication. The simplest instance can be username/password-based 
system. 
• Integrity: the completeness of the information should be main-
tained and it has to be free from any deliberate or accidental ma-
nipulations. Integrity is in charge of making sure that data is com-
plete and that it is not changed while sending from sender to re-
ceiver takes place. For example data integrity is aimed to make 
sure that an electronic transference is carried out with the required 
amount of money. An instance of the mechanism for assuring 
about the data integrity can be the digital signature when it comes 
to an email that is an encryption method which ascertains us about 
the message’s author and the fact that its content is intact (Securi-
ty in WiMAX 802.16-2009 network    Albentia Systems 2011). 
1.1.3 Motivations for Research on WiMAX Security 
Security is of great importance in data networks, but it is even more critical in 
wireless networks, and particularly when it comes to WiMAX technology. Some 
of the main reasons are mentioned as follows: 
1- In case of wired networks, it can be difficult to illegally access the 
network as a result of the fact that a physical connection with cable is 
needed. WiMAX is counted among wireless technologies and thus da-
ta are sent by radio waves. 
2- WiMAX is regarded as an outdoor technology capable of delivering 
services for covering large areas. Therefore these large areas are prone 
to an unauthorized access. 
3- WiMAX was not primarily defined to be a Local Area Network 
(LAN) technology. Its initial intended usage was for MAN/WAN net-
works. WiMAX technology is for offering simultaneous services to 
multiple users. Thus, user’s privacy and access privilege should not be 
violated and users must not be authorized to access other users’ infor-
mation. 
4- Like in any other networks, if someone suspicious gets into our net-
work, there are definitely several risks that can be threatening. For ex-
ample, the Internet connection can be utilized without permission, 
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computers and files may be seen or e-mails, passwords, etc. may be 
sniffed. Therefore an absolute control over the network access is an 
essential issue. 
5- It can be agreed that if a wireless unauthorized intrusion is regarded as 
rather dangerous in a private or personal network, it has even worst 
impact when it comes to a governmental, corporative or especially 
when it comes to military deployment that are usual WiMAX scenari-
os. Most essential environments and applications need high security 
alertness and WiMAX must be capable to offer that (Security in Wi-
MAX 802.16-2009 network    Albentia Systems 2011). 
The above-mentioned five motivations are considered adequate from this disserta-
tion’s perspective to select this important topic and strive to carry out more re-
search in the field and try to address these issues respectively.  
1.2 Dissertation Research Problem 
The main research problem of this dissertation can be defined as keeping the se-
curity in the WiMAX framework in various situations and its protection against 
numerous attacks. Other research problems maybe how the detection and mitiga-
tion can take place in order to protect the network in early stages. In order to deal 
with the above-mentioned problems one needs to have a clear classification and 
modeling of the existing threats and to achieve: 
1- The first is to provide a well-investigated anthology of security issues and 
threats existing in WiMAX and by this contribute to a better understanding 
and comprehension of the subject.  
2- The second aim is to study the behavior of this technology in different securi-
ty scenarios.  
3- The third goal was to determine the lacks and shortages when it comes to 
WiMAX and its associated security problems, so that suitable and relevant 
measures could be taken to act against them.  
4- The fourth target of this dissertation has been taking alternative approaches 
and suggesting some ideas to apply in scenarios related with those cases. 
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1.3 Dissertation Research Methodologies 
In this dissertation, a comprehensive theoretic security approach has been provid-
ed in such a way that security is at the center stage of each investigation and dis-
cussion. The theoretic notions are utilized in running comparative sort of analysis. 
The dissertation tries to verify the key findings by scientific judgment and inter-
pretation, running attacks and validation tests. As a result of relying on this ap-
proach, the dissertation can be well comprehended and easy to read. Other aspect 
of the dissertation is the fact that notions and ideas which can be realized but are 
purely based on specific conditions to take place will not be taken into account. 
For instance there are some attacks and threats that can happen in huge networks 
having heavy loads with continental scales like Botnet army attacks which is be-
yond the scope of this dissertation and instead security issues that are based on 
real problems with which WiMAX technology encounters would be discussed.  
1.4 Dissertation Contributions   
Some of the results of this dissertation have been published in 4 IEEE conference 
papers and one journal paper in International Journal of Computer and Communi-
cation Engineering, IASCIT press (M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013). Fur-
thermore, one paper has been submitted to IEEE Transaction journal. More pa-
pers could be submitted later. The contributions of this dissertation can be divided 
into the following three main areas: 
• Proposing new classifications and modeling’s of the security threats and 
attacks in two cases. One is the general attacks against WiMAX and the 
other is the security attacks and threats while offering VoIP services un-
der the framework of the WiMAX network represented in Figure 18. 
• Proposing a comparative analysis of the security basics, components and 
characteristics of next generation networks such as WiMAX, WiFi and 
LTE together with description of their deployment choice  
• Proposing a new alternative WiMAX-specific intrusion detection system 
for the attack detection and prevention with structure explanations and 
functioning mechanism together with verifying its performance and run-
ning DoS attack for result validation and verification using NS2 simula-
tor and Toshiba consumption analyzer. The proposed WiMAX-based in-
trusion detection system which has been presented is also power effi-
cient. The carried out NS2/Toshiba simulations prove this claim. Moreo-
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ver the amount of power savings and thus efficiency obtained are com-
puted as well. The topic is covered in chapter 4 and chapter 6. 
- The impact of the classification and modeling on security threat mitigation 
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is its emphasis on the advanced 
classification of the security attacks and threats together with labeling them ac-
cording to the risk they impose and the likelihood of their happening. In the tech-
nical literature, security analysis has mainly concentrated on the attacks which 
have been performed to challenge the system and therefore in some cases ignor-
ing the possible impact of having an integrated comprehensive attack anthology 
for grouping the threats. Handling the security problems of a system requires 
great focus and attention.  It is very important to analyze the threats and based on 
its characteristics choose the relevant countermeasure. Some attacks are similar in 
their essence and there is the possibility of taking similar actions to deal with 
them. As shown in this dissertation, it will be demonstrated how classification and 
modeling the security threats and attacks contributes to a better detection, protec-
tion and mitigation. This dissertation illustrates the importance of classifications 
in detection and mitigation by showing how significantly the security and thus the 
performance will decrease if the breaches and threats are not detected in early 
stages. Threat detection can be carried out utilizing some algorithms as shown in 
this dissertation thus drastically increasing the level of protection. Investigation of 
the security threats in some scenarios are included into this dissertation. Also, the 
behavior of the attacks are studied down the process after the classification and 
the risks are given attention.  
- The role of comparative analysis in better protecting the next generation 
networks 
This dissertation presents the extent of usefulness of comparative analysis when it 
comes to next generation networks. It is critical to understand that while going 
down the process there is a matter of options implying what technology to choose 
for better meeting the requirements of the end-user or the operator. Therefore by 
listing the security basics and properties of WiMAX, WiFi and LTE it is clarified 
which technology is superior having considered the background and goals of us-
age. The architectural aspects together with differences when it comes to dealing 
with security issues are discussed as well. It is foreseen that by summing up the 
most important characteristics of each technology a far better judgment can be 
deployed to deal with these 4G technologies     
- Proposed IDS technique to detect and treat the threats  
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A new technique has been proposed according to the previous available literature 
(B. Zhou 2011) to detect and deal with the security threats in order to maintain a 
high level of security and performance. The technique and the know-how of its 
functioning is introduced and analyzed. In addition to this some analysis and sim-
ulations have been done by the aid of NS2 simulator and Toshiba consumption 
analyzer to asses and demonstrate its performance. One attack like DoS is also 
simulated to demonstrate how the proposed system functions. 
1.5 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter one contains the introductory descriptions and research motivations. 
Chapter two offers the details of the architecture of WiMAX together with Wi-
MAX security elements and comparisons between other wireless access networks 
such as WiFi and LTE. Chapter three provides the literature review of the most 
recent available research findings. Chapter four describes the security of the Wi-
MAX standard and at the end of this chapter LTE security problems together with 
their solutions are discussed as well. Chapter five and six both discuss the contri-
butions and the details of published scientific papers. In these chapters the applied 
ideas of the author together with the papers will be demonstrated. Finally, chapter 
seven comprises dissertation results, their usage and conclusions followed by a 
proposed future works. 
1.6 Original Publications 
I. M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan, M. Elmusrati, R. Virrankoski, E. Antila “Security 
Centric Comparative Study of WiMAX and LTE” The IEEE Vehicular Technol-
ogy Society, Asia Pacific Wireless Communications Symposium (APWCS),  
Seoul, South Korea, 2013 
In this research work, the differences between emerging technologies being Wi-
MAX and LTE are investigated from the security perspective. The security focus 
analyses various aspects of the technologies from structures to mechanisms and 
protocols together with discussions from technical viewpoints. Finally it con-
cludes with an overall look over each one’s advantages and disadvantages. The 
content has been mainly included in 2.1.2 section page 15 and 4.7 in page 93.  
II. M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan, M. Elmusrati “Hybrid Security Classification Ap-
proach to Attacks in WiMAX” IEEE International Conference on Signal Pro-
cessing, Computing and Control (ISPCC), Shimla, India, 2013 
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In this research work, concentration has been on the detailed classification of the 
security attacks and threats together with labeling them based on an hybrid ap-
proach being the risk they impose and the likelihood of their happening. The clas-
sifications are integrated and reduced to four groups and each threat is investigat-
ed throughly. It is covered in chapter 4 page 52 and chapter 5 page 101. 
III. M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan, M. Elmusrati “WiMAX-Based Energy Efficient 
Intrusion Detection System” IEEE International Conference on Robotics, Biomi-
metics, & Intelligent Computational Systems (ROBIONETICS), Yogiakarta, In-
donesia, 2013 
In this research work, a novel IDS technique has been proposed according to the 
previous literature to detect and deal with the security threats for maintaining a 
robust security level and performance within WiMAX. The technique and the 
know-how of its functioning is introduced and analyzed. Moreover  some investi-
gations and simulations have been performed through NS2 simulator and Toshiba 
consumption analyzer to test and approve its performance. It is explained in chap-
ter 4 and 6. 
IV. M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan, M. Elmusrati “Kiyotaki-Moore Approach to Per-
formance Devolution in Mobile WiMAX” IEEE 5th International Congress on 
Ultra-Modern Telecommunications and Control Systems (ICUMT), Almaty, Ka-
zakhstan, 2013 
In this research work, it is proved that within 802.16, the security and number of 
simultaneous users affect the performance of the WiMAX network. This perfor-
mance devolution and behavior of the system has been described by an economic 
theory the Kiyotaki-Moore model. The topic is covered in chapter 6, page 122. 
V. M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan, M. Elmusrati, and H. Mohammadi, ("Secure 
Communication and VoIP Threats in Next Generation Networks"), International 
Journal of Computer and Communication Engineering vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 630-634, 
IASCIT Press, 2013 
This research work discusses and classifies the attacks in case of VoIP services in 
wireless access and WiMAX-specific situation proposing a new model in Figure 
18. It explains all the attacks and briefly describes them in each case. The topic 
has been covered in chapter 5, page 101. 
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2. ARCHITECTURE AND SECURITY COMPONENTS 
OF 802.16 
2.1 Wireless Access Networks and WiMAX 
When wireless data connections are utilized for connecting network nodes then 
that computer network can be regarded as a wireless access network. Nowadays 
wireless networking is an alternative way that telecommunications networks, 
business setups and homes deploy in order not to go through the process of cable 
installations in buildings that also requires spending a lot of money (Wireless 
overview 2008). Today radio communications are utilized to implement and man-
age wireless telecommunications networks. The physical layer of the OSI model 
is where the implementation occurs (Zimmerman 1980). Some instances of wire-
less networks among others are Wi-Fi local networks, cell phone and terrestrial 
microwave networks. In our era there are many ways for establishing a connec-
tion to the Internet. One way is the wireless Internet service which offers Internet 
access to customers without requiring any fiber, copper cables or any other net-
work cabling. Wireless technology provides more mobility and convenience to 
computer networks if one compares it with cable internet and other wired services 
like DSL. Different common kinds of wireless Internet services available are de-
scribed as follows: 
Public WiFi Networks 
Wi-Fi technology has been utilized in various municipalities for providing public 
wireless access services. Mesh networks are canonic points where several wire-
less access points (AP) come together to cover larger areas. In addition to this 
WiFi hotspots are offering public wireless Internet service in some locations too. 
Among providers of wireless Internet service WiFi is considered a low-cost op-
tion. Its related equipment is cheap and WiFi hotspots are free in some locations. 
Since availability is counted among key issues in WiFi as one cannot find public 
WiFi access in most rural and suburban areas. There is another form of wireless 
access regarded as Super WiFi which is different from WiFi. It is also famous as 
white spaces technology. Super WiFi performs over another part of the wireless 
spectrum and uses different radio spectrum than WiFi. White spaces technology 
has not been utilized widely and is expected not to become a popular choice of 
wireless. 
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Satellite Access 
Satellite access came up for the first time in 1994 and became the first main-
stream consumer wireless access service. Initially satellite access was taking 
place just for downloading information and thus it was a one-way operation. Us-
ers required to setup a dialup modem and utilize a telephone line associated with 
the satellite to get the system working and gain satellite access. Later on novel 
forms of satellite service came up and offered two-way connectivity as well. 
When it comes to wireless Internet service, satellite has the advantage of availa-
bility. By simply having a small dish antenna, a modem and subscription plan, 
this system of access performs acceptable even in rural zones where no other 
technologies are within reach. It should be also mentioned that satellite’s setback 
is that it provides comparably low performing wireless Internet. This is because 
satellite is affected by high rate of latency in connections as result of the fact that 
far away distances should be traveled by signals among the orbiting stations and 
earth. Satellite also offers a nearly modest network bandwidth. 
Fixed Wireless Broadband 
WiFi hotspots or satellite access are different from fixed wireless broadband. 
Fixed wireless is a kind of broadband which deploys mounted antennas directed 
toward the towers of radio transmission. 
Mobile Broadband 
 It is known that cell phones have been used for decades but it should be high-
lighted that just since the last 15 years the cellular networks have become able to 
offer wireless Internet service. Therefore by the aid of an already installed cellular 
network adapter, or plugging a cell phone to a laptop computer, one can keep on 
having Internet connectivity until when it resides within cell tower coverage. It 
should be mentioned that previous cellular communication protocols in the past 
years did permit networking but with a low speed. Third generation cell technolo-
gies such as UMTS and EV-DO bring about delivering network speeds much 
closer to DSL. Nowadays cellular providers and their access subscription plans 
are sold mainly separate from their voice related network contracts. WiMAX is 
considered being among new types of wireless access networks. It deploys base 
stations like in case of cellular networks, but the difference is that WiMAX is 
defined particularly to offer services and data access rather than voice phone 
communications. It is expected that as WiMAX becomes more widely used, it can 
provide roaming capability and offers a much better performance networking ex-
perience compared to satellite and it costs cheaper as well (B. Mitchell About 
Technology, 2012). 
12      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
2.1.1 WiMAX versus WiFi 
In addition to the mentioned issues, WiMAX has many advantages over WiFi 
which is another wireless access technology. Chief differences are listed as fol-
lows: 
- Coverage: The WiMAX base station can offer coverage for as many as hundreds 
of users simultaneously together with administration of the transmission and re-
ception of data at very high rates preserving network security whereas WiFi is 
restricted in terms of offering services and its coverage range is limited (O. Kharif 
2003;Free WiMAX info 2012). 
- High Speed: The quick connectivity speed over remote distances and offering 
high speed voice makes it more ideal in all areas including scattered populated 
and residential zones as well whereas WiFi cannot compete with WiMAX in this 
respect (T. Willson 2008). 
- Multi-functionality: WiMAX carries out a wide range of applications simultane-
ously like offering quick speed internet, video streaming, telephone service and 
voice applications among others. 
- Development and potentials: WiMAX has been a remarkable technology count-
ed among the next generation networks because it has adequate potential for de-
veloping and ability to provide diverse services to users. One is able to establish a 
connection to Internet anywhere and browse any site and experience online con-
ferencing with mobile Internet. 
- Keep being in contact with the user: WiMAX network makes it possible to stay 
in contact with your friends deploying same WiMAX network as a result of the 
fact that it offers absolute communication service to the end users for seamless 
communications to be fulfilled. 
- Infrastructure: The 802.16 infrastructure is very easy to work with and flexible 
at the same time thus it offers maximum reliability of network. 
- Cheap network: Today WiMAX is a famous wireless network due to offering a 
low cost network replacement alternative for Internet services provided by local 
area network or ADSL. 
- Rich features: WiMAX is indeed providing rich features that makes it even 
more demanding and practical. WiMAX comes up with dedicated voice and data 
channel for fun. Moreover it brings about fast connectively, freedom of move-
ment and license spectrum among many others.  
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- Smart antenna and mesh topology: The smart antenna utilization in 802.16 net-
work providing high quality widest array that enables one to make possible com-
munication on far routes without any ciphering. It provides 2.3, 2.7, 3.3 and 3.8 
GHz frequency ranges. The deployment of mesh topology in 802.16 network for 
the expansion is an extensive spectrum of antennas for residential and commercial 
users (Free WiMAX Info 2012).  
- Ultra wide band: the unique infrastructure of WiMAX is providing Ultra-
Wideband. Its design is offering range from 2 to 10 GHz and with an acceptable 
time response. 
- Homeland security: when it comes to security, WiMAX also provides high secu-
rity due to utilization of AES-based encryption systems. Thus one can transmit 
data throughout the network without having preoccupations (Free WiMAX Info 
2012). 
Here a brief analysis is carried out on WiMAX and WiFi to justify why WiMAX 
has been chosen from a security perspective:  
1) Authentication: when it comes to authentication in WiMAX, it should be high-
lighted that due to using X.509 certificates and the digital signatures, it is indeed 
reliable. The authentication mechanism defines every user that is striving to enter 
the cell and also the dynamic keys that alter regularly together with the automatic 
re-authentication requests in the BS. These certificates cannot not be forged and 
provide protection against any unauthorized body from entering the WiMAX cell. 
Utilizing WEP encryption/authentication technology which deploys static keys 
has lead into an unfortunate security setback in WiFi, since it has become remark-
ably susceptible. Today any network deploying this system is prone to various 
kinds of cracking attacks. Even though WPA and WPA2 have addressed and set-
tled the problems of the WEP mechanism, WiFi equipment should be rather mod-
ern to deploy them, thus older network equipment can just rely on WEP.  
 
2) Encryption: it is to be highlighted that WiMAX utilizes basic block ciphers: 
AES and DES. It is the the way of selecting, transposition and association of the 
blocks in a message that determine the complexity of the algorithms. WiMAX 
deploys CBC (AES), CBC (DES), CCM (AES) and CTR (AES). For these meth-
ods, it is not the matter of being  superior technologically compared with WiFi’s, 
but that they are deployed correctly, for instance they utilize dynamic keys that 
expire after a time to live and are renewed automatically, without repeating ini-
tialization vectors, encrypting every SS’s service flow independently, etc... . WEP 
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and WPA in WiFi have demonstrated to have security breaches when it comes to 
encryption, and just in case WPA2 is used then they can offer encryptions as 
strong as WiMAX. 
 
3) Medium Access: the technology plays an important role and affects the securi-
ty to a large extent. WiMAX offers a deterministic Medium Access that is perma-
nently supervised by the base station. One can observe that when it comes to 
WiMAX, no station can send even a single bit if it has not been permitted before 
by the base station, thus the radio spectrum is supervised automatically and vari-
ous types of attacks are prevented. Other wireless access technologies such as 
WiFi and its MAC layer that is CSMA/CA-based, utilize unsupervised and ran-
dom Medium Access that results in a situation that any user floods the air with 
traffic, when it is not registered in the Access Point (AP). This causes these net-
works to be more susceptible to various Denial of Service intrusions. 
4) Operator technology: WiMAX was not defined and intended to be used as a 
LAN technology, it has been invented to be an operator technology for WAN or 
MAN (Wide-Area, Metropolitan) networks. This means service to multiple inde-
pendent users, wide coverage areas … and thus the WiMAX standard developers 
were alert regarding the security of this technology. WiFi differs a lot as a tech-
nology and has been designed for other usages: it is particularly designed for 
small local networks, so it was “born with lacks” when it comes to security as-
pects. WiFi is an affordable and cost-saving technology for the people around the 
globe. WiFi obviously has several advantages but it introduces some risks too, for 
instance when the number of users increase, it is normal to expect that more in-
truders and hackers will pop-up. If one searches the hacker communities, those 
who did focus on WiFi networks are a lot and even several programs are written 
to break into WiFi, whereas WiMAX has proved to be well-armed against exist-
ing threats. 
5) Additional security not needed: security breaches and lacks when it comes to 
other technologies may be addressed by deploying extra equipment and servers or 
high level security protocols: Kerberos, Radius, EAP, PAP(LDAP), … It is clear 
that these “external” elements undoubtedly boost the security but cause additional 
costs and need extra equipments. If like WiMAX, many security mechanisms are 
already integrated into the technology, then it will be more feasabile to use a se-
cure network without needing other methods (Security in WiMAX 802.16-2009 
network    Albentia Systems 2011). 
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2.1.2 WiMAX versus LTE 
WiMAX or Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access is a wireless tech-
nology regarded as the IEEE 802.16 standard. The main aim for IEEE 802.16 
standard is to offer broadband wireless access. WiMAX brings about some re-
markable features like scalability, mobility, high data rates, quality of service and 
security.  
Long-term evolution or LTE, is a rapid growing fourth generation standard for 
wireless communication, when it comes to mobile phones. In this dissertation we 
are going to come up with a comparative perspective to the security problem in 
both technologies and analyze their security architecture and features to determine 
their advantages and disadvantages. All the investigations are security-based. This 
research work can pave the way for a better understanding and having a more 
accurate picture of these two forth generation technologies and their differences. 
Such a comparative insight meticulously addresses the notion of technology ap-
plication and usage.  
This further clarifies the essential selection of the technology considering the re-
quirements and existing infrastructure. It can be confirmed that by having a spe-
cialized look into the matter one can decide that for an intended network which 
technology is better to be deployed. Also the implementation itself does have 
complexities for each of the two technologies. This research addresses to make 
the selection easier by providing a comparative investigation of both LTE and 
WiMAX from a security point of view.  
The security and architecture of the next generation networks have been the sub-
ject of many research projects and academic articles. WiMAX and LTE are 
among the most emergent wireless technologies belonging to the 4-G family. Due 
to this fact, indeed the investigation and comparative comparison of these two 
technologies from a security perspective becomes important. Therefore, the au-
thors have addressed and carried out this comparative research and have high-
lighted the differences and similarities. So this would provide a precise insight 
which aids in a better understanding of the subject. 
The WiMAX designs a multipurpose network that provides services within wide 
ranges. The Security of WiMAX is predefined in the Privacy Sublayer of the Ref-
erence Model. Below, some critical factors of the IEEE 802.16 Security Architec-
ture are presented (S. Wattanachai 2006): 
Authorization SAs comprises the following attributes: 
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• X.509 certificates. These digital certificates permit WiMAX communication 
factors to validate each other. The certificates are signed by the device manufac-
turer. 
• Authorization key (AK). AKs are means for authenticating among BSs and MSs 
before the traffic encryption key (TEK). The authorization SA comprises an iden-
tifier and a key value for each and every AK. 
• Key encryption key (KEK). The KEK is for encrypting the TEKs during the 
TEK exchange. 
• Message authentication keys. It checks the authenticity of key messages while 
establishing the keys. These keys are deployed to sign management messages to 
validate message authenticity as well. 
• Authorized data SA list. Given to the SS/MS by the BS, the authorized data SA 
list demonstrates that data encryption SAs the SS/MS is authorized to access. Da-
ta SAs establish the parameters deployed to protect unicast data messages among 
BSs and SSs/MSs. A data SA comprises the following security attributes: 
• SA identifier (SAID). It is a unique 16-bit value that signifies the SA to recog-
nize it from other 
SAs. 
• Traffic encryption key (TEK). TEKs are generated by the BS and are deployed 
to encrypt WiMAX data messages. For preventing the communications disruption 
during TEK rekeying procedure Two TEKs are generated. 
• Data encryption SA type detector. This detector signifies the type of data SA. 
There are three types:  
- Primary SA. This SA is defined as a unique connection for each and every 
SS upon initialization with the BS. 
- Static SA: This SA secures the data messages and is generated for each 
service defined by the BS.  
- Dynamic SA: This SA is created and eliminated in reflection to the initia-
tion and termination of some service flows. 
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Group SAs includes the keying material for securing multicast traffic. Key mate-
rial has restricted validity duration and is controlled by the BS. The BS informs 
the SS just after delivering key material. The SS’s is in charge of requesting new 
key material within the validity duration. However, the entire authentication pro-
cedure has not to be performed. 
Encapsulation Protocol 
The Encapsulation Protocol provides the possibility for the data encryption 
among BS and SS. For this aim, it establishes the cryptographic packages that are 
cryptographic identifiers specifying authentication mechanism supported by the 
SS. A complete packet-like set of sequential cryptographic remedies are forward-
ed to the BS. The set comprises the encryption of data or the algorithm of authen-
tication and encryption for the TEK (D. Johnson et al. 2004). 
PKM Protocol 
Privacy Key Management Protocol (PKM) is in charge of routine SS authoriza-
tion, re-authorization and reception or renewal of key material. It is exactly simi-
lar to a typical client and server-model where the SS asks for key material from 
the BS that plays the role of a PKM server. By means of this mechanism, both 
client and SS just receive key material that is in line with their requirements. The 
architecture of LTE is categorized into five parts: 1- access security, 2- domain 
security, 3- user domain security, 4- application domain security, 5- discernibility 
of the security services. The LTE security architecture is presented in Figure 1. 
Compared with the security architecture of UMTS network, the differences are 
presented below: First of all, two-headed arrows are added between ME (Mobile 
Equipment) and SN (Service Network), which demonstrates that there are non-
access-layer security between ME and SN too; Secondly, bi-directional arrow is 
added between AN and SN highlighting that security communication is desired 
between AN and SN; Thirdly, the notion of service network certification is inject-
ed, therefore one-way arrow has been replaced by a two-headed arrow among HE 
and SN; 
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Figure 1. LTE Security Architecture (L. Zhu et al. 2012) 
LTE determines a novel layering of security and the enforcement of a clearer sep-
aration of control plane security and user plane security offering strong security 
features. LTE has support for UMTS Encryption Algorithm 1 (UEA1), UMTS 
Integrity Algorithm 1 (UIA1) and their respective second versions UEA2 (SNOW 
algorithm supporting 256 bits keys) and UIA2. Signaling at User Plane Entity 
(UPE) and Mobility Management Entity (MME) relocation permits the transfer of 
algorithm information to the target UPE, MME and User Equipment (UE) (Erics-
son, S3-060705 2006). WiMAX has a powerful encryption mechanism, deploying 
Advanced Encryption Standard. It also embodies key management protocol and 
support for privacy issues. The system has an authentication architecture that is in 
accordance with Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), which permits a vari-
ety of security issues, like username or password, smart cards and digital certifi-
cates (Tutorials Point, WiMAX Silent Features 2010). 
When it comes to issues about security both LTE and WiMAX have similar func-
tions but are not identical. LTE and WiMAX have mechanisms together with pro-
tocols for making sure that the connections are safe. One can draw a conclusion 
that LTE is better than the WiMAX when the main focus is technology due to 
being new and up-to-date. LTE appeared after WiMAX, thus some telecommuni-
cation firms already invested in WiMAX and offered commercial services. There-
fore for some companies the process of transferring from WiMAX toward LTE 
does not seem financially feasible as a result of already focusing on WiMAX. As 
both WiMAX and LTE systems have similar technical profiles, the choice of the 
next generation technology hinges on the timeline benefit of the technology and 
the service provider’s legacy platform.   
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2.2 The WiMAX protocol 
The WiMAX broadband wireless access (BWA) standard can be explained ac-
cording to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model that is often regarded 
as the OSI seven layer model (Zimmerman et al. 1980). It starts from the Applica-
tion Layer and finishes with the Physical Layer. Each protocol in line and in ac-
cordance with the role which plays, is assigned to various layers; it is so that the 
higher layers of this model benefit from services of their lower layers. As a de-
fined and well-organized model the work is designed such that the lowest layers 
are concentrated on hardware aspects and the higher layers on software ones (M. 
Hossain 2008). It is important to mention that, as it can be seen in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Seven layers of the OSI model (ITU-T X-Series Recommendations 
1993) and WiMAX protocol layer architecture 
For WiMAX just the Physical layer and Data Link layer are valid. Data link layer 
is comprised of Logical Link Control (LLC) and Medium Access Layer. Figure 3 
demonstrates the critical functional factors of 802.16 network architecture, chief-
ly, the Mobile Station (MS)/Subscriber Station (SS), Connectivity Service Net-
work (CSN) together with the Access Service Network (ASN) (WiMAX Forum 
2006; J. G. Andrews et al. 2007). The first two belong to Network Access Provid-
er (NAP) but the final one remaining is belonging to Network Service Provider. 
Due to the fact that the architecture has basically altered following the WiMAX 
standard’s evolution, here the concentration is mainly on the model that corre-
sponds to the eventual emerging standard being the mobile WiMAX. Basically 
MS refers to the device which the user utilizes to connect to the internet/network. 
20      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
In fact, this maybe a mobile station capable of supporting several hosts. The us-
er’s 802.16 access network is actually represented by the ASN. Its role is offering 
a defined interface among the MS and the CSN. It is made of many Base Stations 
(BS) and a certain number of ASN gateways. The ASN actually manages the 
available radio resources. It performs several things like controlling the handover, 
establishing the layer-two connectivity, interactions with surrounding ASNs. 
They also perform the relaying among the MS and the CSN to make the connec-
tion possible for location controlling and paging within the IP layer. The BS de-
vice offers an interface among the MS and the corresponding WiMAX network. 
 
Figure 3. The WiMAX Network Architecture (S. Rekhis et al. 2010) 
The ASN-GW is basically a canonic point where the corresponding LLC traffic 
sums up there within the ASN. It covers areas like mobility management and 
connections, DHCP relaying, authentication of clients to see whether they are 
authorized, the AAA mechanism, user associated issues, administration of service 
flow along many others. Sometimes the ASN-GW applies the notion of Foreign 
Agent (FA) within the internet protocol version 2 that offers the connection pos-
sibility to users which check the network together with saving the data regarding 
those (J. G. Andrews et al. 2007). The AAA user within ASN-GW gathers the 
data associated with the flow entitling the density of bits received /dispatched. 
The CSN plays the role of a heart in the network’s body of WiMAX and is in 
charge of transporting, switching and authentication related complexities. It also 
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controls and balances the related admission procedure and prepares the billing. 
The CSN is the associated host to the AAA and DHCP servers, the home agent 
and also voice over IP gateways (J. G. Andrews et al. 2007). Two different func-
tional entities are connected and associated by a group of references which define 
the links. The initial reference, denoted as R1, associates the mobile station with 
the base station. It basically demonstrates the defined radio interface within the 
medium access control sublayer and physical layer together with executing the 
standard. The R2 is regarded as the second reference that is an interface which is 
situated among CSN or ASN-GW and MS. 
Further on R2 is related to the authentication/authorization. R2 is deployed for 
mobility/service administration or administration of IP host configuration. The R3 
represents the interface among the CSN and ASN. It aids the processes of authen-
tication/authorization, mobility administration together with policies among the 
CSN and ASN.  
The R3 is also in charge of applying a tunnel among the CSN and ASN. The R4 
interface locates among 2 ASNs to makes sure that by the time a MS displaces 
among them, the interworking of ASN remains seamless and functions as ex-
pected. The R5 indicates an interface among 2 CSNs which is deployed for inter-
net access among a viewed network service provider and home. This interface 
also does activities like roaming. 
2.3 The WiMAX Physical Layer  
Physical Layer also settles and categorizes the type of deployed signals, the 
transmission power and modulations thoroughly. The WiMAX has set the fre-
quency band of 2-66 GHz. The first part begins from 2 and stops at 11 GHz and is 
intended for NLOS transmissions. This was previously the 802.16a standard and 
the current sole range included in WiMAX. The second range is 11-66 GHz and 
was defined for LOS transmissions. This range is not deployed for WiMAX 
(Loutfi Nuaymi 2007; M. Hossain 2008). 
The IEEE 802.16 standards came up with five PHY layers so that all of them can 
be deployed with the media access control (MAC) layer. The PHY layers defined 
in IEEE 802.16 are as follows: 
• WirelessMAN SC: a single-carrier PHY layer. It is set for frequencies beyond 
11GHz which need a LOS condition.  
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• WirelessMAN SCa: a single-carrier PHY for frequencies existing 2GHz-11GHz 
for point-to-multipoint operations.  
• WirelessMAN OFDM: This PHY layer has been accepted by WiMAX for fixed 
operations and is regarded as fixed WiMAX. It is a 256-point FFT-based OFDM 
PHY layer for point-to-multipoint operations in non-LOS cases between frequen-
cies 2GHz -11GHz.  
• WirelessMAN OFDMA, a 2,048-point FFT-based OFDMA PHY for point-to-
multipoint  operations in NLOS cases between frequencies 2GHz - 11GHz. 
•  Wireless High-speed Unlicensed Metropolitan Area Network that is for license 
exempt band and for frequencies less than 11 GHz. WirelessHUMAN just uses 
TDD for duplexing (IEEE 802.16-2004, “IEEE Standard for Local and Metropoli-
tan Area Networks). 
It is important to notice that WiMAX just recognizes and works with OFDM and 
OFDMA PHYsical Layers of 802.16 standard (Loutfi Nuaymi 2007). 
 
Figure 4. WiMAX PHY scheme (Jeffrey G. Andrews et al. 2007:273) 
Figure 4 demonstrates the functional scheme of WiMAX PHY layer. One can 
first observe the functional units in charge of performing the forward error correc-
tion (FEC), channel encoding, interleaving, and symbol mapping. Furthermore, 
functional units are dealing with the construction of the OFDM symbol. The final 
functional units are working to convert the OFDM symbol from the frequency to 
the time domain to put it in the ideal analog form transmittable over the air. 
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2.4 The Media Access Control (MAC) Layer    
The WiMAX MAC is intended to provide a bedrock for very speedy data rates 
and in the same time it is intended to offer a high level of quality of service. The 
WiMAX MAC deploys a variable-length MPDU and paves the way for more 
flexibility resulting to better transmissions. 
 
The MAC layer has three sublayers, the CS (Convergence Sublayer), the CPS 
(Common Part Sublayer) and the Security Sublayer. Among the characteristics of 
MAC is being connection oriented and having 16-bit connection identifiers 
(CIDs). As a result of having associations together, several UL and DL channels 
are distinguished by a CID. The role of SSs is to verify the CIDs, and opt for 
those PDUs addressed to them. The MAC PDU can be described as a data unit 
being exchanged among the BS’s and its SS’s MAC layers. The MAC layer of 
WiMAX protocol is demonstrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. MAC Layer of 802.16 protocol (David Johnson et al. 2004) 
2.4.1 Convergence Sublayer (CS)  
The Convergence Sublayer (CS) is the top sublayer of the MAC Layer. The CS 
accepts higher-layer PDUs from upper layers and sends them to the MAC CPS. 
The CS is in charge of the optional Payload Header Suppression (PHS), which is 
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the process of suppressing repetitive payload parts of the headers at the sender 
and restoring them at receiver. In addition to this, the CS categorizes and maps 
the MAC service data units into relevant Connection Identifiers (CIDs). 
2.4.2 MAC Common Part Sublayer (MAC CPS) 
The Common Part Sublayer (CPS) is located in the middle of the MAC layer. It is 
in charge of the functions like bandwidth allocation and bilateral connection ini-
tialization and maintenance. 
According to the 802.16-2004 version of the standard, during the connection ini-
tialization, management messages are being transferred between SSs and BSs. By 
the time the connection initialization takes places, the transfer messages can be 
sent to allow the data transmission. The CPS gets data from several CSs. When it 
comes to the PHY Layer, QoS is defined to evaluate the transmission. One of the 
main operations performed by the CPS are QoS management, radio resource 
management among many others (M. Hossain 2008). 
2.4.3 Security Sublayer  
The WiMAX security sublayer deals with authentication, encryption and integrity 
control. In case of WiMAX, the encryption is carried out by a protocol and it 
takes place at both sides. This protocol has a set of defined rules and algorithms 
for performing the encryption. Moreover, an encapsulation protocol is deployed 
for encryption of data packets. WiMAX security provides end-to-end security 
across a routed network and can provide authentication, data integrity, and en-
cryption services. In this case, these services are provided for IP traffic only. 
Once the network endpoints are authenticated, IP traffic flowing among those 
endpoints is protected. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) is a protocol suite for 
securing Internet Protocol (IP) communications by authenticating and encrypting 
each IP packet of a communication session. IPSec also includes protocols for es-
tablishing mutual authentication between agents at the beginning of the session 
and negotiation of cryptographic keys to be used during the session. IPSec is an 
end-to-end security scheme operating in the Internet Layer of the Internet Proto-
col Suite. It can be used in protecting data flows between a pair of hosts (host-to-
host), between a pair of security gateways (network-to-network), or between a 
security gateway and a host (network-to-host). 
The Privacy Key Management (PKM) protocol is utilized to offer a secure data 
key distribution from the BS to the SS while they are often synchronized with 
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each other. The BS deploys PKM protocol to make sure not everyone gets access 
to the services. Further on, 802.16e came up with PKM second edition as an ex-
tension of the PKM first edition, with novel ciphering algorithms, reciprocal two-
way authentication and some more features. 
2.5 Packet Header Suppression 
Packet header suppression (PHS) is the process of removal of the repetitive part 
of the SDU header. The procedure in which some identical repetitive parts in the 
packet header get deleted is called suppression. This action always takes place at 
the sender’s side by the CS for diminishing the overhead. For instance, in the 
transmission of SDUs IP packets, the header of each IP packet comprises the 
source and destination IP addresses which remains the same for all the packets. 
This repetitive part is discarded at the transmitter prior to transmission and is then 
reinserted back into the SDU at the receiver. To achieve a successful PHS opera-
tion, the CS at the transmitter is synchronized with the receiver CS using PHS 
protocols. The application of PHS increases packet transmission efficiency such 
as VoIP though the implementation is optional in WiMAX but has problems if 
packets are lost (S. O. Ailen-Ubhi 2012). 
The usage of PHS is performed by a well-defined PHS rule pack that creates the 
framework of the SDU header suppression, and the rule to be applied is distin-
guished by the CS hinging on the defined factors or the type of service, like 
HTTP or VoIP. The CS produces the needed connection identifier (CID), service 
flow ID (SFID) and PHS for the SDU action, instantly after a matching rule is 
established. (PHSV), the received PHS field (PHSF) bits are verified against the 
expected bits, utilizing the PHS rule. If the SDU PHSF and cache PHSF corre-
spond, the SDU PHSF bytes are dismantled and a PHS index (PHSI) is attached 
on the SDU according to the matching rule. In addition to this, if the SDU PHSF 
and cache PHSF do not correspond, the suppression action is not performed on 
the SDU PHSF and a PHSI value of “null” is then appended. (Andrews et al. 
2007: 309-310.) 
2.6 Data/Control Plain 
The data and control plain modules are distinguished by means of the application 
identifier on each and every connection. Each MS has a distinct MAC address of 
48 bits, utilized for the establishment of the connection registration with a BS. 
The connection is identified by a 16 bit CID dedicated by the BS.  
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During the MS initial network entry, the BS makes two pairs of management 
CIDs. Moreover it makes an arbitrary third pair for MS that lets the network con-
trol action to take place. Two-way CIDs imply a CID pair for each and every 
connection. According to operational aspects, there exist three classification of 
management CIDs: basic management connection, primary and secondary man-
agement connection CIDs. The basic management connection CID is employed in 
the transfer of brief immediate MAC management messages between BS and MS, 
while primary management connection CID is used for lengthy and delay flexible 
MAC management messages. Secondary management connection CID is used in 
the exchange of standard-based messages for example DHCP (Ergen 2009: 312-
313; S. O. Ailen-Ubhi 2012). 
2.7 MAC PDU Format 
In WiMAX network basically the data are transported in form of the MAC PDU. 
The MAC PDU structure shown in Figure 6 comprises a fixed length MAC head-
er, a payload with flexible length and a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC). The 48 
bits length MAC header is a host to information contents like the user ID and the 
instructions about the header’s length. The arbitrary MAC PDU payload is com-
prised of a full or partial version of the MAC SDUs. Fragmented or partial ver-
sion is the division of MAC SDU into further subparts fragments Sub-headers that 
are sent in various SDUs therefore improving the flexibility of the MAC PDU 
size. A Fragment Sub-header (FSH) has 16 bits factors appended to each and eve-
ry MAC PDU which holds the SDU fragment. The FSH factors are as follows: 
• Fragmentation Control (FC) that consists of 2 bits. 
• Fragment Sequence Number (FSN) having dedicated 11 bits needed for non-
ARQ connections. 
• Block Sequence Number (BSN) consisting allotted 11 bits used for ARQ con-
nections. 
• Reserved 3 bits used for rounding purpose. 
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It is to be noted that the status of the payload fragmentation is represented by FC 
(00, 10, 01 and 11). Non-fragmentation is represented by 00, while first fragmen-
tation is distinguished by 10, last fragmentation by 01 and continue fragmentation 
by 11. The FSN is in charge of providing the required SDU fragment sequence 
number. The length of the header is not always an integer number bytes, the 
standard uses the reserve bits to carry out an integer number of bytes length for all 
the headers (Can, Vannithamby, Lee & Koc 2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 6. MAC PDU format (IEEE Std 802.16TM-2004 2004: 35) 
2.8 MAC PDU Construction and Transmission 
The structure and sending of MAC PDU procedure takes place by means of some 
three actions: fragmentation, concatenation, and packing that are carried out on 
management messages and data packets. Fragmentation action includes the split-
ting of each and every MAC SDU into several MAC PDUs and this paves the 
way for a better performance and enhances the QoS scheduling together with 
frame feedback. The sending of the fragments hinges on the status of the ARQ 
that is enabled or disabled. The enabled mode activates the retransmission of the 
fragments, while a single transmission in sequence is executed whenever the 
ARQ in disabled. The receiver utilizes the sequence number to recover the sent 
MAC PDU. In addition to this concatenation is an action where numerous MAC 
PDUs are mixed into a sole transmission. 
Every MAC PDU holds a distinct CID and this provides a possibility so that the 
receiver become able to di-multiplex the received MAC PDU. Packing is a pro-
cess which holds a sole MAC PDU consisting of the pack of numerous MAC 
SDUs. The MAC header length field can be employed to identify the packed SDU 
just in case when a fixed size of SDU is deployed. (Ergen 2009:320) 
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2.9. Network Entry and Initialization 
A mobile station that is intending to get access to a WiMAX network should un-
dergo network entry operations in order to establish communication with the net-
work. At the onset of the entry operation, the MS checks for the availability of a 
DL channel of the intended WiMAX network. At the moment when the network 
presence is confirmed, the MS synchronizes itself with the DL channel of the se-
lected network BS. On completion of synchronization, the MS procures transmis-
sion parameters from various control messages received from the BS and then 
carries out ranging. Further on, the MS negotiates basic capabilities to make sure 
that efficient network communication takes place, and subsequently undergo reg-
istration and authentication operations. Finally, the MS gets an IP address that 
accomplishes the network entry procedure and prepares the MS to start dynamic 
or provisioned service flows set up before transmission of data and management 
messages. (Ergen 2009: 325.) 
2.10 Bandwidth Request and Request Mechanism 
In 802.16, CIDs devoted ranging from just one to three are assigned to each and 
every mobile station to send and receive control messages during network entry 
and initialization. The target of the link pairs explains the usage of unique groups 
of QoS on MAC management traffic links. Bandwidth usage flexibility is impera-
tive in all services besides incompressible UGS connections characterized with 
constant bit rate, whose demands for example channelized T1 may vary based on 
the traffic. Resources are allotted for Demand Assignment Multiple Access 
(DAMA) services based on demand and the time of need. BS is responsible for 
bandwidth allocation to MSs. MS requires bandwidth for successful transmission 
and the request message is communicated to BS through the following methods: 
1- Requests 
Requests are basically UL messages by which the mobile station announces the 
base station to allocate UL bandwidth. There are two types of requests: stand-
alone bandwidth request header and the piggyback bandwidth request. As a result 
of the dynamic variability of the UL burst profile, the UL bandwidth requests 
consists the needed number of bytes for the transportation of the MAC header and 
payload. 
The bandwidth request is cumulative or aggregate and is positioned in the band-
width request header Type section. The base station replies to these two request 
types in two various manners. When it comes to cumulative bandwidth request, a 
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specific amount of bandwidth is added to the existing mobile station bandwidth of 
the link where in aggregate bandwidth request, the existing mobile station band-
width is entirely substituted by the amount of the requested bandwidth. 
 
2- Grants 
Grants are messages by which the base station acknowledges the mobile station 
about the assignment of the requested bandwidth. These messages are sent to the 
mobile station basic CID since the base station is not aware of the connection 
CIDs that requires the assigned bandwidth. The distribution of the assigned 
bandwidth to the real CID connection is performed by the mobile station. In cases 
when the received assigned bandwidth is less than the needed bandwidth, the mo-
bile station may withdraw momentarily and ask once again or specify the connec-
tion which will deploy the bandwidth, otherwise the MS deletes the SDU based 
on the received BS information. 
 
3- Polling 
Each and every connection needs bandwidth for sending. The mechanism of mo-
bile station bandwidth requests also requires bandwidth assignment for operation. 
This mechanism by which a mobile station is specifically allocated bandwidth for 
bandwidth request purpose is known as polling. A single mobile station or sets of 
mobile stations may be recipients of these assignments. The assignments of a sin-
gle mobile station is carried out by the fundamental CID and that of sets of mo-
bile stations is by UL-MAP and special CID (IEEE Std 802.16TM-2004 2004: 
141- 142). 
2.11 Mobility Management 
Mobility management was dealt with in the IEEE 802.16e standard following the 
amendment of IEEE 802.16d standard to support mobile applications. There are 
two points regarding the mobility in wireless networks. They are the power and 
handoff management. These issues are dealt with in mobile WiMAX (WiMAX 
Forum 2006: 22) by aspects like Sleep Mode and Idle Mode actions to smoothen 
a suitable deployment of power resources. Moreover, a consistent handoff scheme 
that makes sure a seamless and continuous communication of the mobile station 
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takes place when going from one base station to another at regular paces (S. O. 
Ailen-Ubhi 2012) 
2.12 Encryption Mechanisms 
In the IEEE 802.16 standard security sublayer, there exist a number of security 
mechanisms for encrypting the transport data. Therefore the most common mech-
anisms are briefly explained as follows:  
2.12.1 DES (Data Encryption Standard), TDES (Triple Data Encryption 
Standard) 
IBM came up with the Data Encryption Standard (DES) which was later pushed 
forward and became a standard in 1976. For enhancing DES, IBM made several 
efforts and eventually created the Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES). The 
name is triple because the same approach is applied three times, moreover the 
existing 64 bit keys increases to 192 bits. Thus nowadays even with the latest 
advancements, TDES is considered very safe even for financial transactions (P. 
Hamalainen et al. 2001).  
 Both DES and TDES have a common secret key encryption mechanism. The 
DES mechanism can be deployed for data encryption while TDES algorithm 
maybe utilized for coding of the encryption keys.  
In DES, a secret key is utilized along the way from plaintext to ciphertext. It is of 
great importance to notice that the data is encrypted with the first key, decrypted 
with the second key, and eventually coded again with the third one. Figure 7 
demonstrates the just explained functional blocks. It is studied that for breaking 
the TDES with brute force attack 22112 tries are required. This actually indicates 
the robustness of TDES. 
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Figure 7. Triple DES (NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 2004) 
2.12.2 AES (Advanced Encryption Standard).  
In 2002, DES was gradually replaced with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
that is regarded as “Rijndael”. Rijndael has a block size of 128 bits and the key 
are variable from 128 bits to 256 bits (Chih-chung Lu et al. 2002). Rijndael de-
ploys a substitution permutation network that is also handily implemented. The 
Rijndael is also regarded as being practically crack-proof (Chih-chung Lu et al. 
2002). It is proven that the existing brute force attacks have not been successful 
against Rijndael. The AES mechanism is a shared-based encryption mechanism. 
When it comes to AES mechanism, the cipher key is of 128, 192 or even 256 bits 
length. This algorithm has a dual usage and can be deployed either for data en-
cryption or encryption of keys.  
2.12.3 RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) 
 In 1977, RSA was defined by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman and it is one of the 
common mechanisms for public-key encryption. It is utilized for coding the Au-
thorisation Reply message by the SS public key. The Authorisation Reply mes-
sage consists of the Authorisation Key (AK). RSA can be deployed for encryption 
of keys as well but just when the scenario is such that the keys are being sent 
from the BS to the SS.   
32      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
2.13 HMAC (Hashed Message Authentication Code)  
A keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) is deployed for computing a 
message authentication code (MAC) that consists of a hash function together with 
a secret key. It can be utilized to check the data integrity and message authentica-
tion. For computing the HMAC, hash functions like MD5 or SHA-1 can be de-
ployed. Thus to what it leads, the mechanism is labeled as HMAC-MD5 or 
HMAC-SHA1 respectively. If the hash function is strong for instance with 160 
bits output size the HMAC’s degree of trust and reliability is higher. In other 
words if an attacker wishes to attack HMAC based authentication, he will need to 
find out the secret key of the HMAC. Take a HMAC with output size of 128 bits 
as the example, the attacker needs to acquired 264 correct plain messages with the 
corresponding HMAC value (with the same key) to figure out the right HMAC 
secret key. The attacker can only replace or generate fake massages and compute 
a good HMAC result if he knows about the secret key. One can refer to the 
RFC2104 to observe that this is considered an impossible task in any realistic 
scenario (for a message block length of 64 bytes, this would take 250,000 years in 
continuous 1Gbps link, provided without changing the secret key during all this 
time). If one replaces a strong HMAC with 160 bits output size as mentioned ear-
lier then the number of original messages and HMAC code required should be-
come 280 which is even harder and impossible to attack. 
2.14 Encryption Keys 
Diverse set of encryption keys are deployed for the security of IEEE 802.16. All 
encryption keys belonged to the IEEE 802.16 standard are available below. Other 
details associated with it such as notation and the number of bits can be observed 
in Table 1. 
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Table 1. WiMAX Encryption Keys (Laurent Butti, 2007) 
Encryption 
Keys 
Symbol Number 
of Bits 
Description 
Authorization 
Key 
AK 160 SS gets authentication from its 
BSs It’s a shared secret key and 
used for secure transactions. It is 
also used to generate encryption 
keys.  
Key Encryp-
tion Key 
KEK 128 Key Encryption Key used for 
the encryption of the TEK. 
Traffic En-
cryption Key 
TEK 128 Used to encrypt data by using 
different algorithms. 
HMAC Key 
for the 
Downlink 
HMAC_KEY_D 160 It authenticates messages in the 
downlink direction. 
HMAC Key 
for the Up-
link 
HMAC_KEY_U 160 It authenticates messages in the 
uplink direction. 
HMAC Key 
in the Mesh 
mode 
HMAC_KEY_S 160 It authenticates messages in the 
Mesh mode. 
 
2.15 Security Associations (SAs) 
In WiMAX standard, the security association is comprised of a group of security 
data elements that the base station and its subscriber stations share for having a 
secure connection. In fact, base station is in charge of administrating the security 
associations. Therefore when it comes to an authentication scenario the base sta-
tion transmits a group of Security Associations related to its connections to sub-
scriber stations. Furthermore, the base station may come up with one or more SAs 
to the subscriber station. The SA’s identity is regarded as “SAID” and is shared 
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between BS and the SS and is of 16 bit length. Moreover SA contains a crypto-
graphic suite identifier (for selected algorithms), traffic encryption keys (TEKs) 
and initialization vectors (David Johnson et al. 2004) 
2.16 X.509 Certificate 
ISO/IEC and ITU introduced a standard called X.509 in 1988. The X509 is actu-
ally an electronic identity certificate (Hoyt L. Kesterson 1997). X.509 is an au-
thentication mechanism which binds a name to a public key value. The role of the 
certificate is to associate a public key with the identity contained in the X.509 
certificate. Thus when the BS is in the process of checking a client SS, due to the 
fact that SS holds a X.509 digital certificate, the identity would be verified with it. 
This digital certificate content is the so called SS’s MAC address and public key. 
If an AK is desired, an SS presents its digital certificate to the base station. The 
base station checks the digital certificate and then codes the AK. Then the BS 
transmits and returns the AK to SS. Figure 8 demonstrates the X.509 authentica-
tion. 
                              
 
Figure 8. X.509 Authentication (Hoyt L. Kesterson 1997; M. Hossain 2008) 
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In fact, the BS proceeds with the authentication of the identity of a client SS and 
offering the services that the SS is permitted to access take place with the AK 
exchange. Therefore due to this BS-SS authentication process, base station can 
stay protected against a masquerading impersonation attack. Thus all SSs can 
hold factory-installed RSA public/private key pairs or have an internal algorithm 
to produce likewise key pairs dynamically. In case an SS requires to produce its 
RSA key pair by utilizing its internal algorithm, the SS produces the key pair pri-
or to exchanging AK. Practically almost all SSs which count on internal algo-
rithms to produce an RSA key pair basically support a mechanism for installing a 
manufacturer-issued X.509 certificate. The usage of a factory-installed RSA pub-
lic/private key pair increases the intruder’s chance of success. The initial uphill 
battle for an intruder is to have an SS from the same vendor as the aimed BS, and 
the second is cracking the X.509 encryption. 
2.17 The PKM Protocol 
For describing the functions of the PKM protocol one has to build a model in 
which the BS is the server who provides and transmits the secret key to client 
SS’s. The PKM (Privacy Key Management) takes place while the process of au-
thentication between BS and SS is going on. PKM protocol utilizes public key 
cryptography to determine a shared secret key among SS and the BS. The PKM 
protocol phases are shown below in Figure 9. It basically provides an in detailed 
picture of what actually takes place while the protocol phases follow their paths 
(S. Xu and C.-T. Huang 2006).  
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Figure 9. PKM protocol phases (S. Rekhis et al. 2010) 
In WiMAX standard, the PKM protocol has two MAC management messages: 
1- PKM Request: The PKM-REQ message includes one PKM message in the 
message payload. This message is transmitted from the SS to the BS. 
2- PKM Response: The PKM-RSP message includes one PKM message in the 
message payload. It is transmitted from the BS to the SS. 
So the BS checks the SS and offers key material to let the data coding take place. 
Each and every SS has the priority of beginning with RSA key pairs that are al-
ready set by its manufacturer. Therefore, the RSA key pairs are already set on the 
SS and it also holds a digital X.509 certificate. The X.509 certificate of the sub-
scriber station is a public key certificate which combines the subscriber station’s 
identifying data to its RSA public key. The operator receives the secret key AK. 
While asking for the AK, a subscriber station shows its digital certificate to the 
base station. The subscriber station’s manufacturer signs the X.509 certificate 
digitally. As the base station is well-aware of the manufacturer’s public key, it 
can check the signature. While asking for AK, the subscriber station gets the veri-
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fication from the base station through presenting its X.509 digital certificate. It 
shows the supported cryptographic algorithm’s description to the base station as 
well. This shared secret AK is in charge of further secure transactions (M. Hoss-
ain 2008). Prior to transmitting an authentication response to the subscriber sta-
tion, the base station checks the digital certificate and specifies the ciphering 
mechanism which should be utilized. The RSA algorithm is deployed to cipher 
the AK with the checked public key. This RSA public key ciphered AK is then 
transmitted to the asking subscriber station from the base station. Initially, a PKM 
authorisation information message is transmitted by subscriber station. X.509 
certificate is given with this message. This is actually an informative message that 
subscriber station transmits to the base station and the base station becomes aware 
of client subscriber station’s certificate of manufacturer. Next to the authorization 
information message, the subscriber station transmits a PKM authorization re-
quest message to the base station. This message includes the X.509 certificate of 
the subscriber station, subscriber station’s primary SAID and a description of its 
security ability. The digital certificate is checked again by the base station. The 
AK is ciphered by the public key. The base station returns a PKM authorization 
response message to the subscriber station containing this AK. Cloned subscriber 
stations are averted from passing incorrect credentials to a base station with this 
method. The PKM authorization stage is demonstrated below in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. PKM authorization stages (S. Rekhis et al. 2010) 
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2.18 The Key Administration and Privacy 
In the PKM protocol’s second stage that is demonstrated in Figure 11, the target 
has been beginning the TEKs transfer together with fixing the SA. Mentioned 
TEKs will be further deployed for ciphering. As already mentioned, the authori-
zation response message includes the characteristics of the SA together with the 
SAID. Thus, the subscriber station begins an individual state for every SAID 
specified in the authorization response message. Each state is in charge of admin-
istrating the keying material related to the associated SAIDs. For the TEK’s re-
newal sake, each SS transmits a key request message to the base station regularly. 
The message consists: 
- The sequence number of AK that permits the base station to specify the 
HMAC Key of the uplink which the subscriber station utilizes to produce 
the HMAC digest 
- The security association identifier associated to the SA  
- The HMAC digest generated through the function of HMAC in case of the 
message payload via HMAC Key of the uplink 
 
Following the assurance that at the SS, the captured SAID corresponds with the 
SA and checking the integrity and the authenticity of the KReqMess through veri-
fying the HMAC, base station replies to the message. The base station transmits a 
key response message including the key material that the TEK state needs. It 
should be noted that for every SAID, the base station keeps 2 keying materials 
active that are represented with TEK-elements within the key response message. 
Therefore a keying material consists (S. Xu and C.-T. Huang 2006): 
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Figure 11. Privacy and key management phase (S. Rekhis et al. 2010) 
 
• TEK ciphered by KEKs utilizing the AES in ECB mode with 128 bits, 
TDES in EDE mode with 128 bits or RSA PKCS#1  
• The TEK’s remaining lifetime  
• The sequence number of TEK 
• An initialization vector of 64-bits long  
The key response message consists the security association identifier, the se-
quence number of AK, the new/old TEK associated parameters together with 
HMAC digest to assure the subscriber station that the base station has sent the 
message. It should be mentioned that the durations of validity belonged to both 
TEKs coincide. Actually, prior to expiration of the old TEK, the new TEK be-
comes activated. The subscriber station utilizes the mentioned TEK’s lifetime to 
evaluate the timing of a previous TEK’s invalidation or asking for a new TEK by 
the base station.  
In case the KReqMess’s security association identifier is invalid, the base station 
replies with a key message rejection consisting the sequence number of AK, the 
security association identifier, a HMAC digest and an error code together with the 
cause of rejection. Thus to obtain a new TEK the subscriber station can retransmit 
the KReqMess again. 
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It is essential to note that an optional message, represented as RkeyMess can be 
used as the starting point for describing the key administration and privacy stage 
of the PKM protocol. The base station transmits the RkeyMess for carrying out 
the rekeying prior to when the subscriber station asks for one. The message basi-
cally consists of the sequence number of AK, the security association identifier 
associated to SA whose keying materials are requested together with the message 
digest which the HMAC key of the downlink generates. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the first place, by the aid of having a literature review of the problems and ex-
isting solutions when it comes to WiMAX security, a clearer picture can be ob-
tained. This seems logic that being updated with the latest developments and ad-
vances offered by researchers and authors, paves the way for recognizing and 
understanding the existing open issues and further facilitates the mitigation. 
Moreover it helps making the contributions vividly distinguishable.  
The IEEE 802.16 standard, specially the version brought up by Financial Times 
Information’s Mobile Cloning in March 2005, defines the radar interface for fixed 
point-to-multipoint broadband wireless access networks. An outlook of the IEEE 
802.16 can be reached in “Club de la securite des systemes d'information francais 
(CLUSIF)” Methods Commission. The IEEE 802.16e (LAN MAN Standards 
Committee of the IEEE Computer Society 2004) edition defines extra methods to 
support mobile subscribers at vehicular pace and also methods for data authenti-
cation. As it was mentioned before, when it comes to IEEE 802.16, security was 
taken into account as the chief issue while the design of the standard was taking 
place. Despite numerous considerations, security mechanisms of the IEEE 802.16 
still have several open problems to be addressed. WiMAX is not yet utilized in a 
very large scale but theoretically it can be deployed in various scenarios and 
many security threats can pop-up as its usage grows.   
An attacker having bad intentions like information theft may handily break into a 
weak WiMAX network by the aid of various techniques. In addition to this, in 
case the attacker has a strategic position with a RF receiver, it can block the mes-
sages transmitted wirelessly or simply do a jamming and thus a security mecha-
nism revision would be required. From the literature review, one can draw a con-
clusion that present security mechanisms are not mitigating the entire issues to the 
full when it comes to IEEE 802.16a Mesh modes network. Therefore this results 
in emerging security threats. Thus it is essential to deal with the security aspects 
of the IEEE 802.16 standard and highlight the security faults, risks and threats 
connected to it.   
Now the question is what motivates and why should an attacker thinks of intrud-
ing a system or network. The subject of what motivates a hacker to carry out at-
tacks has been investigated in the literature for achieving the means for better 
countermeasures. In 1994, in an old study anthropologist R. Blake deployed the 
fundamental social stratification theory to claim that hackers are motivated chief-
ly by wealth, power and prestige. In his paper (R. Blake 1994) he believes that 
money is the main cause among other motivations. It can be observed that by sell-
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ing private information or by eliminating a business rivals in the market both a 
remarkable financial gain and power in the market can be achieved. These reasons 
together with the prestige and attention which the hacker gets in the community 
are counted as powerful motives for intrusions. 
In 1994, R. Schifreen suggested five probable motives for hackers.  
In his paper (R. Schifreen 1994), he classified the motivations as follows: 
-Opportunity: some systems have a poor security and this itself attracts the atten-
tions 
-Revenge: the intrusions can be launched by a disgruntled employee for taking 
revenge 
-Greed: getting money for selling the information, blackmail or espionage 
-Challenge: conquering a system having security measures itself can bring about a 
prestige 
-Boredom: the hacker may have no other thing to do, thus when get bored can try 
to carry out intrusions 
M. Barber, in his paper (M. Barber 2001) added the following motivations to the 
existing ones: 
-Vandalism: the defacing of corporate or organization web sites 
-Hacktivism: Intrusions carried out for scoring political, economic or ethical 
points 
-Information Warfare: this is done by government to promote their own policies 
domestically or internationally 
In order not to ignore the most updated security issues and motives together with 
the places where are challenged by them some professional problems like 1- mili-
tary 2- corporates 3- Governments 4- Professional crime and 5- Fanciness should 
also be mentioned.  
This dissertation provides an anthology of the attacks and countermeasures found 
in the literature contra IEEE 802.16 family of standards because this is the subject 
of investigation here in this dissertation. In addition to this the differences of 
WiMAX with other wireless standards will be briefly mentioned as well. The em-
phasis is on attacks contra physical and MAC layer up to the latest version of the 
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standard. Moreover, this dissertation tries to categorize and classify the attacks 
under realistic conditions (S. Karen et al. 2010). 
For all of them primarily the susceptibility of the protocol that makes the attack 
realizable is demonstrated. Furthermore, the attack methodology is described and 
investigated according to two criteria’s. A risk analysis of threats in WiMAX has 
been realized in the past (M. Barbeau 2005; M. Barbeau et al. 2007; K. Sansuroo-
ah 2009).  
The DoS/Replay attacks and the authorization susceptibility of WiMAX were 
addressed and effectively solved (S. Xu, Manton Matthews, Chin-Tser Huang 
2006). It needed a reasonable alternation to the standard, but it is intricate to fore-
see the precise impact on performance and scalability even though it is known 
that security solutions have practically always some impacts on performance and 
scalability. Therefore if it passes all those tests smoothly, one can regard it as an 
acceptable solution.  
In 2007, a solution was proposed and settled down the authorization attack (Tian 
Haibo et al. 2007). It did need just a few alternations. In that paper it was ex-
pected that the performance would just slightly drop, but more research is re-
quired to attest this and to investigate the scalability of this solution.  
The paper of Fuqiang Liu does not really solve a security problem. In this paper 
(Fuqiang Liu et al. 2006), what the solution provides is actually diminishing the 
key size for encryption, therefore reducing message size and boosting the perfor-
mance. Therefore one can draw the conclusion that their modification to encryp-
tion and certificates passes the testing stage from performance and scalability per-
spective, but on the other hand if we look at it from the authentication and author-
ization enhancement, it simply fails because reducing the key size is always a bad 
idea. It is even a bad idea for boosting the performance.  
In 2007, a theoretical framework was proposed that could offer numerous security 
advantages. In this paper (Kejie Lu et al. 2007) because an extra layer is required, 
the setback would be the fact that a major modification of the standard would be 
required thus it is yet to see whether this would be an efficient step to take or not. 
Moreover because no simulation results are presented, no conclusions on scalabil-
ity and performance can be drawn.  
As it can be confirmed technical difficulty is another notion which attackers deal 
with it. It refers to the technological challenges faced by an attacker in his efforts 
to pose a threat. It can be highlighted that similar difficulties are regarded as dy-
namic. The reality is that what sounds like an uphill in the path nowadays, may 
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not be so in the next few years. For instance, WiFi implementations in accordance 
with the IEEE 802.11 standard's original characteristics deploy the Wired Equiva-
lent Privacy (WEP) approach to security (H. Haverinen et al 2004).  
The standard's working team thought that WEP's security mechanisms causes 
firm technical hurdles to intruders. In 1999, the technical difficulty for attacks 
addressed to WEP was evaluated as being so strong, and attacks were not proba-
ble to happen. Nevertheless, it promptly became vivid that WEP had security 
faults and several weaknesses. WEP's security breaches were discovered by 
Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir and made public in 2001 (Technical Specification 
ETSI TS 102 165-1 V4 2003). The technical difficulty became solvable and the 
probability of attacks rose to the level of likely.  
In 2002, Stubblefield, Ioannidis, and Rubin implemented an attack against WEP. 
Since that time, the attack has been known, and its relevant software has been out 
there available, diminishing the technical difficulty to “none” and upgrading the 
probability of the attack to likely. WiFi Protected Access (WPA), WEP's succes-
sor, is at present believed to cause strong technical difficulties to intruders but 
nobody knows if in future it would be as strong as now (M. Raya et al. 2004). 
Scrambling is a kind of jamming that is performed for short intervals of time and 
aimed at particular frames. Scramblers can selectively scramble administration or 
control data for affecting the network’s normal functioning. The problem is of 
greater amplitude for time sensitive messages that are not delay tolerant, like the 
report requests/responses for measurement of the channel. Scrambling phenome-
non and scramblers can be detected by monitoring anomalies in performance cri-
teria. This issue has been studied for WiFi/802.11 systems (M. Raya et al. 2004). 
The situation for WiMAX/802.16 is much different, and further research is re-
quired for this case. 
L. Maccari and his colleagues have investigated some security issues of the fami-
ly of IEEE 802.16 standard which has not been addressed as far as we know. 
Thus the ideas in this paper (L. Maccari et al. 2007) were new and novel ap-
proaches were taken. Further on, they have highlighted the lack of message integ-
rity code (MIC) for data and authentication packets. Lack of authentication at the 
base station (BS)’s side. In this paper authors have only proposed some modifica-
tions, such as the introduction of EAP (Extensible authentication protocol) proto-
col to strengthen the authentication stage. In contrary the authors have not sug-
gested any solution and they just discussed regarding the problems. T. N. Nguyen 
and his fellow researchers improved EAP-based pre-authentication for fast and 
secure inter-ASN handovers in mobile WiMAX networks. In this paper (T. N. 
Nguyen et al. 2012), it is discovered that there are three security vulnerabilities 
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that would result in DoS and replay attacks. For overcoming the vulnerability in 
the authentication process in handovers under the DoS and replay attacks together 
with enhancing the efficiency, the EEP scheme was proposed. 
B. Sikkens has argued that even though IEEE 802.16e has a robust and promising 
security architecture, there are still some issues to be taken care of (B. Sikkens 
2008). For example he has discussed about three problems being 1- DoS(Denial 
of Service) 2- Key Space Vulnerability and  3- Downgrade Attack. For DoS at-
tack the author has suggested the timestamp approach together with signature of 
BS and SS for authentication. In addition to this, for “Key Space Vulnerability” 
the author has suggested to use more number of bits for Acknowledgment. To 
address the problem of Downgrade Attack, author has claimed to neglect the mes-
sages that are having security capabilities up to a limit. Having said all this, add-
ing the timestamp and signature needs the modification of the Standard. Moreo-
ver, increased number of bits for acknowledgment needs alternation in encryption 
and decryption. Thus one can see that the suggested solution for downgrade at-
tack would actually result in a DoS attack for SSs that do not have the required 
capabilities though because the way down grade attack works is such that the first 
message of the authorization process is an unsecured message from SS telling BS 
what security capabilities he has. An attacker could send a spoofed message to BS 
containing weaker capabilities in order to convince the BS and the attacked SS to 
agree on an insecure encryption algorithm. The standard does not specify a con-
crete solution for the situation that two valid answers are received by a BS. 
J. Brown designed a new and effective rekeying scheme for WiMAX networks. In 
this paper (J. Brown 2009), the author has mentioned that DoS attacks on the BS 
can take place during the PKM second edition. The author has said that Multicast 
and Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) do not actually scale up to the level 
of expectation. The author also suggests a Tree Base Rekeying Scheme for set-
tling down and mitigating the DoS attack. The only setback can be the fact that 
Tree Base Rekeying Scheme would result in a possible storage overhead. 
G. Kambourakis and his colleagues specifically zoomed on the Multicast and 
Broadcast Rekeying Algorithm (MBRA) of 802.16e. In this paper (G. Kam-
bourakis et al. 2010), they have claimed that even though this algorithm has been 
created having considered the safety issues in mind, but it still has numerous se-
curity problems. In the paper the authors have recommended the utilization of 
several decryption key in asymmetric group key management protocol. The set-
back is that handling of multiple keys at decryption is another huge concern to be 
dealt with. Authors have also elaborated on attacks addressed to physical layer 
like jamming and scrambling and respectively at MAC layer DDoS attack (Dis-
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tributed Denial of service), Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) and Authorization Key 
(AK) problems. In addition some protection methods against the attacks have 
been proposed. Many people in the scientific community have tried their best to 
classify and categorize the attacks and security issues of WiMAX. Some of these 
efforts and classifications are acceptable, however there are a number of reasons 
which explain why the classification proposed by this dissertation is superior to 
previous ones. The first point is that some of the attacks previously classified by 
other researchers are just according to pure theoretical definitions and some oth-
ers cannot be traced for security mitigation and protection for instance when it 
comes to cyber army Botnet attacks. However the classification of WiMAX secu-
rity attacks provided by this dissertation is meticulously inclusive implying that 
some special cases that cannot be traced and realized are not considered. The sec-
ond point is that other classification versions look so scattered and one cannot 
find an integration between them. The third point which contributes to uniqueness 
of this dissertation’s classification is that by removing some theoretical and not 
traceable attacks and having an integrated approach, our version will be more 
comprehendible and understandable even in a glance. The fourth point is that in 
the same time maximum efforts have been made in order not to neglect important 
posing threats and attacks. Finally the fifth point is that the attacks are only 
judged as being “Major” or “Minor” like black and white and there is no categori-
zation in between like some others do. Further on Kambourakis and his fellow 
researchers recommend Intrusion Detection System (IDS), but the paper was just 
a review related to WiMAX and converged network. Moreover, in 2011 B. Zhou 
has proposed an intrusion detection system based on WiMAX. Also in 2011, Y. 
Zhang et al. proposed a new architecture for enhancing the cyber security of the 
smart grid by deploying a hierarchical and distributed intrusion detection system 
in the wireless mesh network while also achieving the ideal routing for smart grid 
communications. Security is enhanced by the categorization of intrusion data de-
ploying the support vector machine (SVM) and artificial immune system (AIS) 
algorithms (Y. Zhang et al. 2011). All these evidences show the importance of 
deploying the IDS for wireless networks including WiMAX.  
In 2010, M. Habib et al. have investigated the security issues for WiMAX and 
converged network. They have emphasized on the threats to both the technologies 
and security measures for these threats (M. Habib et al. 2010). 
 In 2011, F. Tshering et al. have described the security mechanisms currently ex-
isting in the WiMAX. The authors further elaborate on various security issues in 
PKM (Privacy and Key Management protocol) and the numerous solutions avail-
able in literature. They eventually conclude that more research is still needed for 
the security of IEEE 802.16e. The paper mostly addressed the Key Space Vulner-
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ability and Downgrade Attack. Moreover, it also argued regarding the suitability 
of Cryptographic Algorithm-RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman). Furthermore Tsher-
ing and his colleagues have pointed out already existing solutions like utilization 
of 8 bit sequence number rather than 4 bit for Key Space Vulnerability. Base sta-
tion could neglect messages with security capabilities under known limit for 
Downgrade attack and rather than RSA, authors have recommended the utiliza-
tion of ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography). That is because compared to RSA, 
the common public-key scheme of the internet today, ECC offers smaller key 
sizes, faster computation as well as memory, power and bandwidth savings. It can 
also be mentioned that while RSA and ECC can be both accelerated with dedicat-
ed cryptographic co-processors like in the case of smart cards, those co-
processors need extra hardware adding to the size, complexity and cost of imple-
mentation.   
The setback is the fact that the suggestion is not capable to implement 8 bit se-
quence number. Moreover the solution provided for Downgrade attack results in 
DoS (Denial of Service) for SS (Subscriber Station) and also there is this modifi-
cation in standard that ECC needs.  
M. Nasreldin and his fellow researchers have investigated on the security risks to 
wireless access networks and analyzed them based on their risk level (M. 
Nasreldin et al. 2008; M. Habib et al. 2010). The 802.16’s physical and MAC 
layer threats are explained. Based on the author’s investigations strong wireless 
protocols with robust ciphering methods together with deployment of Intrusion 
Prevention Systems (IPS) is practical for removing many wireless risks. The 
physical layer of WiMAX is susceptible to threats as compared to MAC layer. 
The jamming and scrambling are respective intrusions on physical layer. The au-
thors described the points open to threats, and these threats were also categorized 
based on classes. Some of these risks are easy to deal with but issues are yet there 
due to several intrusions being intricate to mitigate; for example the DDoS attack 
which has a very hard detection procedure. The solutions which the authors pro-
pose are security association, spread spectrum mechanism, robust ciphering 
methods, reciprocal two-way authentication and authentication protocol (EAP). 
The setback of this paper is that the securing protocol has several susceptibilities 
like using the weak RC4 and key management. 
 As mentioned previously, M. Barbeau has investigated the intrusions on WiMAX 
as well. In this paper (M. Barbeau 2005) investigation of WiMAX/802.16 archi-
tecture has been carried out which demonstrates how the ATM cells together with 
the IP packets become frames. The main concentration in this paper is on the risk 
investigation of the 2 layers being the MAC layer and physical layer in details. 
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When it comes to physical layer, the bits flow is organized in a set of frames with 
identical length. Author points out 2 risks to the 802.16; “Jamming and Scram-
bling”. Jamming attack may be not intentional or malicious and also stated that 
jamming is handily detected and when detected then it is smooth for mitigation 
purposes. Scrambling attack is hard to carry out and also intricate to detect. While 
explaining the MAC layer the author highlights the MAC layer risks in terms of 
authentication and confidentiality. The majority of threats are regarding the au-
thentication level. In this paper it is mentioned that there was no protection for the 
WiMAX’s data traffic integrity, but mobile WiMAX came up with this kind of 
protection methodology for protecting data. Traffic messages related authentica-
tion has been investigated as well. Authentication of traffic messages is a moder-
ate motivation for an attacker because it is an attack originated from creating mis-
chief. The modification of data traffic is very unlikely to happen if AES is utilized 
due to the strong technical difficulties encountered, and likely if AES is not de-
ployed, given the lack of technical difficulty in carrying out an attack. 
Such an attack has the potential to create short-term consequences for the user 
and system, resulting in a medium impact. If AES is not used, then this is a major 
threat, otherwise it is minor. It further adds that the message modification is prob-
able when AES is not deployed, and then traffic modification becomes a serious 
risk. Author mentions that DDoS attack is a main issue on this point as well and 
that it is so intricate to mitigate it. The author recommended the IDS solution for 
handling some of the threats. The distinguished aspect of this paper is that it has 
discussed about almost all the previous research work carried out by the IEEE and 
the WiMAX forum up to the time when the paper was written. Another strong 
point of this paper is that the author has deployed a unique mechanism for the risk 
investigation. The major setback of this paper is that just 3 authentication choices 
are investigated being X.509 certificate based or EAP based and device-list based. 
However, actually all these three can be compromised by an intruder. If only de-
vice list-based authentication is deployed, identity theft by device address repro-
gramming can be launched, and the probability of a BS or MS masquerading at-
tack is likely as a result of the fact that there are few technical difficulties to over-
come. The effect on a user is considerable due to leading to loss of service for 
remarkable periods of time and also the user may be billed for some other user's 
fee. The effect when it come to a system is medium due to leading to limited fi-
nancial loss or theft of resources. The risk is thus crucial for a user and major for 
a system, and there is the need for countermeasures. If X.509-based authentica-
tion is utilized, the probability for the MS to be the victim of BS masquerading is 
likely because of the asymmetry of the mechanism and the solvable technical dif-
ficulties. The strong technical difficulties in MS masquerading render it an unlike-
ly threat to a system. The impact is the identical for the device list-based authenti-
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cation. Therefore, in the case of a user, the risk is evaluated as major, and coun-
termeasures are required. For a system, the risk is minor, and there is no need for 
countermeasures. If EAP-based authentication is deployed, the probability of a 
BS or MS masquerading attack is possible. Some of the EAP methods are still 
being defined, and security flaws are often uncovered in unproven mechanisms. 
The technical difficulties in launching an attack are thus best evaluated as solva-
ble. The impact is identical as for the device list and X.509 certificate-based au-
thentication, so the risk is labeled as major for both a user and a system.  
 J. Hasan published a review based paper. In this paper (J. Hasan 2006), what can 
be observed is that, the review has roots in other published materials, journals, 
literature and mostly from some relevant websites. In the paper it is elaborated 
that the WiMAX is still “on paper” and some of its mechanism are being devel-
oped. The WiMAX’s MAC/physical layer have been investigated thoroughly. 
Primarily the MAC and physical layers are reviewed and then their security issues 
are analyzed. In addition to this susceptibilities and risks to the WiMAX are pro-
vided in an overview form. The chief flaws investigated were reciprocal two-way 
authentication, data privacy and key management. The author claims that the 
gates of WiMAX/802.16 are wide-open to threats that are the TEK and Authori-
zation Key (AK) related problems. Actually they can be exposed and may cause 
problems. The subjects about user authentication, the issues associated to mobility 
are mentioned. The setback is that the author have not offered any novel ideas, 
just he has referenced to the other researcher’s carried out achievements. The au-
thor has actually taken other’s perspective and has sorted them out in a row in his 
paper. It is only a review, moreover the issues regarding mobility are only men-
tioned briefly and the sole suggestion is that more research is required in this 
field. Majority of the paper is about WiMAX’s security in a converged network. 
It is a survey paper that elaborates on securing the data link layer, application lay-
er and wireless access networks. The vulnerabilities list is provided and in addi-
tion, the infrastructure of security for these problems are taken care of in details. 
The security threats of WiMAX are identical to the threats in converged network. 
Finally the author explains that if one deploys secure devices by the WiMAX 
consequently the communication can be regarded as secure. This is always the 
case that the application level security is required to secure the communication 
and that the carrier should never be trusted. The strong point about this paper is 
that a detailed infrastructure for security purposes is offered on ways of securing 
the communication. 
R. Mylavarapu described the method for the DoS intrusion detection. In this paper 
(R. Mylavarapu 2005), the session border controller (SBC) can be deployed to 
detect the DoS attack. It is a survey paper and the restrictions were not so tangi-
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ble. The author’s proposed infrastructure for security purposes is very safe but the 
major setback is that the cost will be remarkably high. Therefore the security and 
cost are affecting each other. In addition to this, the author elaborates on risks like 
server/client impersonation, tampering of the message, hijacking the session, sig-
naling request leading to DoS intrusion and has suggested taking security 
measures like IDS, IPS, NAT traversal and firewalls, DoS and flood intrusion 
detection, hiding the topology, media and signaling security, session admission 
control together with granular access control.  
In 2008, E. Eren et al. introduced the fundamental enhancements among the 
802.16e and 802.16 together with the WiMAX security factors. The security 
methods like authorization, authentication, and ciphering are investigated in de-
tails for the BS and MS in various stages. The emphasis is on the 2 critical stages 
that have lacks being: “Authentication stage” and “Key Material Exchange 
stage”.  
According to the literature review which was discussed in details throughout this 
chapter and further investigations of this dissertation, one can conclude that major 
weaknesses, shortages and setbacks when it comes to mitigating and dealing with 
security issues of WiMAX can be seen as follows: 
-  Adding the timestamps and signatures needs many modifications to the stand-
ard. 
-   For Key Space Vulnerability using more number of bits for acknowledgment 
needs modification on the deployed encryption and decryption mechanism. 
- Tree based Rekeying for prevention of Denial of Service attack scheme results 
in storage overhead. 
-  Neglecting the messages as a solution can end up in DoS. 
-  For Malicious Insiders attack utilization of several keys results in the issue of 
settling down the several keys at decryption or deciphering stage. 
This dissertation proposes some useful algorithms, classifications and modellings 
together with interpretations and basic comparisons mainly in case of the pro-
posed IDS design, WiMAX security and VoIP under WiMAX to fill the gap in 
the literature about the above weaknesses. In order to contribute and address the 
existing gap, this dissertation zooms on specific and existing attacks. Following 
this perspective in 2013, M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan et al. published a journal 
paper and launched a risk analysis of threats and vulnerabilities of VoIP that is a 
service which can be offered under the framework of IEEE 802.16. 
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In addition to this, deriving from the notion of bringing about innovative ideas, in 
2013, M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan et al. published a paper and explained the deg-
radation occurred in mobile WiMAX due to an instant increase in the number of 
simultaneous subscribers by an economic model regarded as Kiyotaki-Moore. 
Moreover, having mentioned the weaknesses and problems of existing security 
classifications, M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan et al. came up with a hybrid security 
classification approach which complies with the standards and in the same time 
fills the gaps. 
Regarding the notion of IDS, having said about its necessity and importance, M. 
Hossein Ahmadzadegan et al. have proposed a more enhanced WiMAX-based 
intrusion detection system that is in the same time more efficient in terms of pow-
er consumption. Further on, the comparative analysis of fixed and mobile Wi-
MAX and the encryption of data and keys in both the technologies has been pro-
vided. This is understandable because the similarities and differences offer a more 
professional perspective. Having this considered, in 2013 M. Hossein Ahmadza-
degan et al. published a paper explaining the similarities and differences of Wi-
MAX and LTE in terms of security basics with a comparative analysis approach. 
An analysis of the security attacks on the WiMAX and architecture has been car-
ried out as well. Main emphasis would be on the threats analysis of physical and 
MAC layer. Intrusion Detection System is recommended to be deployed for miti-
gating some of the threats. Jamming, scrambling, DDoS, rouge BS creation, com-
promising of X.509 digital certificates are just some of the common attacks on 
WiMAX technology. The offered techniques deployed contra these attacks are 
spread spectrum scheme, strong encryption techniques, communication keys se-
curity and reciprocal two-way authentication. In addition to this alternatives for 
authentication are elaborated. All the above mentioned issues are given attention 
with details in chapters. 
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4. SECURITY OF IEEE 802.16   
4.1 IEEE 802.16 Main Security  
There are several security methods defined in data over cable service interface 
specification (DOCSIS). The 802.16 methods are basically identical to those of 
DOCSIS (CableLabs® 2013). For encryption of the MPDUs payload, DES is 
deployed when it comes to WiMAX. The DES data encryption is shown in Figure 
13. In addition to this, as previously mentioned PKM Protocol performs certifi-
cate-based authorization of the subscriber station. The PKM protocol utilization 
authentications and RSA public key systems to authenticate a SS to a BS. The SS 
gives its X.509 certificate to the BS, consequently revealing its identity together 
with public key to the BS. The BS replies with an authorization key to the SS, 
ensured by the SS's open key utilizing the RSA calculation. 
The SS can decode the acknowledged key utilizing its private key. The authoriza-
tion key is then deployed to determine key encryption keys (KEKs), the SS and 
BS, since they are both well aware that the authorization key can infer the same 
KEKs. To exchange a TEK (temporal encryption key) from the BS to the SS, the 
TEK is scrambled utilizing the Data Encryption Standard (DES) that is weak. In 
order to mitigate and encounter the threats, the 802.16e particularly incorporates 
security upgrades to utilize the AES-CCM coded mode and EAP-based validation 
(IEEE Std 802.16a, Amendment to IEEE Std 802.16 2001). 
Michel Barbeau investigated on some vulnerabilities and security issues of the 
802.16. In his paper (M. Barbeau 2005), vulnerabilities and problems related to 
the PHY and MAC layer were explored and all associated important aspects were 
investigated and compared with meticulous evaluation procedures set by ETSI. 
Dangers are grouped according to the level of criticality they have. The chief se-
curity problems are eavesdropping the admin management messages, admin man-
agement message alteration, BS or MS disguising, and DoS attacks. The WiMAX 
is said to have the potential to settle down the bandwidth bottleneck problem. 
Expanding the adventures and blemishes discovered in the 802.11, the WiMAX 
standard was precisely designed with security issues in mind, providing a more 
reliable protection. 
The WiMAX system is such that a BS is playing the role of a cell phone tower 
and provides the signals all the time, thus those users who have a WiMAX mo-
dem can receive the signals and establish the connection. Therefore in this proce-
dure the security becomes an essential topic to be taken care of. The WiMAX 
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MAC Protocol is in charge of the user’s access to the physical layer. Having said 
all this, the WiMAX standard network topology outlook can be seen below in 
Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12. IEEE 802.16 standard’s network topology (S. Rekhis et al. 2010) 
When it comes to the 802.16 MAC, first-in first-out (FIFO) scheduling algorithm 
is deployed for the traffic and its associated issues. The 802.16 MAC protocol 
provides relatively ideal QoS by a fair bandwidth allocation.  
4.2 Past IEEE 802.16 Security Concerns   
 Despite the fact that IEEE 802.16-2004 standard has all the elements of being 
secure because of the combination of security mechanisms within the MAC lay-
er’s security sublayer, numerous security shortcomings identified with this form 
were uncovered and are depicted by the previous carried out research works. 
Many of these shortcomings are identified with confirmation, protection, key ad-
ministration and accessibility. This part portrays the fundamental security short-
coming identified the IEEE 802.16 standard, indicating potential security risks 
and the practical countermeasures to avert them.       
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Figure 13. DES data encryption (IEEE 802.16 2004) 
4.2.1 Physical Layer Attacks 
The security issue is characterized on top of the physical layer when it comes to 
WiMAX standards, causing the network to inherit the susceptibilities of wireless 
medium. Therefore physical layer becomes susceptible to scrambling, jamming, 
flooding and forgery attacks. S. Xu and his colleagues suggested that jamming 
security risk comprises of creating a powerful Gaussian noise for diminishing and 
interfering the wireless channel’s capacity (S. Xu et al. 2006). Such conduct may 
compromise administration accessibility, particularly if the attacker has shut the 
BS. If it is so then what WiMAX deploys like Scalable OFDM access (SOFD-
MA) and Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDM) cannot fit for 
taking care of such sort of attack (S. Xu et al. 2006). 
A jamming attack requires particular fittings. The danger connected with such a 
risk, which could be easily distinguished utilizing radio range analyzers and 
checking supplies, is critical. U. Tariq, and his colleagues highlighted that the 
area of the attack might be discovered utilizing radio scanning instruments (U. 
Tariq et al. 2007). 
A scrambling attack implies to scramble administration or control data in a selec-
tive way, therefore disturbing the usual operation of the system, or even compro-
mising the system and controlling it. Scrambling becomes very critical particular-
ly when it addresses messages that are not delay tolerant, incorporating channel 
estimation report requests or reactions. A jamming attack could be distinguished 
hinging upon the dissection of disparities with respect to the framework's execu-
tion. Flooding is an alternative sort of attack belonged to the physical layer that 
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includes transmitting pointless frames keeping in mind the end goal to empty the 
SS's electric storage device or evaporate. In this setting, an alternative method for 
catching and tossing the fake outlines should be utilized. Therefore in brief the 
threats and their solutions can be as follows: 
- Jamming attack 
Jamming is described by M. Barbeau as an attack that can be launched by intro-
ducing a source of noise strong enough to significantly diminish the capacity of 
the channel (M. Barbeau 2005). Jamming can be either intentional or unintention-
al. It is not difficult to perform a jamming attack because necessary information 
and equipment’s are easy to acquire. 
Solution: According to M. Barbeau, one can protect against jamming attack by 
increasing the power of signals or by increasing the bandwidth of signals deploy-
ing methods of spreading like direct sequence spread spectrum (DSS) or frequen-
cy spread spectrum (FHSS). Furthermore as a result of the fact that, it is easy to 
detect jamming by deploying radio spectrum monitoring equipment and the 
sources of jamming are easy to be traced by deploying radio direction finding 
instruments, one can also ask help from law enforcement to stop the jammers. 
- Scrambling attack 
Also analyzed in (Barbeau 2005), scrambling can be considered as a kind of 
jamming but only provoked for small time intervals and targeted to particular 
WiMAX frames at the PHY layer. Attackers can selectively scramble administra-
tion or control data for affecting the normal network’s functioning. Slots of data 
traffic belonging to the targeted SSs can be scrambled selectively, forcing them to 
retransmit. It is more intricate to perform a scrambling attack than to perform a 
jamming attack due to the need, by the attacker, to interpret control information 
and to send noise during specific intervals”. 
Solution: As a result of the fact that scrambling is occurring at irregular intervals, 
it is much more intricate to detect scrambling than jamming. Fortunately, one can 
utilize anomalies monitoring beyond performance norm to detect scrambling and 
scramblers. 
-  Flooding attack: 
According to D. Johnson and J. Walker (D. Johnson et al. 2004), this is also a 
usual attack in which an attacker forces a SS to drain its battery or consume com-
puting resources by sending a series of bogus frames. This type of attack is count-
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ed as even more destructive than a typical Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack since 
the SS that is a normally a portable device is possible to have limited resources. 
Solution: To prevent this kind of attack, a complex mechanism is essential to dis-
card bogus frames, therefore avoiding running out of battery or computational 
resources. 
- Forgery attack 
In addition to threats jamming, scrambling and flooding attacks, 802.16 is also 
vulnerable to other attacks such as forgery attacks in which an attacker with a 
radio transmitter can write to a wirelesschannel (D. Johnson 2004) . In mesh 
mode, 802.16 is also vulnerable to replay attacks in which an attacker retransmits 
valid frames that the attacker has intercepted in the middle of relaying process. 
4.2.2 Authentication Attacks 
During the PKM protocol’s authorization, mobile automatically dispatches its 
certificate for authenticating itself whereas the base station does not. An intruder 
can impersonate and pretend to be an authorized base station and in this way at-
tract the mobile station. The attracted mobile station will strive to establish con-
nection to the rouge base station. In case the CSMA mechanism is deployed, the 
intruder would normally be able to obtain the identity of the base station, and 
postpone the action until the medium allows the message transmission deploying 
the base station identity. The utilization of TDMA makes the attacks so intricate 
in 802.16 networks because the attacker should obtain the identity of the base 
station and wait for the authorized base station’s time slot. It sends the message 
deploying a high power for forcing the subscriber station to block the signal 
transmitted by the authorized base station (Michael Barbeau 2005). Following the 
striving to attach itself to the fake base station, the subscriber station goes on with 
the PKM protocol’s authorization through dispatching the primary two messages. 
As soon as the Authorization- RepMess is received, the fake base station returns 
an authorization response message to the subscriber station. In it’s content, the 
intruder puts an AK that is coded with the subscriber station’s public key. As a 
result of the fact that, SS usually does not check the authenticity of the captured 
message because of impersonation and already establishing the connection, it ap-
proves the captured AK and goes on with KEK followed by generation of down-
link/uplink HMAC keys therefore the intruder can get control over the communi-
cation of the subscriber station. Thus at the base station, by utilization of the cre-
dentials belonged to subscriber station, the intruder can register herself success-
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fully, furthermore carrying out a MIM attack. The chief shortcomings associated 
to the explained attack are as a result of the lack of reciprocal two-way authenti-
cation (T. F. Elrahman 2005).  
In order to make sure that subscriber station can authenticate the base station 
seamlessly, a probable way can be integration of the authorization response mes-
sage, base station’s certificate and the signature. For warrantying the activeness of 
the authorization response message together with replay attacks prevention, it is 
recommended to complement it with the relevant timestamp information that the 
subscriber station attached in the authorization request message. When it comes to 
the authorization request message, the point is to secure the base station against 
replay attacks and allow the subscriber station to check if the received message 
matches with the transmitted demand. One can notice the fact that the base station 
should take into account the attached timestamp throughout the signature of the 
authorization response message.  
The principle impediment identified with the deployment of timestamps includes 
the requirement to adjust the subscriber station with the base station. It ought not 
to be challenging subsequent to the WiMAX standard, the subscriber station and 
base station adjust with one another throughout the first ranging prior to the PKM 
protocol’s starting point. There the timestamps will be deployed. Some modifica-
tions were suggested for deploying timestamps as a countermeasure contra replay 
attacks (S. Xu, M. Matthews and C.-T. Huang 2006). The formal presentation of 
the messages can be observed as follows: 
1. AuthenticationInfMess (SS → BS): Cert (Manufacturer(SS)). 
2. AuthorizationReqMess (SS → BS): TSS | Cert(SS) | Capabilities | SAID | 
SigSS. 
3. AuthorizationRepMess (BS → SS): TSS | TBS | [Pre-AK]pubSS | LifeTimeAK 
| SeqNo 
| SAIDList | Cert(BS) | SigBS. 
The subscriber station generates the timestamps that are denoted by TSS and in-
jected in the authorization request message. In order to fight back against replay 
attacks, the base station puts the subscriber station’s timestamp captured from the 
second message in the authorization response message, together with a newly 
issued TBS timestamp.  
The message number two together with the message number three are signed by 
subscriber station and base station’s private key. SigSS and SigBS represent the 
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two generated signatures. Through the aid of the timestamp and the signature of 
the base station, the subscriber station becomes able to check if the captured mes-
sage is active and matches with its request.  
Utilizing NonceSS rather than timestamps can be a practical result in authoriza-
tion request/ response messages. It should be highlighted that deploying the pub-
lic key of the subscriber station, the authorization response message’s nonce may 
alternatively become ciphered. Other alternative can be utilizing pre-shared AK 
instead of AK and permit the base station and the subscriber station for deriving 
the AK (S. Rekhis et al. 2010).  
Therefore there should be a promising method for pre-AK’s integrity and authen-
ticity transmitted among the base station and subscriber station. D. Johnston and 
J. Walker suggested that it is possible to change the PKM protocol’s authorization 
as it can be oberved: 
1. AuthenticationInfMess (SS → BS): Cert (Manufacturer(SS). 
2. AuthorizationReqMess (SS → BS): NonceSS | Cert(SS) | Capabilities | SAID. 
3. AuthorizationRepMess (BS→SS): NonceSS | NonceBS | [Pre-AK]pubSS | 
LifeTimeAK 
| SeqNo | SAIDList | Cert(BS) | SigBS. 
The subscriber station issues the NonceSS which is a random number, and further 
injects it in the authorization request message. Both the received NonceSS togeth-
er with NonceBS are injected in the authorization response message by the base 
station. 
The suggested measure just issues permission to the subscriber station to ascertain 
that the message number 3 is active and matches with its demand. When it comes 
to the authorization request message, for safeguarding the base station against the 
replay attacks, a set of already captured nonces from the same subscriber station 
must be deployed for detecting the replayed messages. 
4.2.3 Key Administration Attacks 
The PKM protocol’s key administration stage is also susceptible when it comes to 
replay kind of attacks. Indeed, in certain cases, the subscriber station is not capa-
ble of distinguishing between a novel and an old reutilized data SA, particularly 
as the key response message does not contain enough data for checking the au-
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thenticity of the replier’s. The 802.16 key administration protocol is presented 
below: 
Message 1. BS--->SS: SeqNo| SAID | HMAC (1) 
Message 2. SS--->BS: SeqNo| SAID | HMAC (2) 
Message 3. BS--->SS: SeqNo| SAID | OldTEK | 
NewTEK | HMAC (3) 
After authentication is carried out, subscriber station starts to ask for keying mate-
rials. The subscriber station transmits a key request message to the base station 
regularly, associated with one of its legitimate SAIDs. The base station replies 
with a Key-Reply message, including the BS’s active keying material for the spe-
cific SAID. In this protocol, message 1 is arbitrary. BS transmits re-key message 
(message 1) to subscriber station just if base station considers it required to rekey 
prior to when subscriber station asks for it. The base station will select a SAID 
from the SAID list which the subscriber station is permitted to access. SeqNo is 
the sequence number of AK given by base station to this subscriber station in the 
authentication protocol.  
This number permits the subscriber station (and base station in the next message) 
to determine which HMAC_KEY_D (HMAC_KEY_U in the next message) was 
actually deployed to authenticate the message. HMAC(1) is the digest of message 
1 under HMAC_KEY_D. Both of the downlink HMAC key (HMAC_KEY_D) 
and the uplink HMAC key (HMAC_KEY_U) are originated from the AK. By 
calculating the value HMAC(1), it permits SS to identify message forgery or cor-
ruption. Once receiving message 1, SS will answer with the Key- Request mes-
sage (message 2). In case SS does not get message 1 from BS prior to when the 
present key expires, SS will transmit the normal Key-Request message when the 
present key is near expiration, where the SAID is selected by SS itself from the 
SAID list, to ask for a refresh of keying material for this specific SAID. 
HMAC(2) is the digest of message 2 under HMAC_KEY_U, which ascertains BS 
about the authentication of the message. Further on the BS answers with the Key-
Reply message (message 3) at once after receiving the SS’s request that contains 
keying materials. Always BS keeps two active sets of keying material per SAID. 
The OldTEK is the keying materials for the presently used TEK, and the New-
TEK is the keying materials for the new to be used after the current one expires 
TEK. The keying materials comprises the TEK ciphered by the KEK (Key En-
cryption Key) that is also originated from the AK. Moreover, the set of keying 
materials also contains the CBC initialization vector and the remaining lifetime of 
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each set of keying materials. HMAC(3) is the digest of message 3 under 
HMAC_KEY_D. As in message 1, HMAC(3) ascertains SS that message 3 is 
from BS and has not been changed. The key administration protocol is threatened 
by the message replay attack that is counted among the chief perils. The SS is not 
able to distinguish the reused data SAs, exactly similar to when it cannot distin-
guish reused authorization SA in authentication protocol. It should be mentioned 
that if the opponent resends message 3 to SS following when the SS has previous-
ly interchanged some keying materials with BS, the SS can express handily if 
message 3 matches with its request. This is due to the fact that each SAID keeps 
two set of keying materials, and that the relevant OldTEK received key reply 
message a little while ago should be the NewTEK in the past key reply message. 
Thus, for carrying out the replay attack, the opponent should mislead the SS from 
the starting point when initially the SS asks for keying materials. However by 
now the opponent will encounter another hurdle. The responsible utilization of the 
AK offers a manner for both BS and SS to verify the validity of the key admin-
istration protocol instance. In case the opponent wants to replay an old Key Reply 
message, the HAMC_KEY_D deployed in HMAC(3) should be originated from 
the AK that the SS utilizes presently. Therefore the sole opportunity for the suc-
cess of this replay attack is that the opponent eavesdropped and saved a previous 
sequence of interchanged key request/reply messages, and the key administration 
protocol is reset that makes SS asking for a completely new keying materials. The 
countermeasure against this attack is forcing SS to ask for a new AK every time 
the present key administration protocol instance is reset or fails (S. Xu 2006).  
The messages should be tied to a certain protocol for preventing replays from 
succeeding contra key administration. The method is to put the nonces inter-
changed in the past Authentication Protocol as the instance identifier but the re-
sponsible utilization of the AK already offers a manner to detect these instances. 
The SeqNo of AK offers some connections between the instance of related key 
administration protocol and the instance of authentication protocol. Nevertheless 
this number of   4-bits long is susceptible to be reused and thus makes the key 
administration protocol liable to replay attack, the digest of these messages inter-
changed while key administration takes place offers a path to ascertain both par-
ties about the legitimate AK’s validity. For the replay attack to be successful, the 
opponent must not just replay the SeqNo, but also replay the correct HMAC mes-
sage whose ciphering key is originated from the presently deployed AK in the 
associated authentication protocol instance. The key administration protocol in-
stance’s binding failure to its associated authentication protocol instance will take 
place just in case when by chance another example of authentication protocol 
happened to have the same AK and the same SeqNo. As a result of the AK’s ran-
dom generation, this is labeled as rare. 
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Even though the subscriber station is free from the replay attacks when it comes 
to message 3, base station is yet susceptible to replay attacks on message 2. The 
reason behind is that the key request message does not have the keying material 
similar to the key reply message that permits the receiver to make comparison 
with its already received message. Therefore if an opponent replays the key re-
quest message to base station, the base station is not capable of distinguishing if it 
is subscriber station’s fresh request or just an old one. Thus, base station then an-
swers with message 3 that allocates new keying materials to subscriber station in 
case when subscriber station did not ask for at all. This can lead to regular inter-
change of keying materials which may cause the confusion in the utilization of 
TEK or an overflow of base station’s capabilities. This case is relatively identical 
to the one base station encounters in the authentication protocol. Eventually, this 
attack leads to the fact that both the subscriber station and base station inter-
change keying material without intentions. The following method was suggested 
by S. Xu, M. Matthews and C.-T. Huang to stop this attack: 
1. RkeyMess (BS → SS): TBS | SeqNo | SAID | HMAC(RkeyMess) 
2. KReqMess (SS → BS): TBS | TSS | SeqNo | SAID | HMAC(KReqMess) 
3. KRepMess (BS → SS): TSS | TBS | SeqNo | SAID | OldTEK | NewTEK | 
HMAC 
(KRepMess) 
Therefore basically the base station and subscriber station issue the TBS and TSS 
which are the 2 timestamps existing in messages they transmit. In case the base 
station transmits the alternative message RkeyMess, the subscriber station incor-
porates the TBS issued in that message in the KReqMess message. The base sta-
tion can delete or neglect it in KRepMess by fixing its value to null. If the 
RkeyMess is not transmitted and the subscriber station begins the request, the 
timestamp TBS is set to null in KReqMess. The base station sets the TBS in 
KRepMess message associated to the KReqMess message’s TSS value (S. Xu et 
al 2006).  
For recognizing the TEKs, the standard deploys key identifiers of 2-bits long in a 
round buffer. Normally, within the largest value of AK lifetime, the key identifier 
space must support the deployment of several completely diverse key identifiers. 
Based on facts AK lifecycle can last up to 70 days, moreover the shortest TEK is 
30 minutes long, therefore the key identifier section supports circa 3360 various 
TEKs. The latter ranges from three to null on each fourth rekeying action. An 
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intruder may then replay the utilized TEKs which will lead to a compromise of 
the TEK and the data.  
4.2.4 Privacy Attacks 
The WiMAX standard demonstrates the support for encryption by incorporating 
DES in CBC mode as an encryption algorithm. This algorithm has a mechanism 
which applies on data blocks of 64 bits to carry out the encryption or decryption 
action and utilizes 56-bit DES keys (TEK) and an Initialization Vector (IV). Basi-
cally, 56 bit key cannot be considered as secure enough as far as today’s require-
ments are concerned, that handily permits one to check each and every probable 
key in a specific interval of time. In addition to this, the CBC-IV can be predicted 
because the SA IV is fixed and public for its TEK and the physical adjustment is 
typically repeated so many times. To deal with this issue and at the same time 
keeping the alternative of the utilization of DES, the only way would be produc-
ing each per-frame initialization vector in a random manner and injecting it in the 
payload, but this way definitely adds to the encryption overhead. 
D. Johnston and J. Walker, claim that the CBC modes deploying block cipher can 
become untrustworthy after a certain amount of operation on 2n/2 blocks, where 
“n” denotes the block size. As a result of the fact that DES utilizes 64 bit blocks, 
it results in insecurity if deployed on more than 212 64-bit blocks. As already 
mentioned, the normal TEK life cycle is half of a day but lasts at most for up to 
seven days. If the pace permits one to generate the 212 64-bit blocks in an interval 
of time smaller than the TEK lifecycle, then the encryption scheme becomes very 
susceptible because if more tries would be performed and the security is only 
safeguarded up to a certain limit. Therefore if one takes a pace of 6 Mbps, the 
total of 212 blocks will be generated in twelve hours. 
Another essential point is that the data protection mechanism deploying DES not 
only fails to offer an acceptable confidentiality but also is not successful to pro-
tect contra replay attacks. According to the shortages and existing lacks regarding 
the deployment of DES, the standard permits for ciphering of the message utiliz-
ing the AES in CCM mode with 128 bit TEK key. 
4.2.5 Attacks on Availability 
Another method comprises of over harnessing and overusing the message replay 
in such a way that the authorized base station would be rejected (E. Eren and K.-
O. Detken 2008). As a result of the fact that the authorization request message 
 Acta Wasaensia     63 
 
 
  
does not include any section that makes sure if it is fresh and active, the PKM 
protocol becomes susceptible to replay attack.  
Following when an authorized subscriber station transmits the authorization re-
quest message, the intruder intervenes and blocks this message and saves it. It 
would furthermore transmit the received message continuously to the base station. 
Considering the fact that this action does not permit the intruder to get the AK’s 
value, it can overload the base station and cause it to reject the authentic and au-
thorized subscriber station (E. Eren 2007). 
To protect contra similar attacks, the authorization request message must include 
a nonce or time-stamp together with the signature of the subscriber station to 
make sure about the activeness and authenticity of the message. 
When it comes to the second stage of the PKM protocol, considering the fact that 
the replay attack on the KRespMess message is not expected to be successful, the 
base station continues to be susceptible to an attack targeted at KReqMess mes-
sage. Indeed, unlike the KRespMess message, the KReqMess message does not 
include keying materials that permit the receiver to make a comparison with the 
already captured message. As a result of the fact that the base station cannot 
check the activeness of the captured message, it would produce and allocate a 
novel keying material to the subscriber station, even if the latter did not ask for it. 
Further on, it answers with a KRespMess message to the subscriber station. It can 
be considered that if this procedure takes place regularly, it may end up the re-
sources of the base station (E. Eren 2007). 
Ranging Response messages (RNG-REP) that are interchanged while the node 
attachment takes place, are susceptible to numerous kinds of attacks. Indeed, 
these messages are not ciphered and thus they cannot be authenticated together 
with being stateless. As a result of the fact that a subscriber station takes into ac-
count instantly the novel parameters offered by the base station, RNG-REP mes-
sages could be utilized in a rogue and negative way by an intruder.  
One of the arbitrary sections of this message, is the Ranging Status section that is 
deployed to state if uplink messages are captured within acceptable bounds by the 
base station. An intruder can distinguish the Channel ID (CID) that the target sub-
scriber station is utilizing and produce a spoofed RNG-REP message by fixing the 
Ranging Status section to 2.  
One should take care of the fact that the intruder can handily apply the brute force 
on the Channel ID by trying all the 65 536 expected values. Thus the target sub-
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scriber station is blocked and not permitted to carry out regular ranging and is 
therefore excluded from the network. 
 According to the existing shortages and lacks in safeguarding the RNG-REP 
message, an intruder can utilize that message to disallow the downlink/uplink 
channel that the subscriber station utilizes. In case there is no base station func-
tioning within that channel, the subscriber station will keep on to navigate and 
screen the frequencies by sniffing for a minimum of 2ms prior to moving to the 
next channel.  
Hinging on the number of active channels, the latter action can last for a remarka-
ble time interval. It is crucial to mention that after scanning the all the channels, 
the subscriber station will strive to reutilize the suitable channel. If the intrusion is 
happening again and again, the subscriber station would be incapable to get ac-
cess to the network and deduces to a denial of service. 
4.3 Present IEEE 802.16 Security Concerns 
In WiMAX, the security sublayer was redesigned for manipulation of security 
faults existed in the past editions of this protocol and fulfill the security needs for 
mobile services.  
In this framework, the security sublayer is improved, ciphering mechanisms are 
enhanced, reciprocal two-way authentication methods are suggested to safeguard 
contra numerous sorts of replay and MiM intrusions, pre-authentication among 
the base station and mobile station is put forward to diminish any possible ser-
vices interruption while handover operations, a key hierarchy is designed to per-
mit an mobile station authenticating itself with an AAA server once not depend-
ent on the number of base station it authorizes with handover and then the PKM 
protocol is further expanded to version two.  
It is of great importance to mention that in the expanded IEEE.16e security sub-
layer, both editions of the PKM protocol are covered. Version one is basically 
expanded to cover novel ciphering mechanisms entitling AES-ECB for confiden-
tiality of the key material, TDES-EDE and AES-CCM for confidentiality of 
MPDU purposes (S. Rekhis et al. 2010).  
From the other perspective, HMAC-SHA-1 is utilized for safeguarding the key 
administration message’s integrity. In this part, the security aspects of IEEE 
802.16e would be clarified by explaining the improvement introduced associated 
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with the IEEE 802.16-2004 edition. Moreover characteristics and methods offered 
by the deployment of PKM second edition are concentrated in details. 
4.3.1 Access Control, Authorization, Reciprocal Two-way Authentication  
The PKM second edition protocol covers reciprocal two-way authorization and 
authentication providing the chance for the base station and subscriber station to 
identify each other’s specifications. Various sorts of reciprocal two-way authenti-
cations are covered: EAP-based authentication (P. Urien and G. Pujolle 2008), 
RSA-based authentication together with EAP based authentication. RSA-based 
authentication includes the utilization of RSA encryption and X.509 certificates. 
EAP entitles the symmetric type of cryptography and is according to the utiliza-
tion of EAP that is basically an authentication protocol for user authentication 
while accessing to local or remote networks. 
The AAA architecture which is a reverse authentication infrastructure is de-
ployed. The mobile authentication can be carried out utilizing a credential gener-
ated by the X.509 digital certificate or the operator. Numerous EAP authentica-
tion mechanisms (T. Otto 2006) are covered by the second edition of PKM, con-
sisting EAP-AKA, EAP-TLS and EAP-CHAPv2. The feedback of EAP is 512-bit 
key, regarded as the Master Session Key (MSK) that is the origin of key hierar-
chy. By the aid of this key, the mobile station and the base station obtain a Pair-
wise Master Key (PMK) that is itself deployed to get to the AK.  
Here a model based on the RSA authentication is suggested that is a key transport 
protocol deployed by the authorization stage of the PKM second edition protocol 
(A. Altaf, M.Y. Javed and A. Ahmed 2008). In this edition of the PKM protocol, 
a reciprocal two-way authentication method is deployed, and nonces are added to 
safeguard contra replay attacks. The authorization stage that is demonstrated be-
low, is comprised of 4 stages, where the initial stage is optional: 
1. Authorization initiation (MS → BS): MS.manufacturerCert. 
2. Authorization Request (MS → BS): NMS | MSCert | Capabilities | BCID. 
3. Authorization Reply (BS → MS): NMS | NBS | KUMS(pre-AK, MSID) | Se-
qNo | 
Lifetime | SAIDs | BSCert | SIGBS (Authorization reply). 
4. Authorization Acknowledgement (MS → BS): NBS | MSaddr | AK(NBS, 
MSAddr). 
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Indistinguishable to the PKM first edition, it is the mobile station that begins the 
authorization protocol. It would transmit an optional message consisting the mo-
bile station manufacturer’s certificate. The mobile station afterwards transmits an 
authorization request message containing its X.509 certificate, together with a 
nonce, represented by NMS, consisting 64-bit value which it issues. 
The message as well entitles the mobile station’s potentials together with the 
Basic Connection Identity (BCID) that is identical to the CID and allocated to the 
mobile station when it move into the network and asked for ranging. It is to be 
highlighted that, this message is not protected and can be a victim to rogue tries or 
alternations.  
The base station replies with an Authorization Reply message after authorization 
request message’s reception, including the mobile station’s nonce, NBS that is a 
nonce issued by itself together with its certificate, pre-AK with mobile station’s 
identifier (MSID) ciphered by the public key of the mobile station’s and the char-
acteristics of the Authorization key containing the sequence number, lifetime of 
the key and a single or several SAIDs (S. Rekhis et al. 2010). 
The base station signs the authorization reply message. It is crucial to highlight 
that the SAIDs in this message are arbitrary if an RSA authorization interaction 
would proceed by an EAP authentication interaction. The AK would be originated 
from the pre-AK with the base station and mobile station addresses. As a result of 
the fact that an authorized subscriber station is capable of extracting the Pre-AK, 
the mobile station authorization may be verified in accordance with the condition 
of having the pre-AK. 
For the base station to be able to approve the authorization request message and 
also an authorization acknowledgement message is transmitted by the subscriber 
station to the authorization reply message’s reception through the base station to 
ascertain that the subscriber station has come up with a valid access request to the 
network services. This message comprises of the base station’s transmitted nonce, 
the mobile station’s MAC address ciphered with the pre-AK and the respective 
MAC address. In WiMAX networks, the mobility is covered in such a way that a 
mobile station can hand over from one visited base station to another. While the 
handover action takes place, a mobile station can utilize the pre-authentication 
with the new base station rather than performing the whole authorization process 
from the scratch. 
In fact, as a result of the protocol of authentication being in accordance with the 
public key infrastructure’s utilization, it might be recommended to avoid such 
steps and speedup getting into the network by initiating a new authorization key 
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in the targeted base station and mobile station in accordance with a pre-
authentication mechanism. When it comes to migration of the voice call, for in-
stance, the International Telecommunication Union proposes taking a certain time 
interval of fewer than thirty milliseconds from the first base station’s leaving 
moment to establishing the context at another base station. 
Normally, in case a Ranging message transmitted by a mobile station involves the 
novel serving BSID, and in case the base station to which the mobile station 
hands over has previously captured backbone’s message including the data of 
mobile station, the PKM protocol’s re-authorization procedure must be utilized by 
the mobile station and the novel base station to accomplish the network re-
entrance when it comes to handover. 
4.3.2 TEK 3-Way Handshake 
The handshake protocol covers many actions involving activation of keys, negoti-
ation on SA factors, acceptance of security negotiation and SA factors refresh (T. 
Haibo, P. Liaojun and W. Yumin 2007).Thus, the protocol is followed up to the 
first authorization or while handover takes place as below: 
1. SA-TEK Challenge (BS → MS): NBS | SeqNo | AKID | LifeTime |H-C/MAC(-
). 
2. SA-TEK Request (MS → BS): NMS | NBS | SeqNo | AKID | Capabilities | 
SecNego- 
Params | PKM Config | H-C/MAC(-). 
3. SA-TEK Response (BS→MS): NMS | NBS | SeqNo | AKID | SA-TEKUpdate | 
Frame- 
No | SA-Descriptors | SecNegoParams | H-C/MAC(-). 
The AK can be originated from one of the three different ways hinging on the 
authentication scheme deployed. Prior to the beginning of the three-way hand-
shake, the BS and SS derive a common shared KEK together with the 
HMAC/CMAC keys. The PKM second edition three-way handshake process 
takes place as follows. While the first network entry takes place, the BS transmits 
PKM second edition SA-TEK-Challenge to the SS after safeguarding it with the 
HMAC/CMAC. If the BS does not receive PKM second edition SA-TEK-Request 
from the SS within SAChallenge-Timer, it retransmits the past PKM second edi-
tion SA-TEK-Challenge up to SAChallengeMaxResends times. If the BS gets to 
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its maximum number of retransmissions, it starts another complete authentication 
or sometimes discards the SS (WiMAX Made Simple 2010). 
If HO Process Optimization is fixed at Bit #1 , demonstrating that PKM authenti-
cation phase is ignored while network re-entry or handover, the BS starts the 
three-way handshake by attaching the SAChallenge tuple TLV to the RNG-RSP. 
If the BS does not receive PKM second edition SA-TEK-Request from the MS 
within SaChallengeTimer, it can drop the MS or start a complete re-
authentication. In case the BS gets an initial RNG-REQ when PKM second edi-
tion SA-TEK-Request is expected, it will then transmit a new RNG-RSP with 
another SaChallenge TLV. 
The SS transmits the PKM second edition SA-TEK-Request to the BS next to 
safeguarding it with the HMAC/CMAC. In case the SS does not get PKM second 
edition SA-TEK-Response from the BS during the expected time in 
SATEKTimer, then it has to retransmit the request. The SS may retransmit the 
PKM second edition SA-TEK-Request up to SATEKRequestMaxResends times. 
In case when the SS gets to its maximum number of retransmissions, it must start 
another complete authentication or strive to associate with another BS. The SS 
entitles the security capabilities that it included in the SBC-REQ message while 
the basic capabilities negotiation phase takes place. 
As soon as when the PKM second edition SA-TEK-Request is received, the BS 
approves that the supplied AKID points to an AK that is existing and available. In 
case when the AKID cannot be recognized, the BS ignores the message. The BS 
also checks the HMAC/CMAC. If the HMAC/CMAC is not valid, the BS ne-
glects the message. The BS must check that the BS_Random in the SA TEK Re-
quest corresponds with the value given by the BS in the SA Challenge message. 
In the scenario when the BS random value does not correspond, the BS will ne-
glect the message. Moreover, the BS must check the SS's security capabilities 
encoded in the security negotiation parameters characterization contra the security 
capabilities offered by the SS through the SBC-REG message. In case when the 
security negotiation parameters do not corresponds, the BS will report the issue to 
upper layers. As successful validation of the PKM second edition SA-TEK-
Request accomplishes, the BS transmits PKM second edition SATEK-Response 
back to the SS. The message contains a list of compound TLV each of which de-
termines the static and primary SAs, their SAID’s, and other in detailed character-
istics belonging to the SA which the SS is authorized to access. In the event when 
an HO takes place, the individual features of any dynamic SA that the asking MS 
was authorized in the past serving BS are available too. Moreover, the BS should 
entitle, via security negotiation parameters characterization, the security potentials 
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that it aims to highlight for the session with the SS. Moreover when it comes to 
HO, for every active SA in past serving BS, the matching GTEK, GKEK and 
TEK parameters are included as well. Therefore, SA_TEK_Update offers a 
shortcut mechanism for re-newing active SAs deployed by the MS in its past 
serving BS. It should be mentioned that TLVs determine SAID in the aimed BS 
that will substitute with active SAID utilized in the past serving BS together with 
"older" and "newer" TEK-parameters associated with the active SAIDs. The up-
date can contain as well items like multicast/broadcast Group SAIDs (GSAIDs) 
and associated GTEK parameter pairs. When it comes to unicast SAs, the TEK-
parameters characterization includes the whole associated keying material match-
ing an specific generation of an SAID's TEK. This actually consists of the TEK, 
the TEK's left key life-time, its key sequence number, and the CBC IV. The TEKs 
are ciphered with the KEK. In the scenario of having group or multicast SAs, the 
TEK-parameters characterization includes the whole keying material matching to 
a certain generation of a GSAID's GTEK. This will be comprised of the GKEK, 
the GTEK, the GTEK's left key lifetime, the GTEK's key sequence number, and 
the CBC IV. The GTEK’s type and length is equal to the ones of the TEK. The 
GKEK has to be shared similarly in the same multicast or broadcast group. The 
GTEKs and GKEKs are ciphered with KEK due to the fact that they are sent in 
form of a unicast. The HMAC/CMAC is regarded as the eventual attribute in the 
attribute list of the message. By the time when PKM second edition SA-TEK-
Response is received, an SS checks the HMAC/CMAC. In case the 
HMAC/CMAC is not valid, the SS neglects the message. After successful valida-
tion of the PKM second edition SA-TEK-Response is accomplished, the SS set-
ups the already received TEKs and related parameters correctly. The SS is also in 
charge of checking that the BS's security negotiation parameters of TLV encoded 
in the security negotiation parameters characterization against the security negoti-
ation parameters of TLV offered by the BS via the SBC-RSP message. In case 
when the security potentials and capabilities are not corresponding, the SS has to 
report the issue to higher layers. The SS may opt to keep on the communication 
with the BS. In this scenario, the SS may adopt the security negotiation parame-
ters encoded in SA-TEK-Response message (WiMAX Made Simple 2010). 
4.3.3 Encryption and Key Hierarchy 
When it comes to WiMAX standard, in order to encrypt the MAC PDU’s pay-
load, either the 128- bit keys of the Advanced Encryption Standard/ CCM mode 
or 56-bit keys of the Data Encryption Standard/CBC mode are deployed. In the 
initial mechanism, the data to be encrypted is separated into various blocks 
whereas just a single one is encrypted with the key.  
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Utilizing the second mechanism, the data is separated into various blocks of 128-
bits long. Each and every ciphered MAC PDU includes a prefix of 4 bytes, denot-
ing the packet number based on the SA. An Integrity Checking Value (ICV) of 8-
bytes long is further attached to the payload’s end. The packet number is not ci-
phered but involved when it comes to the ICV’s authentication. 
 The payload of MAC PDU and the ICV are ciphered by the TEK deploying AES 
in CCM mode. By entitling a packet number, AES offers a method against replay 
attacks, in such a way that any packet number captured more than one time within 
a fix interval of time would be ignored. If one compares AES with DES or TDES, 
it has a better security but in the same time it is computationally more complex 
(IEEE Std 802.16TM-2004 2004: 35).  
In mobile WiMAX data ciphering is done deploying AES in three more modes, 
chiefly 1- CBC mode having 128-bit keys 2- For broadcast/multicast services 
Counter mode (CTR) is used which has keys being 128-bits long  3- the Key-
Wrap.  
In the generic MAC header, the Encryption Control (EC) bit is deployed to judge 
if the MAC PDU is ciphered or not. It is to be highlighted that both the general 
MAC header and the general and initial MAC administration messages are not 
encrypted in mobile WiMAX. S.R. Bajgan, M. Pooyan, A. Khalilzadeh and R. 
Abdollahi in 2008 explained the utilization of AES in CTR mode with CBC au-
thentication code (CCM). However for TEK ciphering with KEK, the mobile 
WiMAX standard covers four mechanisms, chiefly 1- TDES in EDE mode utiliz-
ing 128-bit keys, 2- RSA ciphering utilizing 1024-bit keys, 3- AES ciphering in 
ECB mode utilizing 128 bit keys and 4- AES Key Wrap utilizing 128-bit keys (S. 
Y. Tang et al. 2010). 
It is clear that just the fourth mechanism is particular to mobile WiMAX, the rest 
were previously existing in past standards. Despite AES that utilizes the complete 
KEK’s 128 bits to cipher the TEK, the TDES EDE mode utilizes the initial 
KEK’s 64 bits for ciphering and the rest 64 bits for deciphering. The encryption 
procedure is done in three stages. Primarily, the TEK is ciphered by the first 
KEK’s 64 bits, whereas in the second stage the first cycle’s output is deciphered 
utilizing the second KEK’s 64 bits. The third stage includes ciphering the second 
cycle’s output utilizing the first KEK’s 64 bits.  
 In the initial stage, the TEK is ciphered by the initial KEK’s 64 bits whereas in 
the second stage the initial stage’s outcome is deciphered deploying the second 
KEK’s 64 bits. The third stage includes the ciphering of the outcome of the sec-
ond stage utilizing the initial KEK’s 64 bits. In addition to this, when it comes to 
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Mesh WiMAX structure, the TEK ciphering is carried out according to the de-
ployment of the subscriber station’s public key of the RSA. 
4.3.4 Multicast and Broadcast Service (MBS) 
The MBS of mobile WiMAX enables the distribution of data to multiple mobile 
stations with one single message therefore saving cost and bandwidth. As a result 
of the fact that base station should distribute the data securely, basically the whole 
nodes should have a shared group key. The key is regarded as GTEK and is de-
ployed by the base station to cipher the broadcast or multicast traffic. The MBS of 
WiMAX utilizes an algorithm regarded as MBRA (Multicast and Broadcast Re-
keying Algorithm) to issue, maintain and renew the GTEKs. Based on to the men-
tioned algorithm, a mobile station obtains the first GTEK by the aid of the Key 
Request/Reply messages. The mentioned messages are sent over the first man-
agement connection. Further on, for GTEK refreshment, the base station will send 
a PKM second edition Group Key Update Command message including an en-
crypted _ deploying the GKEK _ fresh GTEK to the members of the mobile sta-
tion group. In fact, the WiMAX standard has 2 kinds of the PKM second edition 
Group Key Update Command message: the GKEK Update Mode and GTEK Up-
date Mode. The first one is deployed for GKEK refreshment, whereas the other is 
for the GTEK refreshment of MBS. These two messages comprise a counter, 
namely Key Push Counter, for protection against replay attacks. 
More specifically, the MBRA is executed as follows: the base station via its initial 
administration connection transmits a Key Update Command to every mobile 
station for the GKEK update. The message includes the new GKEK ciphered 
through the KEK. Each mobile station holds a specific key KEK that is originated 
from the Authorization Key (AK) established during authentication. Then, the 
base station sends a Key Update Command for the GTEK update via broadcast 
type of connection. The latter includes the new GTEK ciphered with the corre-
sponding GKEK. In this context, broadcast messages are encrypted with a shared 
key (GTEK) known within the group. It is to be mentioned that, each member is 
able to decipher the traffic using the same known key. Message authentication is 
in accordance with the mentioned same key too. However, every group member is 
able to encrypt and authenticate messages as if they originate from the legitimate 
base station. The distribution of the GTEK when the MB RA is deployed is an-
other critical issue. Specifically, GTEK is encrypted with the GKEK and broad-
casted to all group members (G. Kambourakis et al. 2010). It is essential to ob-
serve that GKEK is also a shared key known to every group member. Thus, utiliz-
ing the GKEK, a malevolent insider is able to create fake encrypted and authenti-
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cated GTEK Key Update Command messages and attempt to distribute this 
GTEK. In case this scenario goes as planned, members of the group cannot deci-
pher MBS traffic coming from a real base station anymore. 
An insider can force mobile stations to accept the forged key in diverse manners. 
If the system is not suitably implemented, the key contained in the last one of 
subsequently sent GTEK update command messages may substitute the original 
one. Therefore, all the adversary has to do is transmitting its GTEK update com-
mand message following when the base station broadcasts a Key Update. In case 
the implementation is according to the standard, the keys belonging to the two 
messages are accepted. Thus, the insider could falsify specific parts of the base 
station's GTEK update command message making the receiving mobile station to 
discard it. After that, the attacker can send its own GTEK update command mes-
sage to the mobile stations. Considering the fact that MBS is one directional, the 
base station cannot distinguish that the mobile station has different GTEKs. In 
addition to this, the MBRA has another two chief lacks. Primarily when it comes 
to scalability: whenever the base station should refresh the GKEK, the new 
GKEK should be announced to all mobile station’s utilizing their respective key 
KEKs. Secondly, MBRA has several problems when it comes to the issue of for-
ward/backward secrecy. By the time a new member gets into the group and cap-
tures the present GTEK, it can decipher the whole past multicast messages trans-
mitted during the same GTEKs lifetime. Also, a mobile station that leaves the 
group can capture the following GKEK and decipher the following GTEK until 
the expiration of the present KEK. Moreover, GTEK lifetime has considerable 
impact on scalability and on forward/backward secrecy too. The standard does not 
mention any directions about the lifetime of the GTEK. Therefore one may sup-
pose that the lifetime of GTEK is the same as that of Traffic Encryption Keys, 
given the fact that GTEK is a special kind of TEK. Therefore, according to the 
specifications one can infer that the lifetime of GTEK is set to be 12 hours and the 
interval for the minimum is 30 min and for maximum is 7 days. Taking into ac-
count that how many log-in and log-out’s happen, increased lifetime of GTEK 
results in much longer gaps when it comes to forward/backward secrecy, due to 
the fact that higher number of messages are ciphered via the given GTEK. MBRA 
is similar to the Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP), which does not pro-
vide a solution for keeping the forward secrecy except by creating a completely 
new group without the leaving member. Thus, one can easily infer that this 
scheme is not scalable to large dynamic groups (G. Kambourakis et al. 2010). 
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4.3.5 Handover Mechanism’s Security 
The mobile WiMAX standard has 3 handover scenarios, chiefly Fast Base Station 
Switching (FBSS), Macro Diversity Handover (MDHO) and the Hard Handover 
(HHO). Among these 3 scenarios the third one is obligatory but the others are 
regarded as soft handovers and are therefore optional. The mobile WiMAX stand-
ard covers 3 security configurations for each and every handover case. The Hand-
over optimization bit#1 and bit#2 explain these security configurations when it 
comes to RNG-RSP message as below: 
- Bit#1=0 & bit#2=0: Re-authentication and performing TEK 3-way hand-
shake. 
- Bit#1=1 & bit#2=0: No re-authentication process is performed. The TEKs 
for entire SAs are updated. 
- Bit#1=1 & bit#2=1: No re-authentication or TEK 3-way handshake execu-
tion. The 
MS continues utilizing the TEKs established with the serving BS 
Utilizing an HHO, the mobile station just contacts with one base station at a time, 
implying that the mobile station is not able to fix a connection with the second 
base station prior to breaking its connection with the old base station. Every base 
station emits a Neighbor Advertisement Message (NBRADV) regularly that con-
sists information regarding the neighbor base stations. 
The mobile station re-executes procedures associated to registration authentica-
tion and ranging, following switching its link toward the aimed base station. Even 
though this handover mechanism is easy, it infers a considerable latency that can 
be much more than 100 ms. Especially, the execution of a full EAP authentication 
can take up to 1000 ms and causes the WiMAX network to become unfitting for 
transmission of data streaming or video conference. 
When it comes to the MDHO scenario, a group of base stations can be included in 
the handover, and form a list regarded as a diversity set. The mobile station moni-
tors the base stations in this list continuously, select one of them and register with 
that base station. In downlink case, several base stations can send data to the mo-
bile station that would carry out diversity mixture. In uplink case, the data are 
transmitted by the mobile stations is captured by several base stations, which 
would carry out the diversity of selection. The base stations involved in a similar 
handover scenario should transfer or share data being MAC-context based like 
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ciphering keys/authentication utilized by established connections and the fixed 
ones. 
As MDHO, the FBSS handover scenario permits the base station and mobile sta-
tion to keep the diversity group and the MAC-context related information is also 
shared by all base stations involved in the handover. When it comes to up-
link/downlink communication, the mobile station interchanges information just 
with the broadcaster base station (S. Y. Tang et al. 2010). 
4.4 Investigation of Security Problems in WiMAX 
In this part of the dissertation, the chief security shortcomings of the 802.16e are 
investigated. The previously discussed security issues were more focusing on au-
thentication related problems and security of management communication mes-
sages together with key sharing when it comes to multicast/broadcast service. In 
this part, the chief solutions would be provided as far as the topic is concerned. 
4.4.1 Authorization Attacks  
During the authorization stage of the PKM second edition protocol, it can be ob-
served that the request for authorization is not safeguarded against possible for-
gery/alternation attempts. This problem existed also in the PKM’s first edition. It 
has been explained that in case an intruder receives such message, having been 
transmitted from an authorized mobile station, then if he/she transmits it repeated-
ly, it can overload and cause buffer overflow and thus force it to block the access 
to an authorized mobile station. In a scenario that even the request for authoriza-
tion is signed, the protocol is yet susceptible. The point is that actually during the 
time when the nonces are transmitted back to each other in the replied messages, 
one can state that it is not required to verify the timestamps of the three inter-
changed messages and that the mechanism can introduce reciprocal two-way au-
thentication and be deployed without needing adjusted clocks. It is observed that 
the protocol is susceptible to interleaving attack (S. Xu 2008) where the intruder 
can replay the initial message and answer the base station through mentioning the 
correct nonces, and utilizing the compromised mobile station as an oracle.  
The intruder begins with transmitting to the base station, a replayed message 
which it received in the past from an authorized mobile station. Furthermore, next 
to capturing the base station response, the intruder recognizes that it is not capable 
to decipher the pre-AK that was ciphered by the authorized mobile station’s pub-
lic key. The intruder begins with transmitting a replayed message to the base sta-
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tion which it received already from the authorized mobile station. Thus following 
the reception of the base station’s reply, the intruder figures out that he is not ca-
pable to decipher the pre-AK that was ciphered by the authorized public key of 
the mobile station. Therefore the intruder will be unable to transmit the acknowl-
edgement of authorization instantly due to not being able to cipher the base sta-
tion’s nonce together with its address with the correct AK. Hence, the intruder 
deploys the subscriber station as an oracle for issuing a correct acknowledgement 
message. It carries out an attack on the base station and invites the subscriber sta-
tion to attach itself and execute the PKM protocol’s second example. Followed by 
the transmission of the initial message by the authorized mobile station, the in-
truder answers to the mobile station by transmitting the base station, the nonce it 
captured in the initial session held with the authorized base station. Likewise, it 
consists the pre-AK and the MSID captured from the base station in the initial 
session and ciphered with the authorized mobile station’s public key (A. Altaf et 
al. 2008; S. Y. Tang et al. 2010).  
Nevertheless this message has a signature with the intruder’s certificate. To make 
sure that the AK that would be produced by an authorized mobile station, and the 
AK produced by base station in the initial example of the protocol would be the 
same, the intruder requires to imitate the base station address. The explained 
threat presentation can be observed in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. Threat presentation 
The mobile station answers the intruder by transmitting its address and the author-
ized base station’s nonce plus the AK ciphering of the two values. The intruder 
captures the message from the mentioned authorized subscriber station and re-
plays it followed by transmitting it to the authorized base station for finishing the 
initial session where it imitated an authorized mobile station.  
During the time when the PKM second edition deploys AAA to permit a security 
session, the intruder may replay and forge these messages to the mobile station as 
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well. To prevent this intrusion, a solution (S. Xu 2008) can be appending the base 
station identity (BSID) to the final message and cipher it altogether by the nonce 
of the base station and subscriber station’s address. On the other hand, A. Altaf, 
M.Y. Javed, S. Naseer and A. Latif came up with the idea of introducing 
timestamps on the transferred messages, defining a twofold solution that deploys 
both nonces and timestamps (A. Altaf et al. 2008). 
4.4.2 Investigation of SA-TEK 3-Way Handshake 
S. Xu in 2008 demonstrated that the second edition of the PKM protocol’s SA-
TEK 3-way handshake is secure, even in case the initial message is prone to re-
play attack. Indeed, this protocol holds a familiar and likewise structure as the 
Needham Schroeder Secret Key protocol (NSSK) that was published in 1978 (S. 
Xu 2008).  
The NSSK protocol was investigated thoroughly and it was found to be reliable 
and secure following some editions and revisions. To safeguard contra replay of 
the SA-TEK issue message, S. Xu proposed including timely information.  
Interleaving attacks cannot endanger the SA-TEK 3-way handshake protocol due 
to utilizing secret keys rather than public keys. 
E. Yuksel et al. indicated that the SA-TEK 3-way handshake is much more than 
secure because of the protocol’s redundancy mechanism (E. Yuksel et al. 2007).  
Due to the fact that the nonce is produced by the base station, it does assure noth-
ing to the subscriber station. The nonce produced by the subscriber station is 
enough to make sure about the freshness and timeliness of the message. 
4.4.3 Susceptibility to DoS Attacks 
When it comes to WiMAX networks, the network entrance process, performed by 
a mobile station to attach itself to a base station is not protected. Intruders can 
sniff to the transferred traffic and deploy the obtained data to falsify requests for 
ranging or the response to ranging messages. 
Due to the fact that message is not authenticated, the mobile station cannot speci-
fy its true origin. An intruder can block and falsify a RNG-REQ message by alter-
ing certain selected burst profile of the downlink. It can falsify a RNG-RSP mes-
sage as well to fix mobile station’s power to the minimum. This would carry out 
the first ranging process continuously because it can barely send to the base sta-
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tion. Moreover, the communication administration among a mobile station and a 
base station includes the transmission of plaintext and the administration frame’s 
origin, transmitted in broadcast and unicast that is unauthenticated (S. Rekhis et 
al. 2010). These messages consists of some critical unauthenticated messages (S. 
Naseer, M. Younus and A. Ahmed 2008): authorization invalid message, Mobile 
neighbor advertisement (MOB_NBR-ADV), Mobile Traffic indicator 
(MOB_TRF-IND), Multicast assignment request (MSCREQ), Fast Power Control 
(FPC), Mobile association Report (MOB_ASC-REP), Power control mode 
Change Request (PMC-REQ ), Ranging Request (RNG-REQ), Downlink burst 
file change request (DBPC-REQ) and Ranging Response (RNG-RSP). These 
problems paves the way for appearance of several DoS attacks (A. Deininger et 
al. 2007). 
The MOB_NBR-ADV message that is transmitted by the present serving base 
station to inform about the neighbour base station’s characteristics, is unauthenti-
cated. An intruder can falsify a similar message to announce the availability of 
rogue base station, therefore averting the mobile station from carrying out an effi-
cient handover or blocking such an action. 
The FPC messages that are transmitted by the base station to the mobile station 
asking it to balance the sending power can be falsified by an intruder to fix the 
mobile station’s sending power at a very low level. This should balance its send-
ing power in a regular manner to reach the base station once again, resulting in 
the transmission of aggregated power balancing messages.  
The intrusion can aim at many mobile stations at the same time interval. When it 
comes to the uplink bandwidth request slots, as a result of the deployment of 
CSMA, such aggregated transmission can cause collisions. The attacked mobile 
station cause a long delay until achieving correct sending power gain. The intru-
sion can as well drain the mobile station’s battery and be counted as a flooding 
attack (S. Rekhis et al. 2010). 
The Auth-invalid message (Auth-Invalid) is transmitted from the base station to 
the mobile station if the AK shared among them expires or the HMAC/CMAC of 
some exchanged message in the Authorization phase indicates an unauthenticated 
message. Since the Auth-invalid does not include HMAC/CMAC digest and safe-
ty measure are therefore not respected, it results in a stateless rejection, and does 
not utilize the serial number of the PKM, it can be falsified by an intruder to 
block access to an authorized user. The base station normally transmits the Reset 
command (RES-CMD) for re-setting a malfunctioning mobile station or a non-
answering one. The mobile station will reset its MAC state machine.  The mobile 
station can authenticate RES-CMD messages contrary to previously mentioned 
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management messages. Nevertheless, the intruder can pressure a base station for 
transmitting this message to the aimed mobile station.  
In order to carry out this, it adjusts with the network and for selecting a victim 
CID, captures the UL-MAP message. Further on the intruder sends a signal at the 
predefined moment for the victim. The signal would be deteriorated or becomes 
completely unintelligible hinging on the mobile stations signal power. If this ac-
tion is repeated continuously, the base station would transmit to victim, a reset 
command to restart it from the scratch. 
The base station transmits the DBPC-REQ or Downlink Burst Profile Change 
Request message to the mobile station to seek changing the burst profile for cop-
ing with the diversity of distance among the mobile station and base station to-
gether with the communication properties of the medium.  
An intruder can falsify a similar message to alter the burst profile intentionally 
and block the communication among the base station and the attacked mobile 
station. 
While the handover takes place, and during the time when an aimed base station 
together with a mobile station are association within the network, the aimed base 
station does not straightly transmit the ranging response message to the mobile 
station, but alternatively it pass it further through the serving base station’s back-
bone.  
The serving base station captures similar messages from all the surrounding target 
base stations, and sums up entire copies into a MOB_ASC-REP message which 
stands for Mobile Association report. The message would be transmitted to the 
mobile station utilizing the basic administration connection. Therefore similar 
messages that include data useful for the mobile station for opting an aimed base 
station are not authenticated and thus are not safe contra falsification attempts.  
An intruder can falsify a MOB_ASC-REP message in such a way that it seems no 
service is provided from the aimed base stations. A likewise action avoids the 
mobile station from being connected with the best candidate base station and per-
suade it to keep on utilizing a deteriorated service. 
4.4.4 Problems of Multicasting/Broadcasting  
Utilizing the common shared symmetric GTEK, the information is given out 
among mobile stations in case the broadcast/multicast service is deployed. Within 
the same multicast group, a same key is shared among all the members. As a re-
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sult of the fact that the key is symmetric, each mobile station can both ci-
pher/decipher the multicast traffic deploying the same key. 
An intruder can falsify the multicast traffic and transmit it to other mobile sta-
tions. The message holds a viable ciphering and HMAC/CMAC code of integrity. 
Within the multicast group, the users are not able to identify the origin of the traf-
fic and almost always suppose that it comes from the base station.  
Indeed, when it comes to mobile station joining the multicast group, it receives 
the current GTEK from the base station to be able to decipher all the multicast 
messages during the present lifecycle of GTEK. When it comes to the standard, it 
recommends a value ranging from half an hour to seven days, but the default is 
set to twelve hours. Due to the GTEK and update of the GKEK, a small value can 
diminish the overhead of the base station.  
To make the GTEKs up-to-date, the Multicast Broadcast Rekeying calculation 
might be utilized. The base station transmits the encrypted GTEKs to all the mul-
ticast group members utilizing the shared GKEK. Each part that captures such 
message, deciphers it and upgrades the utilized GTEK. 
Since every multicast’s part has the GKEK, it can utilize the MBRA to dissemi-
nate a produced GTEK that has a good ciphering and validation code. Subse-
quently all the parts of the multicast would be compelled to upgrade their GTEK 
(IEEE C802.16-e05 2005). Further to such operation, none part can decipher the 
things that starts from the base station. This conduct is upheld until the following 
time the base station transmits the Group Key Update message to upgrade the 
present GTEK. In order to reduce the susceptibilities specified with broad-
cast/multicast service’s key sharing, two proposed ideas were suggested (S. 
Naseer, M. Younus and A. Ahmed 2008). The solution comprises in safely dis-
persing the GTEK by the base station independently to each and every mobile 
station deploying the KEK imparted among the base station and mobile station. 
The second involves digitally marking the key upgrade message deployed to re-
distribute the GTEK, rather than annexing the HMAC.  
H. Li together with his research group proposed a GKDA that is suggested to 
make use of an adaptable and secure answer for key appropriation in multicast 
cases (H. Li, G.B. Fan, J.G. Qiu and X.K. Lin 2006).  
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4.4.5 Handover Mechanism Weaknesses  
While the ranging response message’s handover bits could be utilized to diminish 
the latency, thus when the handover is carried out it likewise influences the sys-
tem’s security (J. Hur et al. 2008). The more the response time is diminished, the 
more the operation’s security is diminished. 
For example, by fixing the bit#1=1 and bit#2=1, constrains the system to continue 
utilizing identical secret keys prior and after the handover and avoid it from guar-
anteeing forward/backward secrecy. 
Indeed in case a pernicious MS has taken over the serving base station’s security, 
it could likewise trade off the security of every other previous one as well. In the 
situation when bit#1=1 and bit#2=0, throughout the handover operation, the TEKs 
will be upgraded yet the AK is kept. As a result of the fact that AK empowers 
inferring the KEK and therefore acquiring the TEKs, a serving base station can 
utilize the unaltered AK to verify the upgraded TEK of the accompanying aimed 
base stations. Therefore forward secrecy cannot be used. Considering the hando-
ver mechanism’s shortcomings, both bit#1 and bit#2 ought to be fixed to null, 
with the intention that secret key would not be redeployed at all in an alternate 
base station following the handover operation (J. Hur et al. 2008). 
4.5 IEEE 802.16 and IDS 
In certain cases it is recommended to define and install an intrusion detection sys-
tem (IDS) in a wireless-based system like WiMAX. This idea provides an oppor-
tunity for the administrator to detect and control the traffic for abnormalities, al-
ready defined security and attack signatures and many other threats.  
It is a very meticulous measure to take when it comes to WiMAX system, particu-
larly when the security of the mentioned network is of importance to that organi-
zation or institution. Moreover, for supervising and monitoring the intruders and 
hackers activities, the IDS system can be integrated with Honeypots to gather 
information about intrusions and track them respectively. M. Hossein Ahmadza-
degan proposed a new approach to take for designing a WiMAX-based intrusion 
detection system that provides different features like being more efficient due to 
less processing cycles (M. H. Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013). 
Even through many studies were carried out aiming for addressing the WiMAX 
security issues, there are still a large number of security faults, threats and vulner-
abilities existing to be dealt with, for instance the BSs DoS rogue attacks, network 
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manipulation by spoofed frames and man-in-the-middle attacks. It is of great im-
portance to recognize the fact that the precise capabilities of WiMAX for a possi-
ble confrontation with all security threats will be determined only after large-scale 
usage of the technology. It is correct that protocols can be proven to be secure 
even before systems are implemented and implementations can be tested before 
large scale launch but one should consider that new threats and attacks may 
popup any time and until the system is not fully operational in a large scale, it 
may not be discovered (M. Nasreldin 2008).  
Therefore, for example in (C. Kolias et al. 2013) paper many attacks have been 
addressed and classified but some of them are not possible under real circum-
stances and require some special conditions to happen or be traced, additionally 
the attacks are divided into many categories and sub-parts which makes them so 
intricate to comprehend and at the same time the categorizations are not integrat-
ed and well-organized. Thus M. Hossein Ahmadzadegan proposed an alternative 
classification which has two criteria’s for analysis and categorizes only the real 
attacks. In this paper (M. H. Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013), it is explained that by 
filtering based on that perspective there will not be a scattered number of group-
ings. Therefore following this unique approach the attacks are only divided into 
four classes.   
The above-mentioned WiMAX-based intrusion detection system comprises of 
seven units: WiMAX Security Analysis unit, WiMAX Attack Database unit, De-
tection unit, Intrusion Detection unit, Backup & Storage unit, System Manage-
ment unit and Response unit. The system design is presented below in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. System design (M. H. Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013) 
The system and functional mode is explained below as follows: 
Primarily, the WiMAX Security Analysis unit system gets the attack characteris-
tics of the WiMAX network and analyzes these characteristics by attack database 
unit, thus in this manner it facilitates the situation for the next stage being intru-
sion detection unit (T. Shon et al. 2010). 
System should get data from the data link layer of WiMAX network, thus we set 
the wireless network cards to open mode. Furthermore the detector unit call open 
pcap function to open data packets captured by Lib pcap from WiMAX server, 
then pretreatment applies to packets and message goes to the detection unit and 
calls different IP layer analytical functions according to the protocol value that 
addresses the upper layer in the packets. Therefore after analyzing and decoding 
data, the packets will go to the intrusion detection unit.  
As soon as the intrusion detection unit receives the data packets, it will judge to 
see if the system has been attacked by running a comparative sort of analysis that 
verifies if the information from WiMAX attack database unit with the captured 
message by matching algorithm rules to distinguish the attacks. If the packet cor-
responds to a rule, then this implies that there is definitely an attack suspicion that 
will be forwarded to response unit for the respective security measures, otherwise, 
the packet would be counted as normal and does not need any further action. Re-
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sponse unit stores the intrusion packet that can be logged in the database (M. H. 
Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013; Bo Zhou 2011). 
WiMAX security analysis unit:  
This unit gets the intrusion attack features by the aid of the analysis of WiMAX 
vulnerabilities, and transmits these specifications to the WiMAX attack database 
unit. One can extract attack characteristics from the two kinds of WiMAX vulner-
abilities being the security vulnerability of none authentication news and security 
vulnerability of sharing keys in multi-end radio service. 
WiMAX attack database unit: 
WiMAX attack database is the essential brain of an intrusion detection system 
that has a large number of defined attacks and signature databases. Moreover, it 
decides regarding the performance of the intrusion detection system. Basically 
when it comes to having more attack behavior and characteristics databases, this 
actually implies and leads to a better protection against the attacks due to already 
having them in the database the detection can be easier. This unit performs two 
important operations being the recording of a large number of known attacks, and 
in the same time storing the characteristics of new intrusion attacks by analyzing 
the WiMAX security faults (M. H. Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013; Bo Zhou 2011). 
Detection unit: 
Detection unit is situated in the bottom of the system, thus it is the so called 
“prime” unit of the system that processes the data at the initial entrance point. The 
system has to gather all network packets down from WiMAX network. The chief 
duty of the detection unit is to collect the data packets from WiMAX network and 
also process them partially. As the size of the network increases, the network 
packet flow also rises drastically. 
As mentioned above the detection unit checks the received packets according to 
each layer and encapsulates protocol messages in the reverse order, by analyzing 
detailed protocol contents in each packet header. Then it transmits the investiga-
tion results to the intrusion detection unit. Also, the detection unit utilizes the 
plug-in technology that is handy for adding more features to the system (M. H. 
Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013; Bo Zhou 2011).     
Intrusion detection unit: 
The key function of Intrusion detection unit doing a comparison between the de-
tection unit and attack database unit to determine if an intrusion takes place. In-
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trusion detection unit is one of the core parts of the system, it will carry out a 
comparison between the data from the detection unit with intrusion rules along 
with the rule list, if it is found that the data corresponds with a rule existed in the 
feature database, it implies that an attack takes place, then sends the right warning 
to the response unit. If there isn't any rules match with the data, it implies that the 
data is following its expected path (M. H. Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013; Bo Zhou 
2011). The intrusion detection unit and the process which it follows can be shown 
in Figure 16: 
 
Figure 16. Intrusion detection unit 
Backup and Storage unit: 
The backup and storage unit is chiefly responsible about storing different im-
portant pieces of information in the system so that in this way it facilitates the 
system management, for example it captures network packet data of WiMAX 
network, strategies and information about attack database unit. The importance 
for the basic functionality of IDS is that it is connected both to the detection and 
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system management unit. Therefore some specific information’s and suspicious 
traffic can be stored in this unit and further provided to the management unit to 
decide on the matter. For instance if the suspicious traffic and its pattern are of 
concern then that behavior and its characteristics can be introduced to the detec-
tion unit in view of updating the WiMAX attack data base unit so that next time 
that specific suspicious behavior could be blocked and detected at early stages. 
System management unit: 
This unit is in charge of the management operation of the proposed Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS). The key functions are to check the received data packets 
stored in storage unit, administration of system logs, upgrade the attack database 
unit together with disposing each and every unit of the system. User can manage 
the IDS by a set of different alternatives, like web or serial port (M. H. Ahmadza-
degan et al. 2013; Bo Zhou 2011). 
Response unit: 
In case of no detected intrusions by the IDS, the response unit will not take any 
action, but, when IDS detects an intrusion action on WiMAX network, the re-
sponse unit then takes corresponding measures after getting the confirmation and 
based on the user strategy (M. H. Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013). The actions are 
diverse but some are for instance are blocking the traffic in the WiMAX network 
and even stopping the entire service if the detected intrusion is of major threat 
category, in addition to this IDS can be set to cooperate with a firewall in a joint 
action so that after the detection the traffic would be blocked in the network bot-
tleneck or add new rules to the firewall after a possible suspicious pattern is de-
tected and labeled as a potential threat. Furthermore informing the administrator 
of IDS and setting alarms in the WiMAX network can be among other tasks of 
the response unit. The information saved on the response unit can facilitate the 
MS user's query and analysis, and is considered as a catalyzer for performing 
WiMAX network analysis. Indeed, the security of WiMAX is currently subject to 
several speculations (M. H. Ahmadzadegan et al. 2013; Bo Zhou 2011). 
4.6 Real Attacks, Vulnerabilities and Classification 
4.6.1 Ranging Attacks 
 As it can be confirmed, one of the most crucial stages of initial network entrance 
is ranging. During this operation both BS and MS should achieve an appropriate 
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timing offset and make precise power settings in order to set and fix their trans-
missions for the opted physical mechanism. 
1) RSP DoS Intrusion: The intrusion could be either launched to just a single 
aimed mobile station or several ones. Its mechanism is easy to grasp but its exe-
cution is relatively intricate. Thus just in case there is a need and will it can done. 
In both scenarios the intruder should be aware of the network’s radio channel tar-
geted to be attacked and have a dedicated base station like device which permits 
him to send RSP messages. One should consider that RSP messages maybe sent 
in an unsolicited way that makes the intrusion likely. In the initial scenario, the 
intruder should be aware of the victim MS’s CID. This piece of data may handily 
be listened from any unciphered administration message interchanged among cer-
tain base station and mobile station. Later on, the intruder generates a fake RSP 
message having “Ranging Status” section fixed as “abort” and transmits it for the 
victim (IEEE 802.16 Working Group 2005; W. Gu et al.). 
In the second scenario, the intruder must go through the entire existing CIDs with 
a brute force approach, and transmit one fake RSP message for each and every 
CID. Following this the victim device will strive to re-associate to the network 
through running the first network entry. By repeating this loop-like procedure 
again and again, the intruder can transform it to a DoS with even higher user, 
numbers since each attack causes the mobile station to go through considerable 
signaling stages. The DoS effect will keep on just until the aimed mobile station 
remain affected by the intruder and she constantly sends bogus RSP messages. 
One should consider that this increases the intruder detection’s risk. A serious 
intruder might opt to cooperate in a group or for preventing detection be on the 
move. 
2) REQ Downgrading Intrusion: The REQ message can be utilized to announce 
the base station regarding the desired DL burst profile. Nevertheless, an intruder 
might misuse this and utilize this aspect in a negative way. For instance, by sub-
stitution of the burst profile optimum with a least efficient one, thus the intruder 
may become successful in downgrading the service (M. Habib et al. 2010; Bo 
Zhou 2011). 
The intrusion’s effectiveness hinges on the opted burst profile’s level of manipu-
lation. This bounds the intruder to thoroughly focus against a certain victim or a 
few aimed mobile stations. As a result of the fact that, a successful ranging re-
quest downgrading intrusion can only cause annoyance. Thus this intrusion is 
counted as minor. 
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3) REQ DDoS Intrusion: In this scenario a group of cooperating intruders can 
generate a huge number of forged and fake RNG messages and concurrently send 
them to the aimed-BS for finishing up its resources (T. Shon et al. 2010).  In this 
attack the tiny amount of intrusive traffic make it extremely difficult for the Intru-
sion Detection Tools (IDS) to detect the attack so that the intrusion basically can-
not be distinguished as abnormal and intrusive. Thus, this intrusion is labeled as 
major. 
4) MOB ASC-REP DoS Intrusion: The MS during the ranging procedure rather 
than many RNGRSP messages can get a MOB ASC-REP message. This takes 
place when level 2 association is utilized. 
 In this scenario, the RSP data which is transmitted by every aimed base station is 
summed up into the serving base station over the network’s backbone. The base 
station further gathers all the information’s from the RSP messages to a single 
MOB ASC-REP that would be transmitted through Primary Management CID. 
As a result of the fact that the MOB ASC-REP messages are not protected, they 
can be falsified asserting that services are not available from the aimed base sta-
tions (T. Shon et al. 2010).  
The intruder should also be aware in case the victim mobile station keeps level 
two associations that boosts the complication of the intrusion mechanism. Due to 
this cause also this type of intrusion is basically launched contra a few mobile 
stations or one mobile station. According to mentioned causes, an intruder which 
intends to have a definite success, will not deploy this strategy. Thus, this intru-
sion poses a minor threat (T. Shon et al. 2010; C. Kolias et al. 2012).   
4.6.2 Power Conserving Attacks 
The IEEE 802.16e features came up with support for mobile devices. As a result 
of the fact that majority of devices get their required power from a battery, the 
features included power-saving aspects for enhancing the mobile station’s battery 
life. A connections set that have reciprocal requirement characteristics is a notion 
defined by the Power Saving Class (PSC).  
There exist three types of PSCs: (a) The first type that is devoted to Best-Effort 
connections (BE), Non-Real Time Variable Rate (NRT-VR) type, (b) The second 
type that is suggested for Unsolicited Grant Service (UGS), Real-Time Variable 
Rate Service (RTVR) connections (c) The third type that is preferred for multicast 
connections and operations of management.  
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1) Signaling DoS Intrusion: As mentioned before power saving provides some 
advantages and benefits, the authors in (P. Trimintzios et al. 2010) came up and 
remarked an UMTS network’s intrusion but highlighted that it can be technically 
launched in the WiMAX framework as well. Based on their investigation an in-
truder can simply infer issues by flowing a minimal traffic to the network. In oth-
er words, the intruder will create fake packets of TCP/IP, for instance having for-
ty bytes of blank payload, and transmit them to many idle/sleep mobile stations 
instantly. Thus the intrusion traffic becomes as few as 64 bps. Therefore by de-
ploying a cable modem having 1.5 Mbps bandwidth (uplink), affects circa 24000 
mobile stations negatively. As soon as data availability is secured for a particular 
mobile station, the base station shall have to wake it up. Through this packet 
resending in intervals a little bigger than the mobile station’s inactivity timeout, 
the intruder basically creates a repetitive loop of waking up-putting to sleep that 
could demonstrate a big burden of the signaling. One can observe that this intru-
sion mechanism is adequately easy and requires a low cost but there are many 
problems related to the mentioned mechanism. The primary problem is that the 
idle/sleep mode is an option for a mobile station. In addition to this the inactivity 
timeout counter differs to a large extent from one manufacturer to another be-
cause this factor’s default value is not defined. The intruder would be bounded for 
sending in intervals as far as the inactivity timeout’s maximum value. Moreover 
the intruder should have the IP’s of aimed mobile stations and that which mobile 
stations are in idle/sleep mode. This implies that when network is dealing with a 
heavy load, the base station can select to delay the process of device waking ups. 
Due to observed causes this intrusion cannot be carried out in WiMAX frame-
work (P. Trimintzios et al. 2010).  
2) Sleep mode BR and UL DoS Intrusion: As logically described, it is foreseen 
for a mobile station to ask for sleep mode activation through transmitting a UL 
and BR sleep control header rather than the typical SLP-REQ message.  
Moreover, it can be logic for an intruder to falsify an UL and BR control header 
with the identity of the victim and transmit for forcing that mobile station to 
switch into sleep mode. Consequently, the base station would not transmit mes-
sages to that MS anymore, even though MS needs to be paged and DoS will occur 
but this attack may rarely take place, therefore this attack should be labeled as a 
minor one (P. Trimintzios et al. 2010). 
3) Location Update DDOS Intrusion: When a base station monitors the present 
location of a specific mobile station continuously, this process is called location 
update. The mentioned process can be started by the mobile station’s request or in 
case one of these conditions are met: (a) a modification in paging group is detect-
 Acta Wasaensia     89 
 
 
  
ed by the mobile station, (b) the modification is detected before the idle mode 
timer expiration (c) The detection is detected as during the procedure of powering 
down, and (d) when the threshold of the mobile station’s MAC hash counter ex-
ceeds. Secure location update or unsecure location update are the two supported 
modes. When it comes to secure location update, the mobile station should trans-
mit a ranging request message to the base station consisting a HMAC/CMAC. 
Further on, the base station must check the value of the HMAC/CMAC. In case 
the security context is not shared among the present base station and the mobile 
station, it would ask for it through the location update request message from the 
backbone network. The backbone would issue and offer the keying material 
through a location update reply message. Trimintzios and his colleague’s further 
state that this procedure may overload the network when it is carried out instantly 
by a huge number of devices. As a result of the fact that, for location update pur-
poses, any mobile station may ask for bandwidth, the intruder would just have to 
create a valid ranging request but with invalid HMAC/CMAC. A rogue mobile 
station may issue a huge number of requests simply without any risks of being 
detected. Fundamentally, this intrusion is exactly like the ranging request DDoS 
except that it has some extra processes added by the backbone network and the 
base station which may lead to more harm because the outcome will be magni-
fied. Having described the characteristics, this intrusion can be regarded as major. 
4.6.3 Handover Attacks 
Handover (HO) is the scenario in which a certain mobile station is handed over 
and moves from its present base station to another neighboring base station’s air-
interface. HO has several stages and consists of the following major steps (M. 
Nasreldin 2008): 
-  Base station re-option - A mobile station verifies neighboring base sta-
tions. For this purpose, the base station sends a MOB NBRADV message 
on regular bases that includes the appropriate information. This permits a 
mobile station that seeks for handover to identify all the base stations in 
the vicinity. 
- HO Inception - An handover operation can start either by the mobile sta-
tion or the active base station. In the first scenario, the intention is stated 
with a MOB MSHO-REQ where in the second case by a MOB BSHO-
REQ one. Note that the handover command message consists of one or 
more target base stations. 
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- Synchronization to new base station - The mobile station will synchronize 
to the down link of the target base station and gets the parameters of its 
downlink and uplink. 
- Ranging - the full initial or handover ranging can be performed among the 
mobile station and the target base station. Hinging on the amount of data 
which the target base station has about the mobile station it can take deci-
sions if one or many stages of the ranging process may be skipped. 
- Termination of mobile station context - The acting base station can put an 
end to all connections targeted at the mobile station or everything related 
to them  
1) MOB NBR-ADV Downgrading Intrusion: As a result of the fact that, this kind 
of message is not integrity protected, the intruder is capable of altering them by 
deleting the information about the neighbor base station in the appropriate mes-
sage fields.  
This will block the handover and thus it will not take place because the mobile 
station would think there are no possibilities. Therefore as the mobile station 
leaves the acting base station, the mobile station would have no alternative but to 
stay attached to it and the QoS will diminish little by little until it becomes una-
vailable. The implementation mechanism is so intricate that it is expected to con-
vince the intruders opt not to follow the case. One alternative solution is that the 
mobile station should scan the entire radar frequency to find new base stations. 
Thus, this downgrading intrusion can be counted as minor. 
2) MOB NBR-ADV DoS Intrusion: The intruder can manipulate the MOB NBR-
ADV such that the presence of a non-existing base station will be announced hav-
ing better characteristics compared with the acting one. Therefore this would lead 
to DoS when it comes to authorized users because the mobile station disconnects 
from its present acting base station while striving to attach itself to the new base 
station which in fact is non-existing. Furthermore the intruder can entitle the 
rogue base station’s data which is compromised and therefore possibly link an 
authorized user with it. Based on it the connection termination with the acting 
base station takes place just as a final handover step and this just following when 
the mobile station has adjusted with the new base station. In case that would not 
take place, the mobile station would not leave its acting base station. The soft 
handover mode is better compared with the hard handover when it comes to this 
intrusion but it is not the default setting. The hard handover mode abandons the 
field open for this intrusion which leads to DoS in certain mobile stations. The 
chief peril is in fact an intruder with the possibility of linking with a rogue base 
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station and thus from there carry out more serious and harmful intrusions. This 
intrusion poses a minor threat. (IEEE 802.16 Working Group 2004).  
As the mobile station disconnects from its presently acting base station while 
striving to attach to the new one which is non-existing, it is considered that, this 
will lead to DoS when it comes to authorized users. The true danger resides in 
granting the intruder the chance to relate with a rogue base station and from that 
point carry out harsher intrusions. Therefore, the intrusion causes just a minor 
threat. 
4.6.4 Attacks Contra WiMAX Security Mechanisms 
1) Interleaving Intrusion: This intrusion comprises of two rounds. Firstly the in-
truder imitates an authorized and valid mobile station and transmits an authentica-
tion information message next to an authorization request message that have been 
stopped and saved from a past mobile station’s valid session.  
Following the authorization reply message’s reception the intruder should follow 
the protocol of authorization by offering a valid authorization acknowledgement 
response. The intruder cannot build this message due to the lack of having 
knowledge about the private key of the valid mobile station and cannot decipher 
the authorization reply message. Hence, the intruder in parallel with the first 
round may begin the second round targeting at deploying the valid mobile station 
as an oracle on his behalf for creating an authorization acknowledgement mes-
sage. At this stage the intruder would play the base station’s role. Through pres-
suring the mobile station to begin another instance of the protocol, the mobile 
station would deploy the first round’s authorization reply. The valid mobile sta-
tion would offer the correct authorization acknowledgement message that the in-
truder will pass on the valid base station and put an end to the first round. As it 
can be seen the intruder has taken a MiM entity approach to authenticate himself 
instead of the valid subscriber station which leads to registering the wrong user 
into the system. However, from service theft’s point of view no rogue action or 
serious harm can be carried out. The intruder will not have access to the TEK, AK 
or other materials for keying and thus will not be capable of deciphering the traf-
fic which the base station transmits or create messages having valid 
HMAC/CMAC. Form a best scenario’s viewpoint, he may just keep on to play 
the role of a MiM and discard the valid conversation among the base station-
mobile station through falsifying or even dropping the control messages which 
are unprotected. This intrusion can pose a minor threat to the WiMAX network. 
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2) Authentication Request Service Theft Intrusion: So it can be vividly indicated 
that Auth-Req’s random number field, has not been successful for blocking the 
reply intrusion. The message could still be retransmitted by an intruder and the 
base station will not be aware of its timeliness and freshness.  
The authentication request message’s random number field is a method for relat-
ing every authentication reply message with one authentication request and there-
fore its goal has not been protecting against authentication request replay intru-
sions. The mobile station would be aware that the authentication reply is timely 
fresh, in case the mobile stations random number field corresponds with the one 
transmitted in the authentication request message. One can conclude that based on 
evaluations this intrusion does not harm but as it exists, it would be worth men-
tioning (P. Trimintzios et al. 2010). 
3) Authentication Request Replay DoS Intrusion: Xu and Huang defined this in-
trusion against the PKM protocol first edition. In this intrusion, the attacker saves 
and replays the authentication request message instance belonged to an authorized 
subscriber station transmitted previously. It is probable that a base station has 
come up with a timer that pressures it to block duplicate authentication requests 
deriving from the same subscriber station within a certain period. This implies 
that the base station may drop authorized requests coming from victim subscriber 
station as well. Hinging upon the vendor this attack can be counted as feasible in 
the PKM protocol’s second edition. Therefore in this scenario there exist 2 out-
comes: (a) the intrusion will result in a DoS against a varied number of users, or 
(b) the base station would go on smoothly with the process of authorization pav-
ing the way for collaboration of intruders for DDoS attack. Concentrating on the 
second scenario, for every authentication request message the base station would 
have to check all messages signatures, issues keying material, create the authenti-
cation replay message and eventually send it to the mobile station. It is clear that 
this set of actions could be the base station’s burden in case it is duplicated sever-
al times. This intrusion’s issue that distinguishes it from other DDoS intrusions 
contra WiMAX, is that it has an upper limitation. This implies that there is a de-
fined restriction on simultaneous request’s number that cooperating intruders may 
generate. This is to a large extent because the authentication request message in-
cludes the SAID field that would be verified and deployed for the authentication 
reply creation. This basically bounds the intruder to replay authentication request 
messages of mobile stations whose CID is yet active. From a theoretic point of 
view, this intrusion’s main challenge is to have N collaborating intruders generat-
ing simultaneously M requests where M is remarkably smaller than the number of 
simultaneous connections which a base station may cover.  
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4.7 LTE Main Security Issues 
The security issues of the LTE can be divided in six branches being the security 
issues in LTE system architecture, LTE cellular security, LTE handover security, 
IMS security, HeNB security and MTC security. Here the problems and their pre-
sent security measures are mentioned as follows: 
- LTE system architecture 
When it comes to the LTE system architecture, for addressing the security con-
cerns regarding the handover, an acceptable and strong handover authentication 
scheme relying on enhanced proxy signature has been introduced in (J. Cao et al. 
2012) that can be applied to all mobility cases consisting of the handovers among 
the Home eNodeBs (HeNBs), the handovers among the eNBs and the HeNBs, the 
handovers among the eNBs and the inter-Mobility Management Entity (MME) 
handovers. By utilization of this handover scheme, a User Equipment (UE) and 
the target eNB or HeNB can straightly carry out a reciprocal two-way authentica-
tion and set a session key with their old secret keys issued by the proxy signatures 
while the UE gets into the aimed eNB or HeNB’s coverage area. Thus, it has an 
easy authentication process without a complicated key management and can have 
a good level of efficiency. Furthermore, a quick and secure handover authentica-
tion scheme has been suggested to obtain smooth handovers in the LTE networks 
among heterogeneous access systems. According to this scheme, the Evolved 
UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN), the trusted non-3GPP 
access networks and the Evolved Packet Data Gateway (ePDG) for untrusted non- 
3GPP access networks are regarded as Access Points (APs). As soon as the UE 
gets into the coverage of a new AP, the UE and the new AP can carry out an au-
thenticated key agreement deploying their old keys generated by Key Generate 
Centre (KGC) to issue their shared session key just with 3-handshake. The mech-
anism in (J. Cao et al. 2012) can offer a strong security protection and remarkable 
efficiency and works on all mobility scenarios among the E-UTRAN and the non 
3GPP access networks within LTE networks. Consequently, as a result of the fact 
that the utilization of the proxy signature method and Identity-based cryptography 
(IBC), the two mechanisms may cause a lot of extra computational expenses and 
depletion of battery that is not cost-efficient to the mobile devices having resource 
limitations.  
- LTE Cellular Security 
When it comes to the LTE cellular system, a hybrid type of authentication, key 
agreement and authorization mechanism in accordance with Trust Model Plat-
form (TMP) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for 4G mobile networks has 
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been brought up in (Y. Zheng et al. 2005). Due to the usage of the basics of trust-
ed computing and PKI, it can offer a good level of security for mobile users when 
it comes to accessing sensitive data and services within 4G systems. 
Moreover, passwords are linked with the fingerprint and public key to get recip-
rocal two-way authentication among UEs and the HN over the TMP. An authenti-
cation and key agreement mechanism according to self-certified public key 
(SPAKA) has been suggested for 4G wireless systems in (D. He et al. 2008). The 
mechanism issues a public key broadcast protocol according to a probabilistic 
method for a UE for determining the genuine base station, and therefore makes up 
for the lacks and gaps of 3G AKA scheme. Furthermore, 3 authentication proto-
cols consisting register authentication, re-authentication and handover authentica-
tion have been demonstrated for diverse authentication cases. Further on, a Secu-
rity Enhanced Authentication and Key Agreement (SE-EPS AKA) according to 
Wireless Public Key Infrastructure (WPKI) has been brought up in (X. Li et al. 
2011). The proposed mechanism of Li and his colleagues ensures the security of 
user identity and the interchanged message with restricted power consumption by 
deploying Ellipse Curve Cipher (ECC) ciphering. The mechanism in (H. Mun et 
al. 2009) have investigated the vulnerabilities and intrusions in the 3G-WLAN 
interworking and have come up with a new EAP-AKA-based access authentica-
tion and key agreement protocols. The 2 mechanisms utilize the Elliptic Curve 
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) having symmetric key type for cryptosystem to make up 
for the risks explained in the EAP-AKA protocol. It has been highlighted in (J. 
Abdo et al. 2012) that the SE-EPS AKA protocol is susceptible to brute force 
together with intelligent force attacks and therefore it cannot provide a certain 
promise for user identity’s security. Further on, an ensured confidentiality authen-
tication and key agreement (ECAKA) has been suggested to improve the user’s 
confidentiality so that all the AKA messages are completely protected when it 
comes to the integrity via ciphering that can prevent the user identity disclosure. 
All these mentioned mechanisms and schemes in previous paragraphs above (H. 
Mun et al. 2009; Y. Zheng et al. 2005; D. He et al. 2008; X. Li et al. 2011; J. 
Abdo et al. 2012) use the public-key based protection methods to deal with the 
gaps and lacks of the EPS AKA protocol, and therefore can get a reciprocal two-
way authentication and make sure that the secure communication among the UE 
and HSS/AuC by the aid of UE and/or the HSS/AuC of public key certificates 
exists.  Beside this it is necessary to consider that it will incur extra computational 
expenses and communication costs for mobile devices with resource restriction. 
Moreover, since LTE network has an open nature kind of environment, the public 
key infrastructure has to span around all operators with reciprocal two-way roam-
ing agreements. Thus, the LTE network requires to take a huge number of de-
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ployment overheads to set and organize the public key infrastructure. The 3GPP 
appears to be eager to mandate such a costly infrastructure (G. M. Kien 2009).  
An EAPArchie technique (Z. Shi et al. 2009) has been proposed to address the 
access layer security within the LTE networks. By utilizing the AES ciphering, 
the mechanism in (Z. Shi et al. 2009) can get to a reciprocal two-way authentica-
tion and key agreement among the network access layer and the users. The point 
is that this mechanism encounters identical threats as the EPS AKA protocol does 
that is not capable of avoiding and protecting the LTE network contra user identi-
ty disclosure and spoofing attacks. A lightly altered version of the EPS-AKA pro-
tocol has been explained in (G. M. Koien 2011). The mechanism brings about a 
new subscriber module ESIM rather the USIM and offers a direct online recipro-
cal two-way authentication among the ESIM and the MME/HSS to make up for 
the gaps and lacks of the EPS-AKA protocol just with small changes of the access 
security architecture. The problem here will be the possibility of compatibility 
issues in the LTE networks as a result of the deployment of the new ESIM. Due 
to the fact that the HSS requires to take part in each authentication process for 
each UE, it may cause a huge number of communication delays and therefore 
incur congestion of signaling on the HSS. Moreover, it cannot address the prob-
lem of user identity disclosure. An improved EPS AKA protocol has been intro-
duced in (M. Purkhiabani et al. 2011) to enhance the performance of the present 
authentication process by a little increase of SN’ computation. During this intro-
duced mechanism, the SN/MME issues and saves many authentication vectors 
(AVs) from the genuine AVs at the HN/HSS. The mechanism in (M. Purkhiabani 
et al. 2011) can remarkably diminish the authentication signaling interchange 
among the SN and the HN, and therefore stores the consumption of bandwidth at 
the HSS/HN. Another point about this mechanism is that it increases the MME’s 
burden due to over generation of AVs at the MME. Hence, it can just improve the 
authentication procedure’s efficiency, whereas existing security problems in the 
EPS-AKA process cannot be mitigated with it. In (C. Vintila et al. 2011), the uti-
lization of the password authentication key exchange by Juggling Password Au-
thenticated Key Exchange (J-PAKE) protocol in the authentication process rather 
than the EPS AKA protocol to offer a stronger security protection has been intro-
duced. The J-PAKE (F. Hao et al. 2010) is a password authentication keying 
agreement protocol to offer a zero knowledge proof deploying a shared key that is 
never transmitted over the medium of transmission. This mechanism has just ad-
dressed the utilization of J-PAKE within the LTE networks without mentioning 
about the implementation know-how so that preserving the secure communication 
will not be violated. 
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- LTE Handover Security 
When it comes to the LTE handovers, a hybrid type of authentication and key 
agreement mechanism has been suggested to support large-scale mobility and 
secure communications in 4G wireless systems (Y. Zheng et al. 2005). The mech-
anism in (Y. Zheng et al. 2005) relates a dynamic password with a public-key to 
offer a non-repudiation service together with a smooth authentication. Moreover, 
through making use of the public key broadcast protocol defined as a part of the 
mechanism, a reciprocal two-way authentication among the UE and foreign net-
work (FN) can be established without any certificate utilization. This may cause 
many computational and storage costs because of public cryptography, and there-
fore brings about various difficulties for aiding and covering smooth handovers 
when it comes to 4G wireless systems. A security roaming alternative together 
with a vertical handover method among various access technologies in 4G wire-
less networks has been suggested in (N. Krichene et al. 2009). The mechanism in 
(N. Krichene et al. 2009) describes an authentication protocol to facilitate a verti-
cal handover among heterogeneous access systems being UMTS, WiFi, GSM, 
and WiMAX without needing a pre- subscription of visited networks. The setback 
is that, this mechanism concentrates just on the handovers among GSM/ UMTS 
and WiMAX/ WiFi and entitles the existing security problems in the GSM sys-
tems. The handovers among the LTE systems and other access networks have not 
been covered, where the LTE systems are very different from the GSM and the 
UMTS when it comes to security threats and handover procedures. A novel re-
authentication protocol for securing the roaming and interworking from the 3GPP 
LTE to the WLAN has been offered in (I. Bouabidi et al. 2012). The mechanism 
enhances the EAPAKA protocol and utilizes a hybrid unit to offer the secure 
3GPP LTE-WLAN interworking. The setback is that through this mechanism, a 
new entity, Hybrid Interconnection Unit (HIU), requires to be used to act like a 
relay station among the the WLAN and the LTE network that may need huge de-
ployment costs and alternations to the existing architecture and therefore result in 
system complexity. Moreover, handovers from WLAN to 3GPP LTE have not 
been demonstrated. An improved quick handover method has been provided in 
(R. Rajavelsamy et al. 2008) to take care of the handovers taking place among the 
3GPP and the non-3GPP networks. In this method, it uses a security context 
transfer mechanism when it comes to the handovers among the 3GPP networks 
and the trusted non-3GPP networks and a pre-authentication mechanism for the 
handovers among the 3GPP and the untrusted non-3GPP networks to diminish the 
latency of the handover without endangering the security level. By taking the pre-
sent approaches being pre-authentication mechanism and security context trans-
fer, the mechanism in (R. Rajavelsamy et al. 2008) provides a bedrock for an ac-
ceptable mobility among the 3GPP networks and non-3GPP networks. The point 
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is that, there are yet many problems to be dealt like performance, security and 
compatibility issues among others. Five instances of secure and quick re-
authentications protocols for the subscribers of LTE to carry out handovers 
among the WLANs and the WiMAX systems have been introduced in (A. A. Al. 
Shidhani et al. 2011) that protects against connecting authentication servers when 
it comes to the LTE networks while the handovers take place. By utilization of 
these mechanisms, the EAP-AKA protocol for the handovers from a WiMAX 
system to a WLAN and Initial Network Entry Authentication (INEA) protocol for 
the handovers from a WLAN to a WiMAX system can be enhanced by integrat-
ing additional security elements together with keys to accelerate the reauthentica-
tions in WiMAX-WLAN handovers. The altered edition of the INEA and EAP-
AKA has identical messaging sequences like when it comes to the standard EAP-
AKA and INEA that is capable of preventing interoperability issues with diverse 
services without a capability loss that can take place because of alternations. The 
mechanism in (A. A. Al. Shidhani et al. 2011) can get a fascinating performance 
when it comes to reauthentication delay and signaling traffic compared with the 
present 3GPP standards and can offer various security services consisting for-
ward/backward secrecy. The setback will be the fact that this particular mecha-
nism can just cover single-hop type of communications among the Base Station 
(BS) and the UE, therefore multi-hop type of wireless communications require 
further focus and concentration. 
- IMS Security 
When it comes to IMS security, several authentication mechanisms in the UMTS 
have been introduced for diminishing the authentication signaling expenses (Y. 
Lin et al. 2005; J. Fu et al. 2010; X. Long et al. 2010; G. Sharma et al. 2011; A. 
Golaup et al. 2009). An enhanced AKA practice when it comes to the next gener-
ation networks (NGNs) has been brought up in (C. Ntantogian et al. 2007). By 
this mechanism, the security key among the initial authentication and the second 
authentication may be applied in such a way that the user can be authenticated by 
the aid of the (IMPI, IMSI) pair at the IMS service layer authentication without 
the protection of security among the P-CSCF and the UE. Therefore it can dimin-
ish the authentication overhead remarkably compared with the process of multi-
pass authentication. The setback is that this approach is very susceptible to the 
rogue utilization of IMS services like fake server attacks. An optimized AKA (I-
AKA) authentication protocol has been dealt with in (L. Gu et al. 2011) when it 
comes to LTE networks to diminish power usage. By this mechanism, the IMS 
and network layer authentication can be carried out by the aid of the IMPI just 
without the user’s IMSI. Following the successfulness of the network layer au-
thentication, P-CSCF will be in charge of getting the AV from the MME to issue 
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the integrity keys and valid ciphering with the user when it comes to IMS layer 
authentication process. Thus, the mechanism can block the AKA protocol’s dou-
ble execution and therefore diminishes the overhead of signaling significantly. 
The setback will be that the mechanism may cause some issues in the deployment 
of normal network services as a result of the fact that the only IMPI has been uti-
lized to get to the network layer authentication. A new IMS service authentication 
scheme has been suggested in (M. Abid et al. 2009) utilizing IBC to improve the 
security of the IMS authentication process. By using the implication of the IBC 
together with the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), the mechanism permits the 
IMS services personalization via user’s authentication in a personal way while the 
services access takes place and offers an acceptable security level. The setback is 
that the mechanism may cause extra computational and storage costs because of 
the utilization of ECC and IBC that is not cost-efficient when it comes to mobile 
devices having restriction of resources. An enhanced IMS authentication method 
deploying an effective key re-use for a mobile user has been brought up in (M. J. 
Sharma et al. 2011). In this mechanism, the ciphering keys and authentication 
vectors achieved in the initial network authentication process will be re-utilized in 
the IMS authentication by transferring them from the Home AAA (HAAA) to-
ward S-CSCF by the HSS. Thus, the mechanism is able to remarkably diminish 
the time needed to get authentication vectors and therefore prevent from devolu-
tion of QoS and additional overheads when the user displaces from one WLAN 
domain into another. The disadvantage is that, it cannot offer a reciprocal two-
way authentication among the S-CSCF and UE in the suggested IMS authentica-
tion process. 
- HeNB Security 
When it comes to the HeNB systems, the problems of the authentication and ac-
cess control of the HeNB users have been dealt with in (A. Golaup et al. 2009). A. 
Golaup and his colleagues offer a general picture of the works in progress when it 
comes to the HeNB standardization within 3GPP, particularly in case of access 
control strategy. Once a UE intends to connect the network through a HeNB, the 
CN becomes the entity in charge of carrying out the access control for the UE. 
For performing the access control, the CN is needed to preserve and update a list 
of CSG identities regarded as a permitted CSG list where the UE is subscribed. 
Every entry in the list relates the CSG identity to a PLMN identity. The data in-
cluded in the UE permitted CSG list is saved as UE subscription data within the 
HSS and given to the MME for the sake of controlling the access. Prior to the 
reciprocal two-way authentication with the UE, the MME requires to verify if the 
UE is permitted to access the HeNB according to the permitted CSG list. A robust 
reciprocal two-way authentication and access control mechanism has been sug-
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gested to safeguard secure communication for the HeNB by using a proxy-
signature (C. K. Han et al. 2009). In this mechanism, the core network (CN) to-
gether with the OAM have a detailed agreement on the management, installation 
and operation of the HeNB through generating a proxy-signature to one another. 
Further on, the OAM re-selects its own proxy-signing ability to a HeNB. The CN 
also re-selects its proxy signing ability to the HeNB and generates its own signa-
ture to the UE. Eventually, the reciprocal two-way authentication among the 
HeNB and the UE can be obtained with the proxy signature on behalf of the CN 
and the OAM. The mechanism can block a diverse set of protocol attacks like 
pretending to be a valid HeNB, DoS and MiM attacks. The setback will be that, it 
causes a considerable amount of computational and storage costs and needs many 
modifications to the existing architecture because of the utilization of proxy sig-
nature that makes the system not efficient in real cases. Majority of the vulnera-
bilities and threats to the security and the privacy of the HeNB-enabled LTE net-
works have been investigated in (I. Bilogrevic et al. 2010) by new research ap-
proaches addressing some of these risks. I. Bilogrevic and his colleagues have 
proved a solution to the problem of location tracking and identity at the air inter-
face via allocating and modifying identifiers according to the context. This solu-
tion offers a novel protection of identity regarded as user-based ID modification 
rather than network controlled strategy, where the mobile devices are able to take 
decisions on when to modify identifiers dynamically according to their own sur-
rounding observations. Moreover, a secure protection method contra DoS attacks 
with a HeNB usage in the LTE architecture has been proposed as well. It has been 
highlighted that the solutions counted on the cooperation between various partici-
pating entities like Internet Service Provider (ISPs) can be an effective protection 
contra DoS attacks. 
- MTC Security 
When it comes to MTC, the security requirements, the threats and the respective 
solutions of the MTC security have been investigated in (M. Meyerstein et al. 
2009). It has been recommended in (M. Meyerstein et al. 2009) that the Trust En-
vironment (TrE) can be integrated within the MTC devices to safeguard the MTC 
device’s security that can offer more strong secure functions for the authentica-
tion and cover many cryptographic potentials entitling the symmetric/asymmetric 
encryption/decryption compared with the present UICC. A key agreement and 
authentication mechanism for a set of UEs roaming from the same HN to a SN 
has been addressed in (Y. W. Chen et al. 2010). In this mechanism, several UEs 
that are devoted to the same HN, can shape as a group. By the time when the ini-
tial UE within a group goes toward the SN, the SN gets the authentication data for 
the UE from the respective HN by carrying out a complete authentication. There-
100      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
fore the SN can authenticate other members of the group when they visit the net-
work locally without the HN involvement. This mechanism can diminish the 
communication expenses among the SN and the HN. The setback is that, there are 
yet several issues like network congestions in SN nodes when several devices go 
to the SN at the same time due to the fact that every device yet needs 4 signaling 
messages to perform an authentication. A novel mass-device access authentica-
tion mechanism according to a cumulative signature has been introduced in (J. 
Cao et al. 2012). Within this mechanism, a considerable number of MTCDs are 
initialized to shape as a MTC group to select a group leader. As soon as several 
MTCDs in the MTC group ask for accessing the network at the same time, the 
MME authorizes the MTC group by checking the cumulative signature issued by 
the group leader on behalf of all members of the group. Further on every MTCD 
relies on the MME by checking the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) signature from the MME through the leader of the group. Eventually, a 
separate session key among every MME and MTCD would be set based on the 
various key agreement elements transmitted from the asking MTCDs. The mech-
anism cannot just get to a reciprocal two-way authentication and a key agreement 
among every MTCD and MME simultaneously within a group, but can remarka-
bly diminish the signaling traffic and therefore prevent from congestion of net-
works. The setback is that it may cause many extra computational expenses be-
cause of the utilization of cumulative and ECDSA signature, Moreover this 
mechanism needs the devices to cover both WiFi and LTE communications that is 
rare to take place that all MTCDs are needed to have both network interfaces. A 
M2M communication model according to 4G cellular systems has been proposed 
in (M. Saedy et al. 2011) where secure communication among two MTC devices 
can be obtained by fixing the ad hoc networks within the coverage area of the 
LTE systems. In this introduced model, the MTCDs can communicate in both ad 
hoc and cellular modes. In case a MTCD is located in the coverage area of the 
LTE network but distanced from other devices, it will then deploy LTE network 
resources. If not then it tries to contact the devices in the vicinity, where they 
shape as an ad hoc network. The problem will be when a device is in the range of 
both of other devices and the coverage of the LTE network has not been ad-
dressed in the suggested model. Moreover, the ad hoc network’s introduction can 
cause many security problems that will affect the integration of the ad hoc archi-
tecture into the LTE networks. It needs more network optimizations and changes 
for integrating the M2M communications when it comes to the LTE networks (J. 
Cao et al. 2014). 
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5 SECURE COMMUNICATION AND VOIP 
THREATS IN WIMAX  
5.1 Secure Communication and VoIP Threats in Next 
Generation Networks 
5.1.1 Summary 
VoIP is among the services and key issues that can be offered under the frame-
work of the Next Generation Networks (NGN-4G) technologies like WiMAX. 
This technology consists of advantages and disadvantages similar to other emerg-
ing technologies. Today, the operators in telecommunication’s field offer caller 
ID, call transfer/waiting, conference calling, together with other diverse services 
of VoIP in accordance with the NGN and the emerging solution of all IP. There-
fore, the security of VoIP is among the important issues which are currently being 
investigated. In this dissertation it has been decided to focus on vulnerability clas-
sifications for the services of VoIP in NGN. It has been tried to demonstrate the 
shared and specific VoIP service’s security threats and existing susceptibilities.  
Determining the susceptibilities and their categorization, together with the sys-
tem’s risk scenarios clarify the know-how of system penetration and aids in the 
process of solving the problems. Only through being well-aware of the existing 
diverse specifications and security problems, the debate on VoIP matter would be 
taking the right course. Moreover, to send a message about the importance of 
identifying the VoIP security susceptibilities, the probability of the threats under 
the VoIP framework within 4-G technologies like WiMAX are classified. The 
fact is that VoIP is getting a lot more convenient and cost efficient when users are 
travelling. The VoIP industry is therefore continuously seeking for wireless plat-
forms that could facilitate the voice traffic to and from mobile phones, laptops 
and etc. Up until now this has been the main challenge. Through utilization of 
802.16, continuous connectivity of the users is assured. The point is that suburban 
users that cannot be provided VoIP service due to not living in a zone with a DSL 
line will eventually be covered with WiMAX.  
5.1.2 Objectives and Approaches  
Of course the attacks are not new and there exist many attacks which have been 
already discovered. Thus, the aim of this research work definitely was not finding 
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new threats or vulnerabilities, because attacks are mostly fixed in number but the 
main emphasis has been on looking from author’s perspective and the special 
proposed classification. Therefore the approach is to classify and categorize the 
existing attacks in an alternative way such that they would not look scattered and 
provide a more focused and well-organized way of looking at them. Moreover, 
the classification is such that unlikely and purely theoretical threats and attacks 
are basically neglected. By defining this approach as the main objective, the at-
tacks were investigated accordingly.  
5.1.3 The VoIP Implementation over WiMAX 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) offers a new type of telephone service pro-
vided by the old Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) through an IP net-
work to transfer digitized voice. Nowadays VoIP applications are run over wire-
less technology as a result of the fact that packet switched air interfaces support 
flat IP architectures.  
Compression | Decompression (CODEC) methods for VoIP conversion of audio 
signals to digital stream of bits. Speech samples are compressed even more to 
generate bit streams of 8–12 kbps that are transmitted over the IP network. As 
soon as the speech sample is compressed, it is further sent deploying the Real-
time Transport Protocol (RTP) over the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) with the 
IP (R. Vannithamby et al. 2009).  
It is very important to consider that the CODEC selection, packet loss, jitter and 
delay have a great impact on the VoIP over wireless networks. Unstable channel 
conditions normally incur latency increase and packet loss. For maintaining laten-
cies to acceptable levels of 250–300 ms, the delay budget for sending over the air 
interface is 50–80 ms. The backbone, jitter buffer and CODEC infer the remain-
ing delay. In order to control delays and maintain them within reasonable limits 
Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request (HARQ), dynamic link adaptation Channel 
aware scheduling with Quality of Service (QoS) are deployed. For compensating 
when it comes to delay jitter encountered by packets as a result of network con-
gestion, timing drift or route changes, Jitter buffers are utilized.  
- Elements for supporting VoIP over WiMAX  
WiMAX offers several elements to support VoIP. The VoIP traffic prioritization 
is obtained by the categorization of the traffic into scheduling classes. It is essen-
tial to observe that detection of Voice activity together with Extended Real-Time 
Polling Service (ertPS), maintain and save the air link resources during silence 
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intervals of time. The channel scheduling and HARQ are deployed to diminish 
the sending latency on the top of the air link. The compression of protocol header 
is used to send the specific speech sample.  
- ertPS for silence suppression  
802.16 standard covers QoS requirements when it comes to data services and ap-
plications by transposing those requirements to one directional service flows that 
are transmitted over UL/DL connections.  
In case of having no silence suppression, VoIP flows related service requirements 
are carried out by the UGS that is defined to support flows that produce fixed size 
packets of data on a regular basis. While the process of initialization of the voice 
session takes place, the grant size together with period are negotiated.  
Service flows like VoIP having silence suppression produce larger packets of data 
while a voice flow is active, and respectively smaller packets during silence inter-
vals. The rtPS is defined to cover real-time service flows that produce packets of 
data with variable sizes on a regular basis. Compared with UGS, rtPS needs more 
overhead of request, but also covers variable grant sizes. In a typical rtPS, a head-
er asking for bandwidth is transmitted in a unicast request opportunity for permit-
ting the subscriber station to determine the size of the required grant. The required 
grant is further on assigned in the following UL subframe.  
The rtPS’s mechanism of polling smoothens variable sized grants, deploying rtPS 
to switch among VoIP packet sizes when the SS swings among the talk and silent 
statuses infers access delay. Since the VoIP packet’s size is very large for ac-
commodating when it comes to the polling opportunity, the rtPS leads to MAC 
overhead as well, that can just accommodate a header asking for bandwidth. The 
delay among the subsequent bandwidth allocation with rtPS and the bandwidth 
request can infringe the delay limits of a VoIP flow. The rtPS also causes a con-
siderable overhead from regular unicast polling which is not required while a talk 
spurt takes place.  
The ertPS scheduling method enhances upon the rtPS scheduling method through 
increasing the allocation size deploying a bandwidth request header or diminish-
ing the allocation size deploying a subheader in charge of grant management. The 
needed resource’s size is indicated by the aid of the mobile station through modi-
fying the Most Significant Bit (MSB) in the sent data. 
 - HARQ  
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Having aspects like the link adaptation and modulation together with coding, the 
HARQ is enabled in WiMAX deploying the protocol of “stop and wait‟, for of-
fering a quick feedback to packet errors within the Physical (PHY) layer. Chase 
combining HARQ is applied to enhance the reliability of a resending when a 
Packet Data Unit (PDU) error is found. An Acknowledgment (ACK) channel is 
offered as well in the uplink for HARQ ACK/Negative Acknowledgment 
(NACK). Uplink NACK/ACK messages are basically piggybacked on downlink 
data. A HARQ operation with a few channels is used to enhance the error recov-
ery efficiency. The 802.16 also offers signaling to permit asynchronous kind of 
HARQ operation for robust link adaptation. 
The delay budget for VoIP on the down link or uplink is restricted within the 50-
80 ms interval. This entitles the resending delay and queuing. Utilizing the HARQ 
resending for error recovery, remarkably enhances the system’s potential to fulfill 
the outage criteria for VoIP and delay budget needs.  
HARQ is a joint cooperation of error detection and forward error correction cod-
ing deploying the ARQ error control mechanism. When it comes to standard 
ARQ, the data is supplemented with some unnecessary bits to be sent deploying 
an error detecting code like cyclic redundancy check (CRC). When it comes to 
HARQ, Error Detection (ED) are supplemented with FEC bits to fix a subset of 
errors counting on ARQ to distinguish the unfixable errors. Thus HARQ func-
tions better than normal ARQ when signal conditions are poor, whereas this caus-
es having a tangibly lower rate in suitable signal conditions. There is normally a 
signal quality redline below which simple HARQ is superior, and above which 
basic ARQ has advantages. 
Simple Hybrid ARQ  
The HARQ’s simplest edition, Type I HARQ, adds FEC and ED data to every 
message before sending. By the time the coded block of data is received, the re-
ceiver primarily decodes the error correction code. In case the quality of channel 
is fine, errors of sending should be all correctable, and the receiver can get the 
right data block. In case the quality of channel is bad, and sending errors cannot 
be all fixed, the receiver will recognize this situation deploying the error-detection 
code, further on the received coded block of data is rejected and a resending is 
asked by the receiver, like in the case of ARQ (J. G. Ramos et al. 2011).  
Type II HARQ has a more complex form, the originator of message changes 
among message bits along with parity bits for error detection. As soon as the first 
sending is received without error, the FEC parity bits will not be transmitted. In 
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addition, 2 successive sendings should be mixed for error correction in case none 
is without error.  
To comprehend the difference among the Type I and Type II Hybrid ARQ, con-
sider the size of FEC and ED added data: error detection normally just adds a few 
bytes to a message that is an incremental in length increase. FEC can usually 
cause the message to become double or triple in length with error correction pari-
ties. In terms of speed, standard ARQ normally spends some parts of channel ca-
pacity for protection contra error, whereas the FEC spends half or almost majority 
of its channel capacity for channel enhancement.  
When it comes to standard ARQ a sending should be received without error on 
any transmission for the error detection to pass. In type II HARQ, the first send-
ing includes error detection and data. If received error free, then it is fine. In case 
data is received in error, the second sending will include FEC parities and error 
detection. The error correction can be tried by mixing the data received from both 
sendings.  
The type I Hybrid ARQ has loss of capacity when it comes to robust signal condi-
tions. Type II Hybrid ARQ is not so, due to the fact that FEC bits are just sent on 
subsequent resendings as required. In case of robust signal conditions, type II 
HARQ functions as good as standard ARQ when it comes to capacity. In case of 
poor signal conditions, type II HARQ functions having as good sensitivity as 
standard FEC.  
HARQ with soft combining  
Incorrectly received coded blocks of data are usually saved at the receiver instead 
of being blocked, and when the resent block is received, the 2 blocks are joined. 
This is regarded as HARQ with soft combining.  
As it can be so that two transmissions cannot be separately decoded error free, it 
can take place that joining of the already erroneously received transmissions pro-
vides us with adequate data for decoding correctly. There are 2 chief soft combin-
ing mechanism when it comes to HARQ:  
• Chase combining: every resending includes the same data and parity bits. 
The receiver deploys maximum-ratio combining to put together the re-
ceived bits with the same bits from past transmissions. As a result of the 
fact that all transmissions are the same, chase combining can be regarded 
as an extra repetition coding. The reality is that each resending is like 
adding extra energy to the received transmission via an increased Eb/N0.  
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• Incremental redundancy: each resending includes various and different 
data than the past ones. Several sets of coded bits are issued, each demon-
strating the same set of data bits. The resending normally deploys a dif-
ferent set of coded bits than the past sending, with various redundancy 
versions issued by the decoder output’s puncturing. Therefore, at every 
resending the receiver gets additional knowledge.  
HARQ can be deployed in stop-and-wait mode or in optional repeat mode. Stop-
and-wait is less complex, but efficiency is diminished when one has to wait for 
the receiver’s acknowledgment. Therefore several stop-and-wait HARQ processes 
are performed in parallel: when one HARQ process is waiting to get an acknowl-
edgment, another process can deploy the channel to transmit some more data.  
- Channel Aware Scheduling  
One directional connections are set among the base station and the mobile station 
to control the ordering of transmission and scheduling on the 806.16’s air inter-
face. Each connection is known with a unique Connection Identification (CID) 
number. Each mobile station establishes a primary management connection, a 
secondary management connection and a basic connection for accessing the net-
work. At the moment when all of the management connections are set, transport 
connections are fixed. On the downlink and the uplink, the traffic allocations are 
connection-oriented, and a specific mobile station may be related with several 
connections. The base station schedules resources in every Orthogonal Frequency 
Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) frame on the uplink and the downlink based 
on time-varying channel conditions and traffic dynamics. Link adaptation is uti-
lized by HARQ, the feedback of channel quality and adaptive modulation/coding. 
On the downlink and uplink, the resource allocation is communicated in Mobile 
Application Part (MAP) messages at the start of each OFDMA frame. The Down-
link-MAP is a message of MAC layer that is deployed to assign radio resources to 
mobile stations when it comes to down link traffic. Also the Uplink-MAP is a 
message of MAC layer deployed to assign radio resources to the mobile station 
for uplink traffic. The base station deploys data elements within the Downlink-
MAP/Uplink-MAP to indicate the traffic allocations to the mobile station. The 
base station scheduler covers resource allocation in several sub-channelization 
mechanisms to balance speed needs and delay with channel conditions (J. G. Ra-
mos et al. 2011). 
- Main security issue in case of VoIP over WiMAX  
Securing the voice communication is considered as being of great importance for 
VoIP over WiMAX to protect it against a possible interception or eavesdropping. 
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The double type of ciphering the X.509 for Authentication and 152-bit AES, 
TDES or 56-bit DES for data flow brings about the security of the transmission 
and makes the eavesdropping intricate to carry out. As soon as a subscriber sta-
tion wants to connect to a base station, it transmits a request of authorization to-
gether with authentication data within a X.509 certificate frame as shown in Fig-
ure 17. The base station after checking the certificate replies by transmitting the 
message of authorization that has the authorization key ciphered with the public 
key of the subscriber for registering in the network. Thus an IP address is allocat-
ed to the subscriber station by the DHCP. The DHCP server is in charge of offer-
ing the address of the TFTP server, from where the subscriber station obtains the 
manufacturer’s particular configuration data file as well. Further on, the base sta-
tion accepts the subscriber. The data is further ciphered deploying 56-bit DES, 
TDES or 152-bit AES as demonstrated in Figure 17. This protects against the 
theft of service and eavesdropping possibility of the data as the connections 
among the base station and subscriber station are ciphered. Moreover 802.16 has 
integrated and built-in virtual LAN (VLAN) cover that offers protection for data 
sent by several users of the same base station. 
 
Figure 17. Main security issues representation in case of VoIP over WiMAX 
5.1.4 Results  
In this dissertation the susceptibilities of the VoIP have been given out into 2 
classes, vulnerability source and vulnerable component, which are separately pre-
sented (A. D. Keromytis et al. 2009). It is important to categorize them in this 
manner so that the security of the system would be taken care of. Given the vul-
nerable component and its source it would be much handier to deal and mitigate 
the issue respectively.  Furthermore, the VoIP vulnerabilities are classified in four 
groups being Threats against confidentiality, Threats against integrity, Threats 
against social context and Threats against availability. Therefore each of the 
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threats are fitting into one of these as sub branches. Moreover the threats are each 
one separately explained and the its relevant scheme is provided. Finally having 
explained and defined every aspect, a general vulnerability classification model is 
proposed and provided in Figure 18.  
Source of Vulnerability 
The vulnerabilities and risks contra VoIP system availability by exploiting im-
plementation weaknesses are regularly seen (S. R. Chogan et al 2012). In this 
dissertation both issues regarding the implementation of VoIP in general and also 
in WiMAX specific case will be explained. First the general issues are discussed.  
One can consider the fact that several general VoIP implementations are proved 
to be vulnerable to hanging when given null, malformed, or big numbers of SIP 
INVITE messages. In order to investigate the vulnerability sources, here common 
cases are presented as follows: 
• IP-Based Network Infrastructure: As a result of the fact that VoIP is a network 
infrastructure being IP-based, the threats and harms which endangers the internet 
protocol are inherited by the VoIP system. These consists of: Attacks on trans-
mission control protocol, overload flooding, rogue fragmentation of IP and many 
other harms. 
• Public Networks: Within the internet network that is public and open, an in-
stance originated threat is SIP bomber attack that poses serious a threat. 
• Standard Protocol: SIP and H.323 are among the protocols of VoIP that are 
standardizations being open to public for accessing purposes. Thus it is possible 
to produce a server/client from the base even in view of rogue purposes. There-
fore, these open protocols due to can be exploited by the attacker. 
• Compromised Interface: This possibility is offered to the attacker to generate 
traffic that is fake and/or nonsense because random port/IP scan can be per-
formed.  
• Live communication: As a result of the fact that the interruption must have no 
room when it comes to live communications any kind of negative impact from the 
attacker may diminish the quality of service. 
• Mobility: VoIP allows its users to have virtual access to different locations. This 
characteristic leads to the complication of internet phone mobility and at the same 
time protection against the attackers will be more difficult. This is due to the fact 
that there will be no limits for tracing the packets as they can go anywhere but the 
point is that usually up to three-four servers or hops can be traced for identifying 
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the origin of the attack. Thus if the number of hops through which packets travel 
increase, it will be very hard to determine its exact launching point. 
• Missing security devices, measures and features: One of the measures taken to 
stop the attacks against VoIP systems, is to utilize a firewall but due to system 
related complications and risks the described measure is not adequate. 
• Integration of data and voice: Adding data to voice causes unexpected harms 
and if device performance does not fulfill the requirements, the quality of service 
will be reduced (A. D. Keromytis et al. 2009; Syed Ahson et al. 2009). 
Vulnerable Component  
• The components that are utilized by VoIP have some certain susceptibilities that 
influence it more or less. Therefore here some of the major components of VoIP 
together with their respective susceptibilities are highlighted in brief. 
• VoIP application’s operating system: Due to the fact that VoIP runs on UNIX, 
Linux, Windows operating systems, their susceptibilities are inherited by VoIP. It 
is necessary to take into account that the system security patches which are an-
nounced for operating systems from time to time demonstrate that there have been 
security breaches which could be passed on to affect the VoIP. 
• The server/client of Web: is an application belonged to VoIP which offers ser-
vices within web and thus inherits the susceptibilities of web client/server like 
worm threats and malicious traffic. 
• Switch or Router Devices: In case the intruder can compromise the router and 
control the system it would be able to damage the systems seriously. For instance, 
an intruder can verify the media and signals of VoIP without affecting the work-
ing performance. As another instance, configuration errors in the 3rd layer of 
router can cause unnecessary broadcast and the attacker can achieve some infor-
mation and through them will carry out the next attacks.  
• Network: The susceptible component can be the network itself due to vast and 
unsupervised traffic, despite whether it is hurtful or not. 
• Protocol Stack of the VoIP: Security parameters are not taken into account while 
VoIP protocols are initialized (Syed Ahson et al. 2009). A brief form of vulnera-
bilities can be modeled and proposed as in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Proposed vulnerability classification model 
After expressing vulnerabilities, we examine the classification of VoIP risks and 
threats. 
The categorization of threats in VoIP  
In this dissertation, we divided the VoIP threats to 4 categories: 
1. Availability Threats  
2. Confidentiality Threats  
3. Integrity Threats  
4. Social context Threats  
Each of these categories includes some threat which we mention below. 
- Availability Threats  
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Some risks are caused contra services provided 24 hours a day and thus result in 
failure of the system or disruption/interruption. A well-known example is the De-
nial of Service attack. When it comes to these threats we can point to the next 
instance: 
Call Flooding 
A DoS’s well-known instance is the instant call flooding creation where the in-
truder causes a high amount of traffic due to valid/invalid calls and sends them to 
the aimed system, thereby significantly decreasing its efficiency or the system 
will break down (Patrik Park 2009).  
Common methods are as follows, moreover call flooding is demonstrated in Fig-
ure 19 below: 
•Valid or invalid registration flooding 
•Valid or invalid request flooding 
•Call control flooding after call setup 
•Ping flooding 
 
Figure 19. Call Flooding 
It is to be highlighted that both the intentional flooding and unintentional flooding 
can result in the system failure called a "self-attack". Down this process the re-
sources available on the servers become inaccessible duo to overflow of the re-
quests and inability of responding to their demands. The following elements can 
be the cause of attack: 
•Regional power outage and restoration 
•Incorrect configuration of device 
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•Misbehaving endpoints 
•Legitimate call flooding 
Malformed Messages  
An intruder may generate a malformed message and transmit it to a certain user 
for disrupting purposes. An instance of the malformed message can be found in 
Figure 20.This malformed message is similar to a protocol message but its text 
does not comply with the usual standard format, and it causes confusion in those 
devices (Dorgham Sisalem 2009). This threat takes place commonly as a result of 
the coming reasons mentioned: 
- Protocol specification weakness  
- Ease of generating malformed messages 
- Implementation’s lack of handling exception  
- Difficulty in verifying all cases of malformed messages  
 
Figure 20. Malformed messages 
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Spoofed Messages 
An intruder can insert a spoofed message to steal the session or discard the ser-
vices. The "toll fraud" and "call teardown" are among the instances of spoofed 
messages. 
Call Teardown 
In this method the intruder controls a SIP conversation and gains the session data 
together with the “From”/“To” tags, and transmits a "SIP BYE" message to the 
communication device and thus simultaneously close the call session. An attack 
modeling can be seen in Figure 21 (Dorgham Sisalem 2009). 
 
Figure 21. Call Teardown 
Call Hijacking 
Hijacking of the call occurs when the intruder compromises the transactions tak-
ing place among the network and a VoIP user. The common scenarios are hijack-
ing registration, server impersonation together with hijacking of the media server 
(James F. Ransome 2005). 
In this scenario, the attacker identifies himself as an authorized device, and steals 
the entire media/ contact sessions among the two parties. The transmitter suppos-
es that, he is in contact with the aimed user, while the aimed user has no access to 
the messages sent by the transmitter. The call hijacking process described above 
can be observed in Figure 22.  
114      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Call Hijacking 
The Abuse of Quality of Service 
In this mechanism, the intruder occupies a considerable portion of the bandwidth 
and thus the authorized user is capable of deploying services anymore or the QoS 
would be degraded. 
- Confidentiality Threats   
Contrary to the interruption of service described above, confidentiality threats do 
not affect present communications but through media theft and data storing, the 
intruder gets the information required for possible future threats. This is actually 
the most common kind of confidentiality threats. 
Media eavesdropping  
Media eavesdropping is carried out in 2 manners. One alternative can be listening 
to the packets of media within the same domain of broadcasting like the aimed 
user’s. Secondly through an access device compromise (for example, a router or a 
layer2 switch) and forwarding together with repeating it to an intruder device 
(James F. Ransome 2005). 
The media eavesdropping attack can be modeled as follows in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Media Eavesdropping  
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Trucking Call Patterns  
In this mechanism, the intruder goes on in an unauthorized investigation of VoIP 
service and gains the required essential data. For instance, becoming aware that a 
company’s CEO and CFO have been calling the CEO and CFO of another com-
pany can show that an acquisition is taking place. 
Traffic Capture 
Traffic capture is the process of storing the traffic in an unauthorized way and by 
any means which consists of storing packets together with packet snooping log-
ging in view of unauthorized purposes. Traffic capture can be regarded as a fun-
damental mechanism for storing communication without all party’s consent. 
Data Mining 
Gathering data such as phone number, user name, email address, URL address, or 
other kinds of data which the intruder deploys his rogue purposes: phishing, spam 
calls, toll fraud calls and service interruptions,. 
Abuse of Service  
Abuse of service is a considerable category in terms of service’s improper utiliza-
tion which consists of: 
Abuse of call conference  
Abuse of call conference is when the intruder hides his identity for fraud commit-
ting purposes. 
Premium rate service fraud 
Premium rate service fraud is a mechanism for increasing the traffic artificially 
without consent having goals other than maximizing the billings. 
Improper bypass or adjustment to billing 
Improper Bypass or Adjustments to Billing are methods of avoiding authorized 
service charges or for concealing other fraud by altering billing records (VoIP 
Security Alliance 2006). 
- Integrity Threats  
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After the attacker has intercepted the message as a network interface, it tries to 
change. The alteration can consist of deleting, injection or replacing certain in-
formation in the VoIP message or media. This part is given out into 2 kinds: 
• Message integrity threats (alteration of message) 
• Media integrity threats (alteration of media) 
The difference between the two lies on the content being alternated and the meth-
ods used to attack the integrity. 
The message integrity threats (alteration of message) happen by the next 3 meth-
ods: 
Rerouting the Call  
The intruder access, through an unauthorized to call the routing data causes a call 
direction modification and rather than reaching the targeted user, the call is shift-
ed elsewhere. Rerouting the call procedure can be shown as in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Rerouting the Call  
Black Holing the Call  
The process of refusing to forward or delete any protocol message’s critical pa-
rameters through an unauthorized mechanism is regarded as black holing the call. 
The consequence is to delay call setup, refuse subsequent messages, make errors 
on application, drop call connections and so on. 
False Caller Identification 
Where there is a misrepresented identity/presence, it is an indicator of false caller 
identification  
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The media integrity threats (alteration of media) happen by the next 2 methods: 
Media Injection 
In this method the intruder either injects or replaces new media into an active 
channel of media. As a consequence the victim hears a noise or silence during the 
conversation. Media injection process can be demonstrated as follows in Figure 
25. 
 
Figure 25. Media injection 
Media Devolution 
The intruder manipulates the packets belonging to the media control and infers 
reduction of quality of service when it comes to any communication. 
- Social Context Threats  
In this mechanism the intruder plays the role of a trust entity and transmits false 
data to the aimed victim for getting the required personal data and carry out the 
next threats (S. R. Chogan et al 2012). 
Typical social context threats are as follows: 
• Identity, rights, content and authority misrepresentation 
• Voice Spam, IM, and presence  
• Phishing 
Identity, rights, content and authority misrepresentation  
In case the intruder presents a false identity, the victim can be deceived and the 
intruder becomes aware of the key, password, and certificate. 
118      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
Voice Spam, IM, and presence  
A considerably huge amount of unsolicited requests to initiate a video/audio ses-
sion, most utilized when it comes to internet related marketing (Tan Koon 2006). 
The spam presence message can be seen in Figure 26. 
This part is given out into 3 kinds: 
• Spam Call (SPIT)  
• IM Spam (SPIM) or Instant Messaging Spam  
• Spam Presence (SPPP)  
 
 
Figure 26. Spam Presence  
5.1.5 Contribution to the Research Area 
There are diverse types of threats which affect the VoIP services within a net-
worked/internet environment. The chief reason is that the majority of the intru-
sions are not traceable for finding their origins in view of mitigation and protec-
tion. Moreover, networks are known for possible types of sniffing and spoofing. 
Hence, in this dissertation, VoIP vulnerabilities and possible threats have been 
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categorized in a unique manner with a new approach explained above. The set of 
vulnerabilities and threats provided can be considered as a reference for future 
works and can be relied upon as a security anthology for interested scholars. 
5.2 Hybrid Security Classification Approach to Attacks in 
WiMAX    
5.2.1 Summary 
WiMAX(World Wide Interoperability for Microwave Access) is a wireless com-
munication technology that provides the possibility of last mile wireless broad-
band access in order to replace cable and DSL. The end users have the possibility 
of using WiMAX as the primary connection medium for benefiting from services 
like VoIP connections, on-demand video screening and mobile banking transac-
tions. Overall most of the WiMAX-related research has been concentrated on 
physical and MAC layers; from the beginning there has been attention to security 
issues when it comes to WiMAX due to previous experiences like Wifi, but it 
requires to be further investigated. Numerous security problems should be miti-
gated in expected scenarios and for different types of users in the security stand-
ard of WiMAX. In this research work, a novel hybrid classification approach will 
be provided based on a new perspective. In this attempt vulnerabilities and threats 
are classified meticulously into two categories. In addition to this the criteria’s of 
evaluation are also two that is explained later. Also attacks are classified in four 
classes together with their sub branches. The attacks are each explained shortly. 
The important point is that those attacks which cannot be realized under real con-
ditions are omitted and not taken into account. This perspective has led into a less 
scattered and more concentrated investigation. 
There are many attacks which pose threats to WiMAX. Most of them affect the 
MAC layer because this layer is in charge of security issues. The focus will be 
mostly on the attacks associated with this layer. Many people in scientific com-
munity have tried their best to classify and categorize the attacks and security 
issues of WiMAX and even some of them are so complete but the thing is that 
many of those attack are just according to pure theoretical grounds and some of 
them cannot happen under any circumstances. The second thing is that other clas-
sification versions look so scattered and one cannot find an integration between 
them. The third point of being distinguishable is that by removing the absurd the-
oretical attacks and having an integrated approach, our version will be more com-
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prehendible and understandable even in a glance. In the same time maximum ef-
forts have been made in order not to neglect important posing threats and attacks. 
5.2.2 Objectives and Approaches  
The attacks are categorized according to their kind into many classes. The attacks 
are categorized in 4 classes. As a result of the lack of some attack namings, re-
spective names are coined with an arbitrary naming to boost the understandability 
of the dissertation. We classify the attacks based on the imposing risk to the sys-
tem as: Major and Minor. This categorization is carried out by focusing on two 
criteria’s: 
1) Probability of happening - This criteria implies the attack occurrence possibil-
ity being carried out by utilizing the faults and system susceptibilities. The attack 
is counted as unlikely to happen if its costly, serious hurdles are on the way, or 
the risk of becoming known is high. An attack is foreseen in case its related 
costs/risks for the attacker are low and there are no impediments regarding the 
attack. 
2) Effect on the system - This factor is a sign for the respective impact on the sys-
tem, if the attack would be a successful one. The attack is counted as having low 
effect in case it influences a few users, for a short- limited time. An intrusion is 
counted as having a considerable impact if it influences a huge number of users 
for a remarkable time duration and leads to provider’s financial or confidentiality 
loss for many users. 
5.2.3 Results 
The results of the classification and categorization of the author have been pre-
sented thoroughly, Based on author’s studies, the attacks which fell into the real-
izable category were collected and sorted out in four different groups which are 
also integrated in their nature and provide a better and more precise understanding 
of the subject. In addition to this in scenarios when the attack was scarce, we have 
coined new labels. Finally the last point is that the attacks are only judged as be-
ing “Major” or “Minor” like black and white and there is no categorization in 
between. The criteria’s of the classification are not something special or new and 
the author took these criteria’s also in the VoIP paper. 
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5.2.4 Contribution to the Research Area 
Nowadays, one can find research papers that have highlighted some of the securi-
ty flaws and vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.16. In this dissertation we have taken 
a hybrid classification approach so that the attacks are categorized in 4 classes 
together with their sub branches. In addition to this all of them are labeled in 
terms of severity and the risk which they impose, based on criteria’s as probabil-
ity of happening and the effect on the system. Furthermore, we evaluated briefly 
the characteristic of each attack. Finally our analysis made it clear that some at-
tacks cannot be performed against the standard whereas majority of them can 
cause minor harm to the network. 
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6 PERFORMANCE MEASURE OF SECURITY IN 
MOBILE WIMAX 
6.1 Kiyotaki-Moore Model Approach to Performance 
Devolution in Mobile WiMAX 
Mobile WiMAX is developed to meet the demand for personal broadband ser-
vices. Kiyotaki-Moore is an economic model that shows how small shocks to the 
economy might be amplified by certain factors, causing large output fluctuations. 
In this dissertation, we have taken a novel approach to the degradation of perfor-
mance in mobile WiMAX by applying this model. We have produced a small 
shock by accidentally increasing the number of simultaneous users and then ana-
lyzed the output explaining the meaningfulness and applicability of this model. In 
this dissertation the performance of mobile WiMAX under special circumstances 
has been investigated. The performance degradation of mobile WiMAX is ana-
lyzed according to the system parameters which are the number of simultaneous 
users per each channel, the fixed height of antenna plus the fixed distances be-
tween the BS and the MSs. Four scenarios have been conducted for running the 
experiments. NCTUns 6.0 has been selected for simulating the scenarios. This 
simulation program provides the real world environment with a complete set of 
equipment’s and application configurations. This simulation program has facili-
tated the process of setting up a network and running the analysis and experi-
ments. In order to achieve the research target, four mobile WiMAX scenarios 
have been designed to simulate mobile WiMAX topology. 
Objectives and Approaches 
The objective was set to analyze and investigate the performance of mobile Wi-
MAX under the condition of increasing the number of simultaneous users being 
increased at once. For this purpose and obtaining reliable results, an economic 
theory has been deployed to define and explain the occurred degradation which 
appears to the performance of the mobile WiMAX. A shock has been created and 
then analyzed the aftermath. Moreover it was observed that as the number of us-
ers increases the performance faces a logical decrease. 
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6.1.2 Results 
NCTUns provides the possibility for configuring the network topologies and pa-
rameters, surveillance of traffic flows, and gathering statistics about a simulated 
network (Chin-Liang Wang 2010; R. B. Ramle et al. 2010).  
Table 2. Simulation parameters 
Parameters Values 
Frequency Bandwidth 5 MHz 
Modulation Type OFDM-QPSK 
Length of the Frame 5ms 
Simulation Time 100s 
Routing Protocol OSDV 
Mean Length of Packet 1024 bytes 
Number of Nodes Scenario-based 
 
Table 2 shows the simulation parameters. As one can see in Figure 27 the pa-
rameters are set to ensure a standard test condition. The frequency bandwidth is 
fixed at 5 MHz. The length of frame is of 5ms. The simulation duration is circa 
100 seconds and the number of nodes is variable and based on scenarios defined 
through the process to make sure conditions do not interfere with the output. 
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Figure 27. Creating the shock by an increase in the number of simultaneous 
users 
In Figure 28, as one can observe, we have worked on the case where the number 
of simultaneous users have drastically increased. Therefore, by this way accord-
ing to Kiyotaki-Moore model we have designed a small shock to the WiMAX 
network and as one can see the simulation results this small shock has led to a 
decrease of average data rate and finally resulted in a visible decline when it 
comes to the performance of the mobile WiMAX network. Therefore when the 
height of the base station and the distance between the BS and MS’s are fixed at 
values of 25 meters and 1000 meters respectively, then if the number of simulta-
neous users is continuously increasing, the performance of the WiMAX network 
faces a decline. 
The performance decline of Mobile WiMAX is analyzed according to the system 
parameters which are the number of simultaneous users per each channel, and the 
height of antenna. We have conducted 4 scenarios for running the experiments. 
NCTUns 6.0 has been selected for simulating the scenarios. This simulation pro-
gram provides the real world environment with a complete set of equipment’s and 
application configurations. This simulation program has facilitated the process of 
setting up a network and running the analysis and experiments. In order to 
achieve the research target, four mobile WiMAX scenarios have been designed to 
simulate mobile WiMAX topology. The scenarios can be seen listed in Table 3. 
There are four MSs used in this simulation and then the number has been in-
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creased to forty MSs for creating the required small shock. It is to be mentioned 
that all the MSs are connected to one BS. The distance between the BS node and 
MS nodes is a fixed value of 1000 meters. In each of the scenarios, the number of 
the simultaneous users per channel has been increased by 20. 
After running the test with the before mentioned parameters and values, we got 
the following results as shown in Figure 28: 
Table 3. Simulation settings and outcomes 
No Scenario Base Station 
Height 
Number of Simulta-
neous Users per 
Channel 
Average Data Rate 
bits/second 
Scenario 1 25 40 848 
Scenario 2 25 60 842.78 
Scenario 3 25 80 837.98 
Scenario 4 25 100 832.78 
 
 
Figure 28. Performance decline of mobile WiMAX (x axis: number of simulta-
neous users per channel; y axis: average data rate) 
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In this economic model, by considering some factors a small shock to the econo-
my can cause a large amount of fluctuations in the output of the system. The Ki-
yotaki-Moore model can be observed in Figure 29 as follows: 
 
 
Figure 29. Kiyotaki-Moore Model (N. Kiyotaki et al. 1997) 
WiMAX technology can be affected by various issues like the distance from the 
base station, environmental effects and many others (A.Vinel et al. 2011; Q. Ni et 
al. 2012; R.B. Ramle et al. 2010). In this dissertation we have analyzed the case 
when the numbers of simultaneous users have drastically increased. Hence, by 
this way based on Kiyotaki Moore model we have created a small shock to the 
WiMAX network and as one can see the simulation results this small shock has 
resulted in a sharp decrease of average data rate and eventually led to a visible 
decline when it comes to the performance of the mobile WiMAX network. This 
can be observed that when the height of the base station is fixed and the number 
of simultaneous users are constantly increasing, the performance of the WiMAX 
network faces a devolution. 
6.1.2 Contribution to the Research Area 
In this dissertation, we have presented the performance evaluation for mobile 
WiMAX utilizing the NCTUns 6.0 simulation program. The evaluation is deter-
mined based on the system parameters that are the height of BS and the number 
of simultaneous users. Eventually it can be observed that when the height of the 
base station is fixed and the numbers of simultaneous users are constantly increas-
ing, the performance of the WiMAX network faces a decline. Hence, by this way 
based on Kiyotaki-Moore model we have created a small shock to the WiMAX 
network and as one can see the simulation results this small shock has resulted in 
a sharp decrease of average data rate and finally led to a visible decline when it 
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comes to the performance. This research is restricted to the number of the simul-
taneous users. It has been mentioned that other parameters like the height of the 
BS and the distances between the BS and MS’s are fixed.  
6.2 WiMAX-based Energy Efficient Intrusion Detection 
System  
6.2.1 Summary 
After careful consideration of security problems of WiMAX network and based 
on the specification of the WiMAX itself, in this dissertation we have taken a 
novel approach to these issues by designing a WiMAX-based power efficient in-
trusion detection system that has better performance and is more efficient. Our 
investigations indicate that this intrusion detection system can provide both an 
acceptable application value and in the same time offers a less power consump-
tion alternative. An intrusion detection system (IDS) is usually a device or soft-
ware application which monitors network for malicious activities and produces 
reports to an administration unit. By utilizing IDS various systems try to stop an 
intrusion but because the nature of it, is a monitoring system, further capabilities 
can be added by combining it with other security tools like firewalls. Intrusion 
detection system warns and replies to rogue operations prior to attacks against 
computer network and system. As a result of the fact that security is an indispen-
sable part of a WiMAX network, a combination of the intrusion detection system 
and some policies can bring about a more reliable and efficient network. There-
fore an efficient version of a WiMAX-based intrusion detection system has been 
introduced. The proposed IDS block diagram is represented in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30. Proposed IDS Block Diagram 
6.2.1 Objectives and Approaches 
The initial objective has been nothing but a precise IDS capable of performing at 
high standards that is both efficient in terms of power and careful when it comes 
to processing and detection of any vulnerability based on a signature-based ap-
proach and SNORT-like (Snort 1998) deep packet inspection system. In detailed 
version of how everything works together with functional blocks have been de-
scribed in section 4.5 starting from page 69. The related power calculations are 
done based on appendix reference computing procedures. 
6.2.2 NS2 Technical simulation 
There are two separate rounds of simulations carried out in this specific domain. 
One is the simulations performed in NS2 simulator and the second is the simula-
tions completed in Toshiba consumption analyzer program. It is to be mentioned 
that primarily NS2 simulations will be investigated followed by the Toshiba con-
sumption analyzer related simulations. The associated technical simulation is car-
ried out by using the NS2 All-in-one 2.34 version. (Network Simulator) NS2 is a 
discrete event simulator for networking research. NS2 offers a considerable sup-
port for TCP simulation, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and wireless 
networks. NS2 does not offer WiMAX simulation by default. For the specific 
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targets and research goals of this dissertation the (Lightweight WiMAX Simula-
tor) LWX is utilized. LWX module is a NS2 802.16 simulation module (IEEE 
802.16 and IEEE 802.16j) designed for IEEE 802.16 researchers (Y. C. Lai et al. 
2009). The ultimate aim of LWX is to provide a flexible and complexity-free 
software architecture with respect to IEEE 802.16 simulator for the scholars. 
Therefore if one intends to deploy LWX, the NS2 has to be installed primarily. 
LWX offers 802.16 MAC functionalities with QoS, various modulation coding 
rates, and traffic relay supports chiefly utilized for bandwidth allocation and relay 
link selection related scenarios. In addition to this LWX offers many bandwidth 
allocation algorithms for 802.16 and 802.16j networks including strict priority 
and round robin bandwidth algorithms for fundamental 802.16 network and round 
robin bandwidth algorithm for 802.16j relay network. The LWX should be pasted 
in the main directory of the NS2 all-in-one 2.34. During this carried out research 
the chief target is the simulation of WiMAX performance in the downlink and 
uplink when the proposed IDS is deployed compared with when the IDS is not 
used. The following Table 4 demonstrates the simulation configurations: 
Table 4. NS2 simulation configuration 
Configurations Values 
Max Packet Size 2048 bytes 
Quality of Service 2 NS2 units 
Rmin 130 k-bytes 
Rmax 200 k-bytes 
Jitter 30 ms 
Lmax 60 ms 
Simulation Time 300 s 
Bandwidth Allocation Round Robin 
Radio Propagation Model Two-Ray Ground 
Network Interface Type Wireless Phy 
Routing Protocol AODV 
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Topology Size 250 NS2 units 
BS transmiter/receiver 5 Mbps 
 
In order to support QoS, the IEEE 802.16 MAC layer defines five service classes 
including Unsolicited Grant Service (UGS), Real-Time Polling Serves (rtPS), 
Extended Real-Time Polling Services (ertPS), Non-Real-Time Polling Services 
(nrtPS), and Best Effort (BE) (Y. C. Lai et al. 2009). Each service class has its 
specific QoS parameters being comprised of Maximum Sustained Traffic Rate ( 
Rmax ), Minimum Reserved Traffic Rate ( Rmin ), Maximum Latency ( Lmax ), 
Tolerated Jitter, and Traffic Priority. Rmax defines the peak rate in k-bytes, Rmin 
implies the minimal sustainable rate also in k-bytes, Lmax specifies the maximum 
latency between the ingress time of a packet to the MAC layer and the forwarding 
time to its air interface represented in ms and the jitter in ms as well. The simula-
tion time is set to be 300 seconds. BS transmitter and receiver has the throughput 
of 5 Mbps. NS2 has some default values which holds for normal WiMAX net-
works simulations especially in the case of jitter, latency and quality of service as 
shown above in Table 4. The bandwidth allocation has been selected to be round-
robin. The radio propagation model is opted to be two-ray ground. The routing 
protocol is AODV and the network topology size has been fixed at 250 units of 
NS2 simulator. During this simulation we intend to run a DoS attack by running 
50 FTP requests targeted at the base station which provides the services. There-
fore as one can see in Figure 31 the attack is run as follows: 
 
Figure 31. The screen shots represent all the fifty connection requests  
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Figure 31. The screen shots represent all the fifty connection requests 
As one can observe there is a list format having the structure of (x0/x1/ y0/y1). 
The first part that is comprised of x0 and x1 belongs to the source and y0 and y1 
is dedicated to the destination. Further on, x0 and y0 are node numbers and x1 
and y1 are the port numbers. It is to be mentioned that in NS2 usually node 0 is 
132      Acta Wasaensia 
 
 
the base station as it is also in our specific case. Furthermore node 1 and node 2 
represent the subscriber stations as in Figure 32 below. In our case the base sta-
tion is with x=15, y=15, z=0 NS2 unit coordinates and the subscriber stations are 
with x=17, y=17, z=0. The results of the simulations are stored in a file having the 
trace format regarded as “log.tr”. After running the simulation, result’s format can 
be observed in Figure 32: 
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Figure 32. The setup and screenshots of the simulation outcome in NS2 inter-
pretation format 
Due to the horizontal length of the results, they cannot fit the A4 page format and 
thus the continuance of the results are located after the first screenshot. The re-
sults continue much more until 300 seconds but as a result of the page limitations 
two screenshots are presented. In order to understand what specific NS2 acro-
nyms which are of interest to us represent, a small table is provided to facilitate a 
better interpretation of the outcomes as in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Specific NS2 acronym interpretations 
NS2 Result Acronyms Interpretation 
r receiver 
s sender 
-t time 
-Hs source 
-Hd destination 
-Ne energy level 
-Il packet size 
-Ii sequence number 
 
Now that the results of the simulation are completed and they are stored in a trace 
file, we intend to draw the graphs for demonstrating how the packets are flowing. 
In addition to this we target to show how the proposed IDS works and what is its 
specific impact on WiMAX network’s performance. In order to process and 
sketch the obtained results an analyzer programming code has been written in Perl 
language to facilitate the investigation and analysis respectively. What the code 
actually does is the fact that from the result list it takes the time and the amount of 
bytes being transmitted. Then it sums up all the Il’s which are all the packet sizes 
and further on divides the outcome of the summation by the covered time interval. 
The final result will be undoubtedly the speed. The written piece of code can be 
observed as follows: 
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Therefore after processing the results with this Perl program we get this in Figure 
33: 
 
 
Figure 33. The screenshots from processed results formatted for CSV transfer 
 
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Figure 33. The screenshots from processed results formatted for CSV transfer 
The CSV file format is structured like (x0; x1). As it can be observed the obtained 
results are put in CSV format to be able to transfer the resulted values there and 
then sketch the graphs for further evaluations and investigations. There will be 
totally six graphs. The first two graphs represent the WiMAX downlink having 
speed and time in their y and x axis respectively. There are two graphs because 
one represents the transmission speed having the proposed IDS and the other rep-
resents the downlink without having the IDS. Followed by these simulations there 
comes two graphs for the WiMAX uplink with the same specifications as just 
mentioned above. The final two graphs are dedicated to the simulation of the 
bandwidth so that the amount of packets replaced per time interval will be evalu-
ated. 
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Figure 34. The simulation result in case of WiMAX downlink without IDS hav-
ing programming bar calculations-part 1 
 
Figure 34. The simulation result in case of WiMAX downlink without IDS-part 
2 
In Figure 34 as it can be seen WiMAX downlink has been simulated in the IDS 
absence scenario. One can observe that the simulation starts with a visible trans-
mission speed increase (normal for network simulations) and scores some peaks 
and following that the network becomes stable with relatively constant fluctua-
tions until the simulation time ends. It is important to note that from 270th second 
because the simulation time is going to end the 50 connections, they start to close 
one by one and thus it is visible that there is a time interval until all connections 
stop completely.  
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Figure 35. The simulation result in case of WiMAX downlink with IDS having 
programming bar calculations-part 1 
 
Figure 35. The simulation result in case of WiMAX downlink with IDS-part 2 
In Figure 35 as it can be agreed WiMAX downlink has been the subject for simu-
lation but this time our proposed IDS has been utilized. One can see that the simu-
lation begins with a tangible transmission speed increase (normal for network 
simulations) and then records several peaks and following that the network be-
comes stable with nearly constant fluctuations until the proposed IDS detects the 
threat and abnormality of sending 50 FTP requests and blocks them. The red ar-
row indicates the moment when the attack is stopped. It is critical to highlight that 
at 237th second the IDS blocks the DoS attack and thus it does not let the WiMAX 
resources get wasted by the SS’s abnormal requests. It can be also mentioned that 
the proposed IDS in the case of WiMAX downlink blocks the attack 33 seconds 
earlier (compared with the downlink case without IDS) before the simulation time 
begins to end by closing the 50 connections one by one and thus it is visible that a 
specific amount of power has been saved here which will be calculated later on. 
 Acta Wasaensia     139 
 
 
  
 
Figure 36. The simulation result in case of WiMAX uplink without IDS having 
programming bar                                      calculations-part 1 
 
Figure 36. The simulation result in case of WiMAX uplink without IDS-part 2 
In Figure 36 one can take a look at the WiMAX uplink that has been the subject 
for simulation in case when the IDS is not deployed. One can agree that the simu-
lation begins with a considerable rate increase (normal for network simulations) 
and experiences numerous peaks and following that the network goes stable with 
constant fluctuations until the simulation time ends. It is essential to mention that 
from 270th second because the simulation time is going to end the 50 connections, 
they start to close one by one and thus it is visible that there is a time interval until 
all connections stop entirely.  
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Figure 37. The simulation result in case of WiMAX uplink with IDS having 
programming bar                                      calculations-part 1  
 
Figure 37. The simulation result in case of WiMAX uplink with IDS-part 2 
In Figure 37 as it can be observed WiMAX uplink has been simulated by NS2 but 
this time our proposed IDS has been used. It is clear that the simulation starts with 
a considerable pace increase (normal for network simulations) and then has many 
peaks and following that the network becomes stable with relatively constant 
fluctuations until the proposed IDS detects the attack of 50 FTP requests and 
blocks it. The red arrow indicates the moment when the attack is stopped. It is 
critical to point out that at 255th second the IDS blocks the DoS attack and there-
fore it does not let the WiMAX resources get wasted by the SS’s abnormal re-
quests. It can be also explained that the proposed IDS in the case of WiMAX up-
link blocks the attack 15 seconds earlier (compared with the uplink scenario with-
out IDS) before the simulation time goes to end by closing the 50 connections one 
by one and thus it is clear that a specific amount of power has been saved here 
which will be calculated later on. 
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Now we try to measure the efficiency level and finalize the evaluation. According 
to the (K. Gomez et al. 2012), a reference power consumption model has been 
proved accountable for specific wireless access networks including WiMAX. 
Each one is separately discussed and investigated. Therefore if traffic is generated 
using the Iperf traffic generator and then inserted into the WiMAX network 
through the BS and power consumption amount is measured by the “Watts Up?” 
power meter, then one can refer to this graph and chart for meticulous calcula-
tions.  
 
Figure 38. WiMAX power consumption and throughput per packet size (K. 
Gomez et al. 2012) 
“Watts Up?” is a “plug load” meter that measures the amount of electricity used 
by whatever electrical appliance is plugged into it. The meter incorporates digital 
electronics to perform accurate power consumption measurements. Such meas-
urements are then logged into the device’s internal memory with a granularity of 
0.1 W and a sampling period of 1 second. The “Watts Up?” meter is interconnect-
ed via its USB interface to the BS where a custom data logging software is de-
ployed for extracting the power consumption samples. Here we start to explain 
and calculate the amount of the power saved and therefore the efficiency ob-
tained. 
If one looks at the power consumption graph in Figure 38, it can be read that each 
packet with the associated size of 2816 from a WiMAX receiver that has 5 Mbps, 
consumes 16 W to be received. The data related to the BS transmitter of 5 Mbps 
in WiMAX power consumption graph is exactly the WiMAX downlink. The 
above graph together with the chart tells us that each packet with its specific size 
takes specific power in Watts to be transmitted successfully. What we do is that 
we calculate the average size of packets in case of with IDS and without IDS and 
further on multiply it by the amount of Watts they need to be transmitted. After 
this step in order to compute the amount of saved power (power efficiency), we 
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subtract the total power consumption in case of without IDS from the total power 
consumption in case of IDS presence.  
Therefore for WiMAX downlink we have: 
For the case without IDS the total number of packets are 21892. Further on the 
average packet size is 2104.83 and one can observe that based on the graph, each 
packet has consumed 16.9 W thus in total 369974.8 W has been consumed.  
For the case with IDS the total number of packets are 17721. Further on the aver-
age packet size is 1826.75 and one can observe that based on the graph, each 
packet has consumed 16.9 W thus in total 299484.9 W has been consumed.  
  369974.8 - 299484.9 = 70489.9 W                 Amount of saved power 
Thus one can demonstrate that by doing a subtraction when it comes to the total 
consumption of without IDS and with IDS the amount of saved power and there-
fore efficiency obtained is calculated respectively. 
Here we come to the WiMAX uplink so we have: 
For the case without IDS the total number of packets are 18192. Further on the 
average packet size is 1039.08 and one can observe that based on the graph, each 
packet has consumed 16 W thus in total 291072 W has been consumed.  
For the case with IDS the total number of packets are 14492. Further on the aver-
age packet size is 1049.86 and one can observe that based on the graph, each 
packet has consumed 16 W thus in total 231872 W has been consumed.  
 
  291072 - 231872= 59200 W     Amount of saved power 
Therefore one can show that by doing a subtraction when it comes to the total 
consumption of without IDS and with IDS the amount of saved power and there-
fore efficiency obtained is calculated relatively. One can draw a conclusion that 
the proposed IDS can bring about some power savings and thus it can make the 
WiMAX network more efficient especially when the network should deal with 
threats, attacks and abnormalities. 
For sketching the bandwidth graphs with and without IDS we have to write an-
other analyzer program in Perl because in this case we want to deal with the 
bandwidth and the amount of data that is being transferred. For this target the fol-
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lowing bandwidth analyzer program has been written in Perl language which can 
be observed as follows: 
 
After processing the results and sketching the CSV file we get the following from 
the bandwidth graph in case of not having the proposed IDS as follows: 
 
Figure 39. The simulation result in case of WiMAX bandwidth without IDS 
having programming bar calculations-part 1 
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Figure 39. The simulation result in case of WiMAX bandwidth without IDS-
part 2 
In Figure 39 one can see that the WiMAX bandwidth has been the subject for 
simulation in case when the IDS is not deployed. One can interpret that the simu-
lation begins with a considerable speed increase (normal for network simulations) 
and records several peaks and following that the network becomes stable with 
constant fluctuations until the simulation time ends. It is important to state that 
from 250th second because the simulation time is going to end the 50 connections, 
they start to close one by one and thus it can be viewed that there is a specific 
time interval until all connections stop altogether.  
 
 
Figure 40. The simulation result in case of WiMAX bandwidth with IDS having 
programming bar calculations-part 1 
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Figure 41. The simulation result in case of WiMAX bandwidth with IDS-part 2 
In Figure 40 as it can be viewed WiMAX bandwidth has been simulated by NS2 
but this time our proposed IDS has been utilized. It is understandable that the 
simulation starts with a considerable rate increase (normal for network simula-
tions) and then has many peaks and following that the network goes stable with 
nearly constant fluctuations until the proposed IDS detects the attack of 50 FTP 
requests and blocks it. The red arrow indicates the moment when the attack is 
stopped. It is important to declare that at 221th second the IDS blocks the DoS 
attack and thus it does not permit the WiMAX resources get wasted by the SS’s 
abnormal requests. It can be also explained that the proposed IDS in the case of 
WiMAX bandwidth blocks the attack 29 seconds earlier (compared with the 
bandwidth scenario without IDS) prior to when the simulation time goes to end 
by closing the 50 connections one by one and thus it is clear that a specific 
amount of power has been saved here. 
6.2.4 Toshiba Consumption Analyzer Technical Simulations 
WiMAX technology provides high-speed connection for internet and data trans-
mission within a cell radius of as far as 50 km (P. Trimintzios et al. 2010). This 
itself describes the importance of power for transmission to remote distances. 
Even though IDS makes the WiMAX network become more secure, but consider-
ing the realities of WiMAX, in case our IDS would diminish the overall perfor-
mance of the WiMAX network, then IDS would not be valuable from an evalua-
tion perspective. The test conditions were two computers, one simulates the Wi-
MAX network, the other executes IDS, and two computers have identical settings 
as follows: 3 GHz dual-core Intel Pentium CPU, 4 GB memory, hard drive speed 
is 7200 rls, operating system is Windows 2003. As it can be observed the reading 
and writing time with and without IDS are presented in Figure 41.   
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Figure 42. Reading and writing time with and without IDS 
 
In Figure 41, the x-coordinate shows the data size, the unit is MB. On the other 
hand y-coordinate denotes the reading and writing time, and the unit is second. 
Figure 40 implies that the reading and writing time with IDS is only a little more 
than without IDS, the more size is fundamentally stable. The experimental result 
indicate that, in the case of improving the security of WiMAX network, a small 
decrease of disk reading and writing capability is negligible. 
During the test procedures and once the power consumption of the system by 
Toshiba consumption analyzer were seen with the proposed IDS and without it, it 
has been  interestingly found that the power consumption is slightly lower with 
IDS in comparison with the case without it. This result comes in normal network 
load. In addition to this, the VMware software has been utilized for the simulation 
of the two systems. It should be mentioned that by an investigation of fluctuations 
of the consumption one can observe that when it comes to normal circumstances 
in the network, the power consumption under the IDS mode is slightly better. 
This is the result of the application of numerous integrations performed during the 
design process which would lead to less utilization of power and more efficiency. 
Unlike Matlab, the Toshiba consumption analyzer does not provide the possibility 
to put both results in one plot. For the sake of having a better picture and a more 
accurate understanding the two results are put into one plot for analysis using the 
mapping technique. Thus if one draws a virtual line in between the two obtained 
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results and locate markers and points in peak and lowest values, then it can be 
clearly identified even with open eyes that the average value of the highest and 
lowest values are slightly upper in case of having no IDS in the network whereas 
in case of having the IDS this represents a lower values and therefore it implies 
having a lower consumption. Figure 42 represents the power consumption with-
out and with the proposed IDS. 
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Figure 43. Power consumption of simulating system without and with IDS 
6.2.5 Contribution to the Research Area 
With the increasing demand for application of WiMAX, the related research on 
the security aspects of the new generation of mobile wireless networks will rise. 
As a result of the existing security problems of WiMAX network, intrusion detec-
tion system can be counted as an effective security countermeasure. It provides 
many advantages and plays an important role. This dissertation designs and pro-
poses a WiMAX-based intrusion detection system by defining technical opera-
tions in seven units being: WiMAX security analysis unit, WiMAX attack data-
base unit, detection unit, intrusion detection unit, backup and storage unit, system 
management unit and response unit. Besides bringing about more security to the 
WiMAX network, the final result leads to a less power consumption alternative as 
the outcome of the simulations carried out by NS2 and Toshiba Consumption 
Analyzer demonstrated and thus this proves the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the proposed IDS. For simulation model conformance verification of WiMAX 
designs and characteristics in this dissertation some two algorithms are utilized 
based on (S. I. Al-Akhras et al. 2013). Due to the fact that it is beyond the scope 
to explain the verification details, the algorithms are available in the appendix and 
for details of how it was carried out, the above research work should be referred.   
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 General outcomes 
Even the primary versions of WiMAX, were more secure than (Wireless Fidelity) 
WiFi. The most recent version of WiMAX, IEEE 802.16e came up and settled 
down the issues (J. G. Andrews et al. 2007). For fixing the security problems data 
integrity mechanisms, reciprocal two-way authentication, and AES-CCM were 
added to address the issues as efficient solutions.  
Based on all security issues which were investigated in their relevant chapters, if 
one wants to provide an outline of the security issues, attacks and vulnerabilities 
including physical ones, they can be briefly explained as follows: 
Physical layer attacks: 
As mentioned previously, the security of 802.16 is designed at the layer 2 of the 
stack model, therefore the physical layer may be subject to the harms. As a result 
of the fact that there is always a threat to the radio networks, 802.16 is vulnerable 
when it comes to DoS and jamming. An intruder can utilize a well-configured 
radio station for launching jamming attacks.  
This also existed in WiFi but the vulnerability and harm is much higher in Wi-
MAX because of a larger scale coverage and thus affecting more users at a time. 
Through adding to the power of signals by using high gain transmission antennas 
or increasing the bandwidth utilizing spreading techniques one can fight against 
the jamming attack. What can be visibly sensed is that even the designers are not 
paying much attention to the physical threats and these threats are just on the pa-
per. 
MAC Layer attacks: 
As discussed even though physical layer attacks are existing, they are not consid-
ered as important as attacks on the MAC layer of WiMAX. On the other hand, 
MAC layer attacks should be taken seriously because they can cause serious 
harms to clients and ISP’s. Thus some of these attacks can be mentioned as fol-
lows: 
Replay attacks – as noted above, once WiMAX was having an authentication in 
one direction where base station authenticates the subscriber stations. This is why 
replay attacks happen because the subscriber station would be subject to harms. In 
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WiMAX, a well-situated intruder can locate between a base station and a number 
of subscriber station’s and by setting a fake base station to impersonate as being 
the real base station.  
Authentication Key (AK) - The AK suffers from many security flaws, First of all 
the generated keys are not random, therefore this itself questions the credibility of 
it. Now if the random number generator has bias problems the outcome would be 
a reduced key space for AKs that leads to compromised TEKs for subscriber sta-
tion’s connected to base stations.  
In addition to this, the protocol defines a bilateral relation among a SS’s MAC 
address and the key pair certified to deploy by that subscriber station. This will 
result to confusions and problems. Therefore in case an intruder can get the pri-
vate key for a public machine, they can obtain the AK for future unauthorized 
access from that specific machine because knowing the private key, they can pro-
ceed with a successful authentication and thus gain access without being author-
ized. Traffic Encryption Keys (TEK) - TEKs are re-keyable. The space for rekey-
ing is 2-bits wide, causing the TEKs to wrap every forth rekeying. This limited 
keying space and the use of sequence number instead of RNG make the protocol 
more vulnerable to replay attacks. The TEK also suffers from the lack of clear 
definition of ‘randomness’ that the AK suffers from (Mohammed El-Gammal, 
2010). Data packets encryption - TEK has 56 bit DES keys which makes it less 
secure than AES protected packets.  Moreover, MAC header of the packets are 
not encrypted for routing to happen smoother. When it comes to TEK encryption, 
data packets remain without protection. Finally X.509 does not provide any solu-
tion for handling the revocation of certificate if private key falls in wrong hands.  
This dissertation has worked on past and present security problems of IEEE 
802.16 and listed and explained all of them in a classified way. Efforts have been 
made to explain the security threat primarily and then separately provide the solu-
tion afterwards. Further on several investigations and analysis of the threats and 
security weaknesses have been carried out respectively and the detailed descrip-
tions can be followed in chapter four. In addition to this security issues of the 
LTE have been addressed and up-to-dated countermeasures and respective miti-
gation techniques have been provided. Some comparisons between WiMAX and 
other alternative wireless access networks such as LTE and WiFi have been per-
formed as well. The dissertation has provided an alternative IDS based on Wi-
MAX for detection and prevention against security vulnerabilities within Wi-
MAX that can be referred to in Figure 15 and Figure 16. It has been tried to 
demonstrate via NS2/Toshiba simulations, how it works and what advantages it 
can offer like being more power efficient than the previous available alternative. 
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Moreover, this dissertation worked on the general security threats when it comes 
to VoIP together with WiMAX specific security issues while VoIP services are 
being offered under the WiMAX framework. The classification and modeling 
provided can be observed in Figure 18.  
7.2 Results of This Dissertation  
To be brief, WiMAX, like other technologies does have many flaws, security 
breaches and vulnerabilities. This technology can become even more widespread 
if its security would be warrantied and meticulous measures would be taken care 
of. This dissertation carried out a security centric analysis listing the security ba-
sics of WiMAX and LTE together with a scientific comparison with other wire-
less access technologies like WiFi. In this process the architecture of WiMAX, 
security of the standard, its security elements together with the respective attacks 
and threats were covered, modeled and classified. This dissertation proposed an 
alternative classification model and analysis of WiMAX security attacks and as 
WiMAX is counted among next generation networks (4G) and many services are 
provided under its framework, VoIP service general threats and WiMAX specific 
security issues together with means of secure communication are modeled and 
classified respectively. As a result of the fact that maintaining the security and 
increasing the number of users affects the performance of a wireless access net-
work such as WiMAX, this degradation was described by the Kiyotaki-Moore 
model. In addition to this, as a countermeasure to the threats, a power efficient 
WiMAX-based intrusion detection system was proposed. The NS2 simulations 
together with Toshiba Consumption Analyzer simulations were carried out in 
scenarios including WiMAX downlink, WiMAX uplink and WiMAX bandwidth. 
In each specific case the outcomes were compared when IDS were deployed and 
when it were not. Indeed some power savings were obtained. Then the efficiency 
related calculations were performed to demonstrate that this proposed IDS can 
make a difference.   
7.3 The usage of the Results of this Dissertation 
The results of this dissertation can be deployed for obtaining more secure systems 
that will fulfill the criteria’s set for a wireless access network including WiMAX. 
This has been done by classifying and modeling the security attacks and threats 
caused by bugs and breaches in the wireless access systems. Therefore two mod-
ellings and classifications have been carried out in case of attacks in WiMAX and 
security threats while VoIP services are provided under the WiMAX framework. 
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The required security countermeasures and ways of mitigation are mentioned 
where possible. This dissertation will also increase the awareness of the impact of 
the security to the performance and trust of the users and hopefully results in 
more reliable systems in the future. With the proposed IDS, it is possible to check 
the packets with respect to format and essential criteria’s to detect and mitigate 
the attacks in early stages. Therefore, it is possible to investigate some likely sce-
narios when security attacks escalate. In this case, one can test the proposed IDS 
system to stop the intrusion. 
This dissertation has also a significant impact on research methodology in par-
ticular implying that especially security has been the factor which has been under 
scrutiny. The proposed IDS can be implemented and even go further for industri-
alization. The IDS can detect early signs of security threats. Analyze it and take 
decisions. Also the attack behaviors can be stored so that it would be prevented in 
case it happens again. This provides a mechanism to protect the system against 
intruders having bad intentions and motivations.  
7.4 Future Work 
As it was observed throughout the dissertation, the major concentration was de-
voted to security in WiMAX framework. Having considered all the technical 
points mentioned earlier, Mobile WiMAX, the ultimate standard for WiMAX 
already provides remarkable security enhancements over IEEE 802.16. It basical-
ly deploys more reliable encryption techniques and holds an extra secure key 
management protocol. In addition to this, it has a novel authentication technique 
that is according to Extensible Authentication protocol (EAP). However there are 
still several security breaches to be addressed. A serious attention should be paid 
to authentication and authorization because they are the bedrock of security when 
it comes to wireless technology.  
Therefore future work should deal with authentication and authorization of IEEE 
802.16e more than other factors. The following research questions can be ideally 
addressed in future studies: 
1) What are the major authentication and authorization features in Mobile Wi-
MAX? 
2) Which are the existing security breaches threatening the authentication and 
authorization in Mobile WiMAX? 
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3) What are the comprehensive security solutions to address the issues in such a 
way that the efficiency would also be preserved? 
4) What measures should be taken to enhance the level of security and in the 
same time maintain the integrity and reliability? 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. Power Measurements and Power Calculations of 802.16 WiMAX 
OFDMA 
A typical TDD WiMAX signal is not continuous, but has a burst structure. The 
follo-wing figure shows the power versus time graph of a WiMAX signal. 
 
Figure 1: Power vs. time graph of a WiMAX signal [1] 
The start of every downlink frame is the preamble followed by the frame control 
header (FCH) / burst. The preamble, used for synchronisation, contains BPSK-
modulated carriers and is one OFDMA symbol long. It is power boosted and the 
level is a few dB higher than the level of the following data burst [2]. 
As an example the following signal parameters are assumed for all the measure-
ments described and all figures in this application note: 
- WiBro DL signal (OFDMA) 
- 1 PUSC zone with 30 symbol and all subchannels used 
- 16 QAM1/2 modulation 
- 1 segment, #0 used 
- Total frame length 5 ms 
- FFT size, NFFT = 1024 carriers 
Within the WiMAX application firmware R    FSx-K93 there are two tables 
which show all important parameters at a glance and thus help you to optimize 
your system. Beside EVM, RSSI, CINR, IQ constellation,… different power pa-
rameters of WiMAX signals are calculated. The first table ‘List 1’ shows the re-
sults of power measurement in time domain (TD) (see section 2). On the second 
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table ‘List 2’ you can see the results of power measurement in frequency domain 
(FD) (see section 3). 
 
Figure 2: This list shows the power of certain parts of the  signal measured in 
time domain: TD power DL preamble, TD power subframe and TD 
power zone. 
 
Figure 3: This list displays power values measured in frequency domain: pow-
er DL preamble, power data and pilots, power data and power pilots. 
WiMAX – Time Domain Power Measurement 
This section describes typical time domain measurements on a WiMAX OFDMA 
signal in spectrum analyzer mode. 
Settings 
The time domain power parameters of a WiMAX signal as displayed in ‘List 1’ 
(figure 2) can be easily measured with a spectrum analyzer using the time domain 
power function. This function is a stan-dard measurement function of R&S spec-
trum analyzers (‘Meas’ softkey M ‘Time  Domain Power Function’). To make a 
correct measurement the resolution bandwidth (RBW) of the spectrum analyzer 
has to be wider than the bandwidth of the RF signal [1]. For an optimum meas-
urement result you have to switch on the RMS detector. Then you can use the 
limit lines to evaluate the power in certain areas of the burst (e.g. in the preamble 
and the data part). 
Measurement using a Spectrum Analyzer 
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The figure below shows the measurement of the TD Power DL Preamble. The 
measured value correla-tes with the one in ‘List 1’ (figure 2). 
Figure 4: Time Domain measurement – TD Power DL Preamble 
Between the other two TD Power parameters, measured in figure 5, and the val-
ues of ‘List 1’ there is also a good correlation: 
‘List 1’ (figure 2)  TD power measurement TD Power DL Preamble - 8.74 
dBm - 8.70 dBm (figure 4) 
TD Power Subframe -12.38 dBm -12.38 dBm (figure 5, left) TD 
Power Zone -12.56 dBm -12.54 dBm (figure 5, right) 
The inconvenience of this measurement method is that the limits for the burst 
power measurement need to be set manually. For the determination of TD Power 
DL Preamble only the preamble part of the WiMAX frame (see figure 1 preamble 
part) is measured. The measurement range of TD Power Subframe includes the 
preamble and FCH/burst part of figure 1, the measurement range of TD Power 
Zone includes only the FCH/burst part. 
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Fig-
ure 5:  Time Domain measure-
ment – left: TD Power Subframe, right: TD Power Zone 
WiMAX – Frequency Domain Power Measurement 
This section describes the calculation of the boosting factors and the mathemati-
cal relations of the power parameters in frequency domain and in time domain. 
Boosting Factor 
All constellations (BPSK, QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM) in the diagram are normal-
ized to achieve equal average power, e.g. QPSK data is normalized by multiply-
ing the constellation point with c = 1/O2. According to standard [16-2004] the 
subcarriers are boosted by the factor 2(1/2-wk) compliant with the subcarrier in-
dex k and with wk  = {0,1}. For QPSK modulated data you obtain (figure 6): 
Re{data,QPSK} = 1/rad2 * 2(1/2-wk) = rad2 * (1/2-wk) Im{data,QPSK} = 1/rad2 * 2(1/2-wk) = rad2 * (1/2-
wk). 
The pilot carriers within the symbol and the preamble are BPSK modulated. Thus 
the imaginary part is not necessary and only the real part in the IQ domain is 
boosted. The pilot carriers within the symbol are boosted according to [16-2004] 
equation 135: 
Re{pilot} = 8/3*(1/2-wk) = 4/3 * 2(1/2-wk) Im{pilot} = 0. 
The power of the pilots (with wk = {0,1}) is Re{pilot}max = 4/3 and in log 
scale 20 * log (4/3) = 2.5 dB 
above the data subcarrier power level i.e. the pilots are power boosted by 
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2.5 dB. This is a fixed value for all permutations except UL PUSC (partial usage 
of subchannels), UL Ranging and DL FUSC (full usage of subchannels). For 
those permutations the boosting factor for the pilots is 0 dB (figure 6). 
The carriers in the downlink preamble are boosted according to [16- 2004] 
equation 136: 
Re{preamble} = 4*rad2 *(1/2-wk) = 2*rad2 * 2(1/2-wk) Im{preamble} = 0. 
Consequently the boosting factor of the preamble amounts to Re{preamble}max 
= 2*rad2 and in log scale 
20 * log (2*rad2) = 9.0 dB. 
 
Figure 6: Modulation Symbol Power – Modulation and boosting factor of 
QPSK data, preamble and pilots 
When not all subchannels are used within the first DL PUSC zone, zone boosting 
is applied (acccording to [16e-2005] section ‘8.4.9.6 Zone boosting’) and thus the 
data and pilot subcarriers in the corresponding zone are boosted. The subcarrier 
level of the zone is increased as follows: 
10 * log(Nuseful / Nallowed) 
Nuseful – all useful subcarriers (of all subchannels) depending on permutation 
scheme (according to [16e-2005] Table 310x) and excluding DC subcarrier 
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Nallowed – subcarriers of the selected subchannels (that are allowed to be used in 
the zone) 
The following equations summarize the relations for the boosting factors in fre-
quency domain: 
Boosting: 
PFD,Preamble PFD,Preamble = 9 dB + PFD,Data (all subchannels used) (1) 
  = 9 dB + PFD,Data + 10 * log(Nuseful / Nallowed) 
PFD,Pilot   (limited usage of subchannels)  (2) 
  = 2.5 dB + PFD,Data -3 
where PFD,Preamble is the power level of the preamble in frequency domain, PFD,Data of 
the data, and PFD,Pilot of the pilots. 
 
Figure 7: Constellation diagram of a WiMAX OFDMA signal with a QPSK mod-
ulated data burst. The pilots are BPSK modulated. As they are power boosted 
they do not correspond with the indicated BPSK constel-lation points. 
There is only one parameter of ‘List 2’ (figure 3) that has not been explained yet: 
the power value for data and pilots in frequency domain PFD,Data/Pilots. It can be cal-
culated from PFD,Data and PFD,Pilot as follows: 
 
For this calculation the power must be noted in mW. The number of data carriers 
NData and pilot carriers NPilot depends on the FFT size and the permutation 
scheme and is defined in the standard [16e-2005] Table 310. For an example 
please refer to section 5 in this application note. 
PFD,Data/Pilots[mW] = (NData * PFD,Data[mW] + NPilot * PFD,Pilot[mW]) / (NData + NPilot) (4) 
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Mathematical Relations Time Domain / Frequency Domain 
Beside measuring the preamble power in time domain PTD,Preamble you can also cal-
culate this value from the preamble power in frequency domain PFD,Preamble: 
 
 
The number of preamble carriers used Nused,Preamble depends on the number of used 
segments. The DL supports up to three segments. A segment is a subdivision of 
the available OFDMA subchannels (one segment may include all sub-channels). 
As previously mentioned the transmission begins with a preamble. Further to syn-
chronisation the preamble indicates which of the three segments of the zone are 
used. Therefore the preamble subcarriers are divided into three carrier-sets. Carri-
ers 0,3,6… indicate that seg-ment 0 is to be used, carriers 1,4,7,.. indicate that 
segment 1 is to be used, and carriers 2,5,8,… indicate that segment 3 is to be 
used. For every active segment a third of the carriers is used: 
Nused,Preamble = Navail_p * Nsegments /3 
The number of subcarriers available for the preamble symbol Navail_p depends 
on the FFT size NFFT and the number of guard carriers Nguard_p: 
Navail_p = NFFT – Nguard_p  
The number of guard carriers Nguard_p can be found in the standard [16e- 2005] 
section ‘8.4.6.1.1 Pream-ble’. 
A similar equation is valid for the zone power PTD,Zone of a WiMAX signal:  
 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the relation of both lists displayed in the application firmware 
FSx-K93 in brief. The numbers signify the associated equation: 
 
Figure 8: Relation of the parameters displayed in ‘List 1’ and ‘List 2’ 
Frequency Domain Time Domain 
(1) Power DL preamble (5) TD power DL preamble 
(2) Power data and pilots TD power subframe 
Power data (6) TD power zone 
Power pilots (3) 
PTD,Zone = 10 * log( (Nuseful + 1) /NFFT) + PFD,Data/Pilots (6) 
PTD,Preamble = 10 * log(Nused,Preamble/NFFT) + PFD,Preamble (5) 
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OFMDA Calculation Example 
The following example shows how to calculate the main power parameter of an 
OFDMA system signal. As mentioned in the first section we have a 1024-FFT 
OFDMA downlink PUSC signal with one segment and all sub-channels used. 
Values according to standard 
Based on the defined signal there are some fix parameters specified in the stand-
ard [16e-2005]. The num-ber of pilots, data, and guard subcarriers varies for dif-
ferent sub-channelization schemes. The values below are valid for a WiMAX 
1024-FFT OFDMA DL PUSC signal (according to standard [16e-2005] Ta-ble 
310a, page 528): 
Nused = 841 (incl. DC subcarrier) NData = 720 
NPilot = 120 
For the preamble symbol there will be 86 guard band subcarriers on both sides of 
the spectrum (accord-ing to standard [16e-2005] section ‘8.4.6.1.1 Preamble’): 
Navail_p = NFFT – Nguard_p = 1024 – 86*2 = 852 
In our example only one segment is used and thus only a third of all preamble 
carriers: 
Nused,Preamble = Navail_p * Nsegments /3 = 852 * 1/3 = 284 
Frequency Domain Power Calculation 
The power of the data carriers in frequency domain PFD,Data is given in ‘List 2’ 
and necessary to calculate the other power parameters: 
PFD,Data = -12.17 dBm (‘List 2’: Power Data) 
The WiMAX signal uses all subchannels. Thus zone boosting is  not applied and 
the power of the pream-ble (according to formula (1)) and the power of the pilots 
(according to formula (3)) result in: 
PFD,Preamble = 9.03 dB – 12.17 dBm = -3.14 dBm (‘List 2’: Power DL Preamble = -
3.16 dBm) 
 Acta Wasaensia     173 
 
 
  
PFD,Pilot = 2.49 dB – 12.17 dBm = -9.68 dBm (‘List 2’: Power Pilots = -9.68 dBm) 
The power of data and pilots PFD,Data/Pilots is calculated as follows (according 
to formula (4)): 
PFD,Data = -12.17 dBm ^= 0.061 mW 
PFD,Pilot = -9.68 dBm ^= 0.108 mW 
PFD,Data/Pilots = 0.067 mW ^= -11.71 dBm (’List 2’: Power Data and Pilots = - 
11.71 dBm) 
Additional example: 
If you have a signal with limited usage of subchannels (e.g. only 20 of 30 sub-
chan-nels used) zone boosting is applied. In this case 560 subcarriers are useful 
(Nuseful = (841–1)*20/30 = 560) and 840 are allowed (Nallowed = 841–1). Thus 
the difference between PFD,Preamble and PFD,Data is 7.27 dB (9.03 dB + 10 * 
log( 560/ 840)) instead of 9 dB. 
Time Domain Power Calculation 
According to formula (5) the power of the DL preamble is: 
PTD,Preamble  = -3.16 dBm + 10 * log(284/1024) = -8.73 dBm (‘List 1’: TD Power 
DL Preamble = -8.74 dBm) 
and the time domain power of the zone (according to formula (6)): 
PTD,Zone = -11.71 dBm + 10 * log(841/1024) = -12.56 dBm (’List 1’: TD 
Power Zone = -12.56 dBm) 
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